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In three complementary essays, this dissertation analyzes the causes of violent conflict and
the impact of third-party interventions that seek to reduce violence and generate post-conflict
political stability. In the first essay, I analyze how regimes in fragile states cultivate strong
but loyal armies. Drawing on an original survey conducted with members of the Congolese
army operating in North Kivu, the largest operational theater in the Democratic Republic
of Congo and the epicenter of one of the most violent conflicts in Africa, I show that regime
elites withhold payments in order to distinguish loyalty and evidence that this screening
strategy drives high levels of civilian abuse. In the second essay, I assess the impact of “Eyes
on Darfur”, the first-ever satellite intervention implemented by Amnesty International USA
amidst a brutal genocide with the objective of reducing violence. Using a high-frequency,
sub-national dataset on genocidal violence, I show that this intervention resulted in perni-
cious and persistent effects: monitored areas experienced increases in violence during the
program as well as in subsequent years, as did neighboring areas. In the third essay, and
in collaboration with Lauren Young, we assess how peacekeepers cultivate cooperation with
local populations in Haiti. Using a novel survey, we find that exposure to security and re-
lief activities are associated with increases in cooperation whereas exposure to peacekeeper
abuse undermines cooperative behavior. Together, these essays articulate a set of causes
for violence against civilians rooted in the political economy of state institutions, analyze
how human rights interventions are mediated by the underlying institutional dynamics in
the countries in which they are launched, and examine how keeping the peace stems from
altering the cooperative incentives local populations face.
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1.1 Introduction
In the second half of the 20th century, an estimated 3.3 million individuals died from
battlefield deaths in 25 interstate wars and a staggering 16.2 million died from 127 civil
wars (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The ravaging effects of war are not tidily confined to days
of active conflict: war exacts profound tolls on long-term death and disability rates within
countries (Ghobarah, Huth and Russett, 2003), stunts the economic well-being of states (Col-
lier, 1999), and reshapes social institutions and cooperative behavior (Bellows and Miguel,
2009; Blattman, 2009). Understanding the causes of conflict has remained a core objective of
social scientists across all fields (Mead, 1940; Oberschall, 1978; Pinker, 2011; Blattman and
Miguel, 2010; Valentino, 2014). Appropriately, this has been matched by a rich literature
that analyzes the effect of interventions conducted by the international community to reduce
violent conflict. Scholars have examined the impact of United Nations peacekeeping opera-
tions on conflict (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2008), the ways in which international
criminal prosecutions shapes incentives for violence (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003; Jo and
Simmons, 2014), the effect of sanctions on war (Gershenson, 2002; Hultman and Peksen,
2015), and whether human rights campaigns prevent further violence (Keck and Sikkink,
1998; Rise, Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, 1999; Krain, 2005). Yet, conflict persists and the
international community continues to launch interventions that aim to prevent and mitigate
the impact of conflict.
This dissertation builds upon a scholarly line of inquiry that recognizes the central im-
portance of violent conflict and marshals new evidence that aids in understanding the causes
of violence against civilians during conflict and the impact of third-party interventions that
seek to reduce violence. In a complementary set of three essays, I trace the arc of violent
conflict and analyze the institutional causes of violence, the ways in which human rights
monitoring reshapes the strategic dynamics between warring parties during conflict, and the
potential for peacekeeping to stabilize post-conflict countries. In the first essay of my disser-
tation, I examine how leaders in weak institutional contexts use novel screening strategies
to manage the age-old problem of building loyal armies through a case study in the East-
ern Democratic Republic of Congo, and demonstrate that these strategies generate violence
against civilians. In the second essay, I analyze how new technologies can be used to re-
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duce state incentives to abuse civilians during conflict and show that the first-ever satellite
monitoring intervention implemented by Amnesty International in order to reduce conflict
actually increased violence during the Darfuri genocide. In the third essay, and in collab-
oration with Lauren Young, we assess how exposure to the security efforts, relief services,
and abuse produced by peacekeepers in Haiti shapes civilian willingness to cooperate with
peacekeepers, an outcome crucial to the success of fulfilling mandates to keep the peace.
Together, these essays articulate a set of causes for violence against civilians rooted in
the political economy of state institutions, analyze how human rights interventions are me-
diated by the underlying institutional dynamics in the countries in which they are launched,
and examine how keeping the peace stems from altering the cooperative incentives local
populations face. They are committed to tackling important but difficult-to-answer ques-
tions in inaccessible areas for which scant data exists. Essays on the Democratic Republic
of Congo and Haiti draw on newly collected individual-level data and that on Darfur lever-
ages previously unused high-frequency sub-national data. They complement qualitative and
observational work with quasi-experimental and survey experimental methods to identify
causal effects. In addition to painting a broad picture of conflict, they seek to provide the
quantitative estimates required to design precise policy on these issues. Yet these essays are
crafted with a humility that understands measurement is imperfect, that studies provide
limited snapshots of individuals and institutions at one moment in time, and that, as the
philosophy of science marches forward, the methods used here and the results they generate
may become more an artifact of time rather than an enduring truth.
In addition to being woven together by theme, these essays are grounded in three shared
principles. First, the common theoretical point of departure in these essays is one of ra-
tionality. They assume that actors party to a conflict make reasoned decisions that are
strategic responses to the structural incentives they face and that understanding these in-
centives provides analytic traction in understanding conflict dynamics. Second, these essays
focus on sub-national, micro-level processes. They analyze the individuals and organizations
that engage in violence with the goal of building a more accurate portrayal of a small set
of cases in order to illuminate broader truths about conflict. Third, these essays share a
commitment to the scientific study of violence. Each article contributes a set of hypotheses
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and estimates to a rich literature on the causes of conflict and the impact of intervention
with the hope of building on a growing cumulative knowledge base on these issues.
While I discuss the unique contributions of each essay with their introductions below,
a broad set of implications emerge from this work for policy that seeks to prevent vio-
lent conflict and buttress stability. First, and as emerges from work on the DRC, violence
against civilians may result from elites solving institutional dilemmas unrelated to conflict.
Reducing violence may therefore lie in helping regimes solve the very problems that fuel
this abuse. Second, and motivated by findings from Darfur, human rights interventions that
would logically seem to reduce violence may result in perverse consequences and amplify
conflict. Assessing when these types of interventions will work requires appropriately di-
agnosing institutional incentives for violence. Third, and as highlighted from analysis in
Haiti, to effectively secure the peace, peacekeepers must cultivate cooperation with local
populations which requires providing positive material incentives as well as refraining from
abuse. Importantly, investments in the relief and security activities that facilitate peace
must be matched by investments in disciplining peacekeepers who may abuse local popula-
tions. Each of these lessons reveals the underlying importance of appropriately identifying
individual and institutional incentives to engage in violence or cooperation; lessons crucial
to sharpening the arrows in the quiver the international community draws on to reduce
conflict.
1.2 Chapter Summaries
1.2.1 Payment and Predation: The Politics of Wages and Violence in the
Congolese Army
In fragile states, regimes must cultivate military forces strong enough to ward off external
threats, but loyal enough to resist launching a coup. This requires that leaders distinguish
the loyal from the untrustworthy, a particularly challenging exercise in post-conflict settings
with weak institutions. In this article, I explore how Congolese soldiers operating in North
Kivu, the largest operational theater in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the epicenter
of one of the most violent conflicts in Africa, solve this crucial problem. I argue that leaders
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use non-payment as a screening strategy that reveals commitment by driving non-loyal
soldiers to defect and loyal soldiers to weather challenging times. This fuels unpaid soldiers
to engage in civilian abuse, a process managed by commanding officers that is used to further
assess loyalty and cultivate internal cohesion.
To develop and test this argument, I couple analysis based on 175 open-ended qualitative
interviews with a fine-grained quantitative analysis of 350 surveys of the Congolese soldiers
operating in North Kivu conducted between 2014 and 2015. Broadly, I weave together a set
of quantitative correlations and qualitative analysis to paint a portrait of how an inaccessible
and abusive army operates. I empirically demonstrate that the regime strategically allocates
non-payment to various units by month and that this process generates defection by those
who are uncommitted to the regime. I then document that missing payments are associated
with systematically higher levels of extortion — theft, taxation, and forced labor — as well
as three types of violence against civilians — forced detention, torture, and sexual gender-
based violence. Lastly, I show that soldiers who are not paid and engage in various forms of
predation are substantially more loyal to both their units and the army; thus, this screening
process ultimately generates the very type of loyalty that the regime seeks to identify in the
first place.
By examining the internal strategies regimes use to manage an age-old state-building
dilemma, this research illuminates the institutional foundations of regime survival in fragile
states. The tragic and important implication of this work is that the very strategy the
state uses to ensure protection from within generates high levels of abuse towards its own
citizens. In detailing this cause of predation, this paper provides a novel explanation for
how leaders use financial constraints to overcome classic organizational dilemmas in ways
that ultimately cause violence against civilians. Lastly, in demonstrating that violence
perpetrated by soldiers generates internal cohesion, this article illustrates how this type of
abuse may result in the very loyalty that regimes seek to cultivate in order to maintain their
power. In this sense, violence against civilians may ultimately create and reinforce predatory
institutions.
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1.2.2 Monitoring Conflict to Reduce Violence: Evidence from a Satellite
Intervention in Darfur
In my second dissertation essay, I move from assessing the causes of civilian abuse to
examining the effect of advocacy-driven monitoring that seek to expose atrocities in order
to document and deter violence in conflict zones. I analyze the impact of “Eyes on Darfur”,
the first-ever satellite intervention implemented by a human rights organization amidst a
raging conflict with the objective of deterring violence. Between June 2007 and January
2008, Amnesty International USA selected a set villages in Darfur, monitored them using
satellites, and notified the Government of Sudan that those villages were monitored and
that any atrocities committed in them would be globally publicized. To examine whether
this program changed the behavior of the Sudanese Government in Darfur, I estimate the
impact of monitoring using a new dataset I construct of high-frequency, sub-national data
on genocidal attacks.
Counterintuitively, I find that Amnesty’s advocacy effort was associated with between
a 15 and 20 percentage point increase in violence in monitored areas. I also show that
the impact of the program was not only pernicious, but persistent: monitored villages
experienced a 20 percentage point increase in attacks in the year after the program ended.
Moreover, the program increased violence in neighboring villages by 8 percentage points,
tempering hope that these monitoring interventions may generate geographically protective
enclaves. These results are robust to a series of alternative regression specifications, matching
strategies, and placebo checks. Analysis of the Government of Sudan’s public behavior
suggests that they increased violence in monitored villages to retaliate against Amnesty’s
advocacy efforts. Interestingly, given that Amnesty maintained no presence in Darfur, the
Government could only retaliate against Amnesty by targeting the communities they aimed
to serve.
This research contributes to a broad literature on the impact of human right activism
and takes seriously that these well-intentioned strategies may in fact increase violence for a
set of theoretically grounded reasons. To the best of my knowledge, this article provides the
first micro-level quantitative study that examines whether monitoring atrocities incentivizes
governments to refrain from violence and highlights the potentially adverse effects of these
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interventions. It does so while appropriately accounting for spillover effects, which are more
than just nuisance parameters and are key to understanding the unbiased impact of human
rights advocacy. Moreover, this article provides the first set of estimates on the effect of a
new technology championed by activists as a groundbreaking tool to enhance human rights.
Given that satellites don’t require host country consent, this technology removes a decision-
node at which governments can accept or reject monitoring. In analyzing the impact of this
type of intervention, this article illuminates the impact of advocacy for a family of conflicts
that go unexplored and contributes a set of estimates that get past the selection bias in
evidence that monitoring produces.
1.2.3 Cooperation, Intelligence and Keeping the Peace: Civilian Engage-
ment with Peacekeepers in Haiti
In the final essay of my dissertation and in collaboration with Lauren Young, we analyze
how United Nations peacekeepers generate cooperation with local populations to maintain
peace and security. United Nations peacekeeping operations are a cornerstone tool used
by the international community to prevent conflict and stabilize countries plagued by vio-
lence and instability. To solicit information about local political actors, social networks and
violence that are required to overcome the asymmetries of operating in foreign and unfa-
miliar theaters, peacekeepers must cultivate the trust and cooperation of the communities
they serve. In this essay, we develop a theory that individuals decide to cooperate with
peacekeepers based on three key parameters — effectiveness, benevolence, and abusiveness
— and test this theory using an original survey of a random sample of residents living in
metropolitan Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
We examine how the day-to-day experiences that individuals have with peacekeepers
through their exposure to security efforts, relief services, and abuse affect both local percep-
tions of peacekeepers as well as the likelihood that local populations will share information
with peacekeepers. While security and relief provision result from proactive policy choices
and abuse results from failures to restrain soldiers, we compare these three activities pre-
cisely because they stem from a portfolio choice that UN leadership faces in deciding how
to allocate resources between providing relief, security or restraining abuse. While exposure
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to security and relief activities improve public opinion and are associated with substan-
tial increases in the willingness to cooperate with peacekeepers, exposure to peacekeeping
abuse dramatically undermines civilian cooperation. Interestingly, whereas abuse is associ-
ated with a larger impact in shaping beliefs than security and relief, the converse is true
for behavior. Our results highlight the ability of peacekeepers to shape public opinion and
generate cooperation in politicized and unstable settings where negative attitudes towards
peacekeepers are deeply entrenched. They also underscore the differentially powerful impact
that positive and proactive security and relief provision have compared to abuse.
By drawing on a household survey of the population that peacekeepers aim to serve,
this research turns from the cross-national approach that has characterized the study of
peacekeeping and contributes to a burgeoning set of research that examines the micro-level
dynamics of peacekeeping. To do so, our sampling strategy uses satellite imagery and GIS
information to draw a random sample of households in order to a recover credible sample in
post-disasters areas using new technologies. Moreover, we focus on the cooperative relation-
ship between peacekeepers and host populations which, to the best of our knowledge, has
never been studied. As such, our analysis builds on research that examines how third party
military interventions win the ‘hearts and minds’ of local populations and the results pre-
sented shed light more broadly on how civilians view and interact with foreign forces. Our
results highlight a set of opportunities and challenges for peacekeepers: given that attitudes
and cooperative behavior are shaped by peacekeeping activities, peacekeepers must effec-
tively provide security and relief while preventing abuse in order to solicit the cooperation
needed to achieve their mandates.
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Abstract
In fragile states, regimes must cultivate military forces strong enough to ward off external
threats, but loyal enough to resist launching a coup. This requires that leaders distinguish
the loyal from the untrustworthy, a particularly challenging exercise in post-conflict settings
with weak institutions. In this study, I explore how Congolese soldiers operating in North
Kivu, the largest operational theater in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the epicenter
of one of the most violent conflicts in Africa, solve this crucial problem. I argue that leaders
use non-payment as a screening strategy that reveals commitment by driving disloyal soldiers
to defect and loyal soldiers to endure hard times. This fuels unpaid soldiers to engage in
civilian abuse, a process managed by commanding officers that is used to cultivate internal
cohesion. To develop and test this argument, I couple qualitative analysis based on 175
open-ended interviews with a fine-grained quantitative analysis of 350 surveys of soldiers
from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. This research provides a
novel explanation for how leaders use financial constraints to overcome classic organizational
dilemmas in ways that ultimately cause violence against civilians.
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2.1 Introduction
In fragile states, institutions responsible for maintaining law and order are often a source
of exploitation and instability. Nowhere is this more true than in militaries, which are
simultaneously charged with establishing a legitimate monopoly on violence yet represent
the greatest source of coup-risk, violent conflict, and civilian abuse (Walter, 1999; Hoddie
and Hartzell, 2003; Rubin, 2008; Svolik, 2009). To combat these problems, militaries have
become an institutional choice of export and target for foreign aid; the United States, for
example, spends more on annual foreign military assistance than on its entire development
portfolio.1 Indeed, the international community has prioritized building effective armies as
a crucial component of the broader state-building project.
Yet, militaries are often weak by design. While leaders who face external threats must
invest in forces for protection, building forces strong enough to ward off these threats creates
militaries strong enough to overthrow a regime. All leaders face this ‘guardianship dilemma’
and balance a fine line between cultivating weakness and strength (Besley and Robinson,
2010; McMahon and Slantchev, 2015).2 Despite the fact that leaders can draw a broad
set of strategies to undermine potential threats within the military to maximize survival,
developing a professional, civilian-ruled military remains a challenge (Huntington, 1957;
Janowitz, 1961; Desch, 2001).
At its core, leaders face a fundamental problem of discrimination. Rulers must distin-
guish those who are loyal from those who are untrustworthy in order to selectively empower
the former and reduce the threat of the latter. Without the technology to distinguish be-
tween soldier type, leaders can either weaken all soldiers and open themselves to greater
external threat, or strengthen all soldiers, which opens them up to threat from within.
This dilemma is particularly important in post-conflict armies comprised of previously
warring parties that are often the product of negotiated settlements used to end violence.
1For example, in FY 2015, the US State Department spent a total of 8.2 billion dollars on international
security assistance. Comparatively, the US allocated 4.2 billion to development aid, including official develop-
ment assistance, USAID administration and the State Department Economic Support Fund (Congressional
Budget Office, 2015).
2Here, I borrow the terminology, ‘the guardianship dillemma’ from McMahon and Slantchev (2015),
variants of which are more classically known as the ‘civil-military problematique’ (Feaver, 1996).
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Of the 128 civil wars that occurred between 1945 and 2006, 40% ended in settlements that
mandated the integration of armed groups into a national army (Hartzell, 2014). These rein-
tegration processes aim to address security concerns between groups over military control,
reduce the number of ex-rebels integrated into civilian life, and create inclusive institutions
(Simonsen, 2007; Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008; Samii, 2013; Licklider, 2014). However,
integrating competing factions into unified armies often generates the core set of problems
it seeks to resolve. Reintegrated armies are infused with soldiers whose loyalty to a broader
national government are tenuous, which, in turn, amplifies the guardianship dilemma.3
In this paper, I explore how Congolese soldiers operating in North Kivu, the largest
operational theater in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the epicenter of one of the most
violent conflicts in Africa, solve this crucial problem. I argue that leaders use non-payment
as a screening strategy to distinguish the loyal from the untrustworthy. Contrary to the
belief that missing payments are solely a function of bureaucratic mismanagement or a lack
of capacity, I contend that non-payment is used as a form of trial and tribulation that reveals
commitment by driving disloyal soldiers to defect and loyal soldiers to weather challenging
times. Non-payment causes unpaid soldiers to engage in extortion and violence against
civilians, which is managed by commanding officers and used to cultivate internal cohesion.
Coupled, these costly actions help discriminate the committed from the uncommitted and
generate the very loyalty that leaders seek to identify. This helps the regime overcome the
guardianship dilemma and in doing so, illuminates how this very process produces predatory
institutions.
I draw on research I conducted with members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (FARDC) between 2014 and 2015. I couple qualitative analysis based
on 175 open-ended interviews with a fine-grained quantitative analysis of 350 members of
the military to provide a detailed anatomy of payments, violence and loyalty. Broadly, I
employ a methodological approach inspired by a growing literature that profiles the inner-
workings of hard-to-access and understudied institutions, including street gangs (Levitt and
Venkatesh, 2000), the mafia (Gambetta, 1996), and pirates (Leeson, 2007). I treat the data
3I use the term “reintegrated army” throughout this paper to refer to armies that have implemented
policies which incorporate previously warring parties into a single national army.
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I bring to bear not as a doubly-decisive test of a hypothesis (Van Evera, 1997), but rather as
corroborative evidence that forms the foundation of a theory for how the military uses novel
strategies to manage the age-old problem of the guardianship dilemma. I weave together
a set of correlations to understand how an inaccessible and abusive army functions and as
such err on the side sketching a broad portrait of a complex institution rather than painting
a narrow one based on tight inferences.
My argument and analysis proceed in a series of steps. I first marshal data that suggests
the Congolese military selectively allocates wages to different unit-types by month. With
both qualitative and quantitative data, I show that non-payment is correlated with different
unit-types and rotated by month. These correlations suggest that the army chooses not
to pay four different types of units that correspond to key cleavages within the army and
Congolese society more broadly, and that the regime rotates non-payment by month across
units. I then demonstrate that missing payments are associated with defection within units
and that those who defect are uncommitted to the regime. I define defection as the voluntary
or coerced departure from one’s unit and the army.4 I then document that missing payments
are associated with systematically higher levels of extortion — theft, taxation, and forced
labor — as well as three types of violence against civilians — forced detention, torture, and
sexual gender-based violence. While there is suggestive evidence that violence allows officers
to further test the loyalty of rank-and-file soldiers, this type of predation is primarily the
byproduct of screening out soldiers through non-payment in the first phase. Lastly, I show
that soldiers who are not paid and engage in various forms of predation are substantially
more loyal to both their units and the army.
While this methodological approach provides leverage over an inaccessible and violent
institution, an important set of caveats are in order. First, I analyze self-reported data,
which are susceptible to measurement error that stems from a set of cognitive biases that
shape survey response. Moreover, participants may distort or fabricate responses about
sensitive information, including responsibility for extortion and violence. This remains a
4Comparatively, though somewhat different, Lyall (2014) defines “mass desertion as the unauthorized
wartime withdrawal of a unit (or group of soldiers) from the battlefield or its rear areas with the intention
of permanently abandoning the fight,” (Pg. 3). My definition does not depend on proximity to battle and
also captures forced ejection. This broader approach is more liberal in nature, yet is particularly well-suited
to examine the determination of loyalty and assess screening mechanisms.
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key challenge to generating accurate data on violence in all studies of conflict and similarly
afflicts this paper. Additionally, I primarily draw on data from active soldiers. While I lever-
age information on unit-level defections to understand patterns of loyalty and compliance,
this information comes from soldiers within units who observed these patterns among all
members. Lastly, the study analyzes retrospective data, which are observational and noisy
in nature. I draw primarily on correlations and as such, warrant caution in interpretation.
I employ a series of design and analysis strategies to mitigate against these concerns. I
use within-subject repeated survey questioning to assess the extent of measurement error
and bias. I report a set of robustness checks to ensure that findings are not sensitive
to any particular regression specification and use qualitative work to ground and validate
my quantitative analysis. Lastly, I field a survey experiment with soldiers to provide a
complementary set of causal estimates of the impact of missing payments on civilian abuse
and use this approach to further interrogate the mechanisms through which abuse arises.
Ultimately, while I face a series of challenges in the extent to which these data are reliable
and representative, the evidence garnered here offers the unique ability to assess the inner
workings of the Congolese military.
Importantly, the strategies I detail for managing the guardianship dilemma are by no
means the sole strategies available or used by the Congolese army. In the fall of 2014, for
example, the Government was charged with assassinating a rising general who was widely
celebrated and perceived as an internal threat and sent the remaining parts of his contingent
to the Central African Republic to participate in a peacekeeping mission where distance
would reduce their potential threat. The Congolese government has also rotated army
leadership, cultivated conflicting chains of commands, and used other strategies to maintain
control.
Rather, the strategies I detail in this research are unique for two reasons. While the ma-
jority of strategies implemented to reduce threat are indiscriminate in nature, the strategies
I analyze are used as a screening technology that distinguishes soldier type. This approach is
important precisely because it moves beyond blunt tactics common in the analysis of regime
behavior and instead examines the relatively refined tools that regimes leverage. Second,
these are strategies that shift the focus from a limited set of high-ranking individuals within
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the military to the broader rank-in-file who are often necessary to support rebellion or rev-
olution. Analyzing the underbelly of the institution provides a broad complement to the
study of elite politics.
The analysis in this paper springs from a unique study of a reintegrated military insti-
tution in a single African country marked by ongoing conflict, and caution is well-warranted
in generalizing from this case. Yet, the findings in this paper also speak to a broader set
of political dynamics non-unique to the DRC. First, analyzing how regimes in weak insti-
tutional contexts develop novel screening technologies speaks to key questions about how
leaders solve crucial organizational dilemmas in financially constrained contexts. Second,
the spate of conflict experienced in Africa and other parts of the world has birthed a broad
set of institutions composed of fragile coalitions that must be adeptly managed. Whereas
the Congolese army may seem peculiar, it shares many of the same fundamental qualities as
other institutions in developing countries. Lastly, while the explanation for civilian abuse is
new, it is fundamentally caused by principal-agent problems that characterize many violent
organizations. In this sense, this paper helps explain both current and historical patterns in
both military and non-military institutions.
This paper makes several contributions to political science. First and foremost, this
study builds on a rich literature that examines the role of military institutions in society
(Huntington, 1957; Feaver, 1996; Brooks, 2007; Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010), and
details a novel strategy used to solve a classic theoretical dilemma. It highlights the ways in
which regimes manage military institutions to reduce coup-threat while staving off external
challengers and in doing so, illustrates how the logic of political survival shapes strategic
decisions that both maintain and undermine institutions (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith,
2012; Singh, 2014). Indeed, this paper demonstrates that the very strategies used to admin-
ister institutions responsible for establishing a legitimate monopoly on violence generates
high levels of violence against individuals within the state (Weber, 1946).
Second, this paper builds on a growing literature that seeks to understand the chal-
lenges of building institutions in post-conflict, multi-ethnic societies (Call and Cousens,
2008; Del Castillo, 2008; Ghani and Lockhart, 2009). This paper shows that non-payment
is not simply the product of bureaucratic mismanagement, but rather a screening strategy
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that allows regimes to effectively build loyal institutions. Indeed, many regimes inherit het-
erogeneous institutions in which the loyalty of civil servants is questioned. By detailing the
internal strategies used to manage these challenges, these findings illuminate the ‘blackbox’
of how regimes overcome these problems and ultimately invest in institutions — a non-
trivial contribution given that institutions are seen as key to state stability and economic
development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi,
2004). It does so by grounding questions about military dynamics classically housed in the
study of international relations in an analysis of the domestic politics that shape institu-
tions (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2012). This process sheds light on the challenges and
threats that post-conflict institutional reformers face, the diverse set of strategies that can
be drawn on to manage them, and the downstream impacts they may cause.
Lastly, this paper contributes to a rich literature on the causes of civilian abuse and
suggests that violence against civilians is the product of internal screening processes that
are used to determine loyalty. While scholars have assessed patterns of civilian abuse as a
function of territorial control (Kalyvas, 2006; Wood, 2010), local disputes (Autesserre, 2010),
and resource endowments (Weinstein, 2006), among other factors5, few have examined how
violence is used to cultivate cohesion in the context of conflict. This work builds on a nascent
line of research in political science that highlights the role of loyalty as both a cause and
consequence of civilian abuse (Cohen, 2013). Moreover, analysis demonstrates that non-
payment generates high levels of civilian abuse, which closely contrasts with arguments that
contend fewer resources may restrain abuse by incentivizing soldiers to cooperate with local
populations (Weinstein, 2006). Understanding the root causes of civilian abuse has been
central to study of political science and these findings further this line of work.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides a conceptual framework of how
screening mechanisms are used to distinguish loyalty. Section 2.3 sketches a brief history
of the Congolese army. I detail the qualitative and quantitative empirical approach and
introduce the data in section 2.4. Section 2.5 integrates these approaches to analyze the
relationship between payments, loyalty and violence. Section 2.6 considers alternative ar-
5Other commonly examined causes include the strategic dynamics between adversaries (Downes, 2008),
among others, internal indiscipline (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006), and regime type (Eck and Hultman,
2007).
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guments that may explain the empirical patterns and discusses the generalizability of the
analysis. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Theory
While the guardianship dilemma is a problem that has plagued leaders old and new,
this challenge springs from a broader family of principal-agent problems characterized by
asymmetric information. In these settings, leaders must delegate the performance of a task
to civil servants, yet are unsure how these agents will execute the performance of that task
given variation in their quality. These models have a long history in political science given
they characterize fundamental relations in institutional management (Baron and Meirowitz,
2006; Besley, 2007). Overcoming these challenges is particularly hard in fragile states where
monitoring capacity is low and the rule of law weak, and as such, agents often seek to signal
their true type through costly actions or leaders try to assess type through a screening
process.
Given that most regimes don’t fully forgo establishing a military, scholarship on the
guardianship dilemma has explored the strategies that regimes use to overcome these principal-
agent problems. Yet, few approaches leverage a screening model. With the notable exception
of Egorov and Sonin (2011), who provide a model that analyzes the tradeoff between recruit-
ing competent and loyal agents, most scholarship highlights indiscriminate strategies such as
exclusionary recruiting (Louër, 2013), systematically under-equipping soldiers (Gaub, 2013),
or creating conflicting chains of command (Quinlivan, 1999). However, strategies that lever-
age signaling or screening provide leaders increased precision in their ability to identity
loyalty and offer a relatively effective solution to a classic dilemma.
Consider a simple screening game with two players, a regime and a soldier.6 The regime
seeks to maximize its survival and soldiers seek to retain their job in the army. The regime
must recruit loyal soldiers for its army to maintain power. However, in the population of
potential recruits, there are both loyal soldiers and untrustworthy soldiers, which is private
information held by soldiers. Given that the regime cannot observe the true ‘type’ of each
6This stylized application derives from the classic structure of a screening game established by Akerlof
(1970), Spence (1973), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
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soldier, it must design a mechanism by which both soldier types will reveal their private
information. In this set up, the regime moves first and sets up a screening mechanism and
the informed player then selects a strategy to signal their type; if the mechanism is well-
designed, investment into the signal is differentially costly for the soldiers in a way that is
aligned with their true type.
While militaries often design recruitment exams to reveal soldier type, post-conflict
regimes that inherit heterogeneous armies through reintegration processes must design alter-
native screening mechanisms. Here, I contend that regimes use non-payment as a screening
mechanism. The regime can draw on one of two strategies: pay soldiers or withhold pay-
ment. Individual soldiers then decide whether to defect or stay in the military. Non-payment
operates as a screening mechanism because loyal soldiers more easily weather these costly
times and remain with the unit whereas uncommitted soldiers are ultimately unwilling to
endure these trying times for the regime and defect. The critical assumption is that enduring
periods of non-payment is positively correlated with loyalty. In the sequencing of play, after
the regimes decides not to pay and soldiers decide whether to defect, payoffs are realized.7
In an equilibrium in which it more costly for disloyal soldiers to remain, the regime is left
with a pool of high-quality soldiers while those who are low-type depart.
In classic screening models, wage levels are a function of an individual’s signals (alterable
qualities) and indices (unalterable qualities) and individuals invest in these signals in expec-
tation of a given wage schedule (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1990). Conceptualizing non-payment
as a screening mechanism illuminates three points on the role of wage allocation. First,
while theory and empirics suggest that increasing wages attracts better quality agents, this
argument suggests the opposite as a reduction in wages attracts the type of agents that
the regime desires (Bo, Foster and Putterman, 2010). Second, while shocks of non-payment
may alter average expected wages over time for soldiers, it is precisely because non-payment
is periodic and infrequent that it has the ability to generate these signal-inducing environ-
ments. Lastly, a strategy of selective wage allocation can be thought of as a test of intrinsic
motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Benabou and Tirole, 2003). Broadly, loyalty can be cast
as the depth of intrinsic motivation a soldier has for a regime and non-payment operates to
7The equilibrium concept for this type of game is a Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
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reveal the extent of this motivation.
More specifically, loyalty can be conceptualized at two levels (Siebold, 2007).8 At one
level, loyalty reflects the willingness of soldiers to follow orders from commanding officers and
support fellow soldiers (Olsthoorn, 2010). More deeply however, loyalty captures individual
fidelity to the institutional structure that governs the state (Feaver, 1999). In states where
there is little difference between the executive and military branch, cultivating loyalty to the
military also means cultivating loyalty to the regime. Regimes seek to cultivate this type of
loyalty to reduce the risk that soldiers launch a rebellion or coup.
In practice, reintegrated armies generate a set of unique contextual characteristics that
shape the nature of the game, but do not fundamentally change its structure. Given that the
Congolese army is the product of a negotiated settlement in which previously warring factions
have been integrated under one unified command, the regime begins with a pool of soldiers
under its leadership. This affects both sequencing and mechanism design. While regimes
drawing on classic screening mechanisms may use entry-level tests or training to assess
competency, loyalty or other relevant characteristics, reintegration impedes this approach
by automatically consolidating all individuals into the armed forces.
Moreover, in the context of the Congolese army, all soldiers seek to signal their loyalty
despite their true intentions. While some soldiers are motivated to signal loyalty simply in
order to retain their job, an additional reason lies in military reintegration. One motivation
for reintegrating adversarial factions is precisely because it allows groups to monitor the
behavior of those they don’t trust. This helps overcome a fundamental security dilemma
that often hinders negotiated settlements in which warring parties refuse to lay down their
arms and submit to a military institution managed by their rival (Walters, 2002). As such,
all soldiers signal their loyalty in order to maintain their position, which ultimately renders
most signals cheap talk (Schelling, 1980).
This also sheds light on another core challenge in distinguishing loyalty in order to
cultivate a reliable force. Regimes cannot solely identify and privilege elements of the armed
group that brought them to power because that type of exclusion would provoke the same
8While scholars of military sociology highlight four different levels at which soldier characteristics are
cultivated, I focus on two for parsimony.
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dynamics that may have caused the conflict in the first place. This means that even if
the regime believes that participation in their armed movement operates as a perfect index
for screening, using this index may ultimately be self-destructive. Indeed, in the DRC,
post-reintegration armed conflict highlights the over-use of this index in targeting. In 2012,
members of the Congolese military launched the M23 rebellion in part due to the regime’s
favoritism of other soldiers in the army (Baaz and Verweijen, 2013). Here, it is important
to note that the screening strategies I examine were those used in 2014 and 2015 and are
in part a product of regime learning from this rebellion. While models often pre-suppose
that optimal strategies are easy to a priori identify, in practice, they are often the product
of mis-calculations and learning (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000).
One crucial byproduct of withholding payments from soldiers is that this increases various
forms of civilian abuse. A rich literature and history emphasizes the importance of wage
incentives in both extortion and abuse:9 Besley and McLaren (1993) model how various
wage regimes generate lower or higher levels of corruption; Olken and Pande (2012) illustrate
how wages determine the composition and quality of workers who enter civil service; Azam
and Hoeffler (2002) demonstrate that soldiers violently loot as a substitute for missing
funds; Wood (2010) shows that rebels or state actors engage in civilian abuse when they
lack the resources to provide selective benefits to cooperate.10 Whereas the mechanisms
through which these patterns emerge vary, the reduced-form relationship between wages
and predation is surprisingly similar: reductions in wages generate abuse.
While the contention that non-payment generates civilian abuse resonates with these
findings, a crucial difference is that non-payment is strategically used as a screening strat-
egy. This underlying explanation departs from the extant literature on violence against
civilians in two important ways. First, while financial resources have been central to ex-
plaining levels of violence across groups and conflicts (Wood, 2014), these arguments have
9Following the approach provided by Olken and Pande (2012), these models broadly suppose an individual
receives a wage w, that he will forgo if fired, upon which he receives an outside option v. Bureaucrats decide
to predate or not and if so, they are detected with probability p; if they are not caught, he receives wage
w in addition to the returns to predation b minus the cost to personal cost to predation d. In equilibrium:
w − v < 1−p
p
(b− d).
10A notable contrast to this argument suggests that violent organizations that are under-resourced may en-
gage in restraint and cultivate non-abusive relationships with the civilians on whom they depend (Weinstein,
2006).
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largely analyzed resources as a pre-determined, time invariant endowment. My argument
exploits within-organization variation and suggests that abuse is in part the result of the
strategic management of resources used in the service of alternative organizational goals. In
part, this may explain how temporary wage reductions induces predation in the short-term
while longer-term resource scarity generates cooperation with civilian populations (Wein-
stein, 2006). Second, while scholarship on violence against civilians has leveraged principal-
agent models to explain abuse, they tend to focus on the inability of principals to monitor
and discipline their agents (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006; Shapiro, 2013; Salehyan, Siroky
and Wood, 2014). As such, violence is cast as the result of abusive soldiers or rebels who
cannot be restrained by an ineffectual leader. Here, however, violence is the byproduct of a
test that is used by principals to assess the quality of their agents.
In this context, civilian abuse is also used to generate the very loyalty that regimes seek
to distinguish. When units go unpaid, they are more likely to engage in predation, which
is a collective experience that generates internal cohesion as well as increased identification
with their unit and the army more broadly. Theoretical and empirical scholarship from a
broad range of disciplines highlight how the process of participating in violence on behalf of
a group increases collective identification with that group. Social psychology posits that this
process may occur by providing individuals social incentives, making violence a normative
behavior, or generating out-group hate (Littman and Paluck, 2015). Recent research in
political science on the causes of sexual violence across conflicts demonstrates that wartime
rape is deliberately used by rebel groups and state actors to cultivate in-group affinity
(Cohen, 2013), which resonates with the broader role that violence has on socialization
during war (Wood, 2008). And both classic and newer work on military analysis suggests
more cohesive units are likely to engage in violence (Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Grossman,
2009).
While the current literature largely forwards a linear relationship between abuse and
loyalty, I focus on the interactive effect that not getting paid and engaging in violence has
on loyalty. Non-payment generates abuse not only by inducing hardship but also by signaling
to soldiers that they are being screened by the regime and that it is socially desirable to
engage in abuse. Indeed, engaging in violence is tightly managed and engaging in it when
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appropriate is crucial for it to generate cohesion. The fact that violence generates the
very characteristics that regimes seek to distinguish in the first place does not reduce the
importance of that screening strategy. Rather, they are reinforcing processes. In this sense,
loyalty is both an underlying ‘type’ as well as a quality that can be cultivated (this is akin to
classic screening procedures in which firms select on educational investment but also invest
in worker training).
Whereas engaging in violence may increase the in-group affinity associated with loyalty,
it may also increase loyalty by reducing exit options that soldiers have and therefore increase
dependency on the institution or regime. Exacting civilian abuse may make it more difficult
for soldiers to return home if they face social sanctioning. Research from Sierra Leone, for
example, suggests that previous participation in military abuse is one of the strongest bar-
riers to effective post-conflict reintegration (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007). If engaging
in violence cultivates loyalty through these mechanisms, screening for loyal soldiers in the
first place may ultimately generate a group of predatory soldiers as those who remain in the
unit and predate will increase their dependence on the regime. This use of abuse is com-
mon to illicit organizations and gangs who often use violence as a test in initiation rituals
to screen and induct new members (Anderson, 2000; Gambetta, 2009; Goldman, Giles and
Hogg, 2014). Conceptualizing loyalty as a reduction in exit-options achieved through vio-
lence illuminates the process through which cultivating loyal forces may ultimately generate
predatory institutions.
2.3 A Brief History of the Congolese Army
Congolese independence in 1960 ushered in a dramatic restructuring of the Belgian-
managed colonial army. Congolese, who were previously barred from holding officer-level
ranks, were integrated into management positions, trained and equipped. In the years that
followed, education at the elite military academy in Kananga, the possibility of international
training, and a consistently paid salary provided the military prestige and motivated many
Congolese to join the army (Stearns, 2012). However, this moment in Congolese history was
fleeting. Throughout the late 1970s and 80s, the army suffered the institutional cannibaliza-
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tion that afflicted the entire Congolese state under the reign of an increasingly kleptocratic
and extractive regime (Prunier, 2011). President Mobutu crippled the army through a series
of coup-proofing tactics in which he systematically under-funded and neglected the army,
while investing in a small elite presidential guard of co-ethnics that ultimately held power
(Roessler, 2011). In the face of an increasingly strong army, Mobutu solved the guardian-
ship dilemma by completely gutting the army. As such, by the time the first Congolese war
began in 1996, the AFDL — a ‘rag-tag’ rebellion led by Laurent Kabila and supported by
Rwanda, Uganda and Angola — was able to easily overrun the Congolese army and depose
Mobutu.
A mere two years after the first Congolese war ended, the second began. The poorly
reconstituted army that Kabila created proved insufficient in defense and drove him to
fund proxy groups to fight on his behalf as well as accept sponsorship from a set of external
patrons. In 2002, the Global and All Inclusive Agreement was signed, marking the parchment
end of the conflict. The peace agreement mandated the integration of warring factions into
a unified institution. The brassage (brewing) policy restructured the army into a new set
of brigades and defense forces, divided powerful posts across rebel groups to ensure a set
of checks and balances,11 and aimed to retrain all soldiers to follow the same protocols and
strive for national objectives (Stearns, Verweijen and Baaz, 2013). The implementation
of the brassage began in 2005 and, despite its partial fulfillment, drastically reshaped the
current composition, incentives, and behavior of the army.
In practice, this policy resulted in the deep fragmentation of the army (Verweijen, 2014),
which profoundly exacerbated the guardianship dilemma. It integrated adversaries with
different motivations and goals into similar units, while allowing strong war-time groups
to consolidate power in ethnic enclaves that facilitated defection and future rebellion. It
also generated conflicting command structures between distrusting rebels and failed to pro-
vide proper and consistent training to soldiers, leading to problematic barriers in issues of
cooperation and communication within and between units.
In addition to the classic challenges the guardianship dilemma poses, the Congolese
11Senior posts across the army were divided among factions and senior posts also required that commanders
were deputized by individuals from different warring factions.
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Government has been forced to navigate this problem with forces whose very loyalty and
commitment to the regime remain unknown. Moreover, following the formal end of the
conflict in 2003, the Congo has experienced a set of armed rebellions driven both by local
conflicts as well as foreign incursions (Reyntjens, 2009; Autesserre, 2012). A weak army that
President Joseph Kabila hasn’t been able to confidently empower has made him vulnerable to
the same type of credible challenges that toppled previous Congolese regimes (Lemarchand,
2012).
Within this context, the Congolese regime has drawn on both classic approaches to
solving the guardianship dilemma as well as novel ones. The regime has shuffled, sacked, and
assassinated military commanders who pose internal threats, cultivated multiple chains of
command, and established units that report directly to the government.12 As demonstrated
below, the government has also used non-payment as a unique strategy to discriminate
between those loyal to the army and regime and those who are not. Moreover, this process
has generated substantial levels of violence against civilians. While members of the FARDC
are notoriously responsible for predation ranging from petty extortion to brutal human
rights violations that are often associated with a lack of payments (Amnesty International,
2007; Human Rights Watch, 2009; Baaz and Stern, 2008), these two facts have never been
understood as a deliberate strategy used by the government to manage the guardianship
dilemma. In this sense, while the Congolese Army has been cast as a haphazard institution
plagued by violence and bureaucratic mismanagement, an underlying logic used to address
a historical dilemma faced by all leaders explain these empirical observations.
2.4 Data and Empirical Approach
2.4.1 Qualitative Data
Over the course of 2014 and 2015, I conducted 175 in-depth interviews with members of
the armed forces, civilians, government officials, and security sector reform experts in the
DRC. Ninety-two interviews were conducted with members of the armed forces and 98 inter-
views were conducted with non-military respondents. Appendix A.1 enumerates interviews
12The Republican Guard operates as a semi-autonomous force that is primarily responsive to the executive.
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by military rank and type. Interviews were semi-structured, and three enumerators were
trained in qualitative methods to participate in the process. I drew on a set of strategies to
sample and recruit respondents. With respect to members of the armed forces, I requested
interviews with 1) all members of headquarters leadership in the provincial capitals of North
and South Kivu13 and 2) all Chefs de Bureau du Comptabilité (CBCs) in North Kivu. Ad-
ditionally, 13 sites were selected in North and South Kivu in which we surveyed all deployed
soldiers who consented to an interview.14 This resulted in 92 interviews with a diverse set of
military officials. On the civilian side, 74 civilians were interviewed in the same 13 sites in
which soldiers were surveyed. This provided dyadic information on civilian-military relations
in a small set of communities. An additional 24 humanitarian and development workers,
academics, journalists, and banking officials were interviewed.
The primary goal of the qualitative component was twofold. First, the qualitative surveys
were used to illuminate the process and mechanisms by which the core variables of payments,
loyalty and violence are connected. Second, they were used to define accurate measures to
be deployed in the quantitative component of this research. Or, following the typology of
mixed-methods that Humphreys and Jacobs (2015) provide, they were used to shed light on
distinct questions and distinct measurement strategies.
During initial interviews that were used to build theory, soldiers openly discussed the
organization and structure of violence and payments and its relationship to loyalty. All
respondents were quick to suggest that they were “forced” to predate when they went unpaid
and many self-identified as “victims” of the military hierarchy. Interestingly, this perspective
was shared by civilians. One civilian interviewee sympathetically expressed that while life
is hard for all Congolese, it’s particularly harsh for soldiers.15 However, soldiers were also
keen to cast their ability to weather times of non-payment as a source of national pride,
irrespective of the violence in which they engaged. Implicitly comparing their endurance to
those who had defected, active members were proud of their patriotism. This multi-faceted
relationship — one of both anguish and pride — was common to the narratives shared and
13This includes the T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, Brigade General, General Major, and Lieutenant General, as well
as their deputies.
14The names of these sites are withheld to protect the anonymity of respondents.
15Interview with civilian in South Kivu, 2014.
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began to reveal a deeper dynamic in which these were connected through an underlying
process of screening.
Qualitative interviews similarly helped refine the measurement strategy and relevant
parameters for a future closed-form survey in three ways. First, it illuminated the conditions
under which soldiers were willing to openly discuss predation. For example, while soldiers
would not directly discuss violence they had committed, they were relatively open about
discussing violence when it was attributed to their unit. Second, it revealed which forms of
predation were taboo to discuss. For instance, while soldiers were open to discussing sexual
violence committed against women, they refused to talk about sexual violence committed
against men despite evidence that this is a widespread phenomenon in the DRC (Johnson
et al., 2010). Third, these interviews were used to examine the relevant time frame over
which to analyze payment histories and assess the historical extent to which soldiers could
accurately remember their own payment histories and behavior.
2.4.2 Quantitative Data
2.4.2.1 Soldier Survey
To further analyze the dynamics of this screening process, I fielded a closed-form survey
of 350 members of the FARDC in the spring of 2015. I sampled soldiers in the provincial
capital of North Kivu, Goma, for three reasons. First, Goma is the operational headquarters
for the Congolese Army in the Eastern DRC through which soldiers are deployed from other
areas of the country to conduct missions and through which they return after completing
missions. As such, a sample of soldiers positioned in Goma at any given moment draws on
a broad cross-section of Congolese soldiers operating in this region. Second, this theater
is the epicenter of the ongoing conflict in the Eastern Congo. Therefore, soldiers deployed
in North Kivu are those the regime must place the most trust in as they safeguard the
homeland from external threat. Third, soldiers operating in this region are engaged in high
levels of combat and often charged with civilian abuse. Together, this sampling site ensures
diversity and combat exposure at the regional level among a set of soldiers the regime must
entrust.
While I provide the first quantitative data on a notoriously abusive and inaccessible
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military currently engaged in conflict, a set of four key challenges must be highlighted.
First, I drew a convenience sample of soldiers using snowballing techniques.16 The core
limitation of this approach is that it generates a non-probability sample that may not be
representative of the underlying population (Groves et al., 2011). Convenience samples are
typically used to access hard-to-reach populations. At the time the survey was launched, the
Congolese regime had restricted all access to the army by outsiders and promoted generals
responsible for mass atrocities so that international organizations prohibited from working
with those charged with war crimes could no longer collaborate with the military; indeed,
the Congolese general who first granted authorization for this project during fieldwork in
2014 was assassinated by the time the survey was launched in 2015. Shifting political winds,
coupled with the fact that militaries are notoriously secretive for reasons of national security
and averse to questions of human rights violations, prompted this sampling strategy. While
this approach resulted in a diverse sample on key unit-level characteristics (see table 2.1 for
descriptive statistics), quantifying the extent of divergence from the underlying population
without a sampling frame is difficult. As such, I treat the sample I draw on as exploratory
and non-representative and cast the analysis I forward as a first step in corroborating the
theory presented in this paper.
A second challenge is that the underlying ‘legibility’ of the army structure complicates
identifying a common unit of analysis. The reintegration process resulted in a muddled or-
ganizational structure in which commanding officers and soldiers from various rebels groups
draw on different repertoires of bureaucratic management; unit sizes vary with commanding
officers of different rank and soldiers have little knowledge of the organization. As a result,
while interviews generated information on unit-level information, soldiers were unable to pro-
vide unique identifiers about their unit such as a unit name or number. While I attempted
to collect the names of commanding officers to connect unit-level information, respondents
felt uncomfortable providing this information and I was therefore unable to collect these
types of identifiers for analysis. Consequently, I am unable to identify whether respondents
16To the best of enumerator ability, soldiers were selected to over-sample active rank-and-file elements
of the land forces from a variety of units. This survey excludes members of the Republic Guard, a semi-
autonomous branch of the army cultivated by the executive office as a special unit to directly protect the
president’s interests.
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hail from the same unit. To ensure that interviewed soldiers provided information on the
same type of unit, enumerators worked with respondents to define and identify platoons
(peloton). As such, soldiers operate as a set of expert respondents who provide information
on unit-level behavior. Analysis takes place at the individual-level but generally captures
unit-level characteristics and phenomena. To assess the impact of this asymmetry, I re-run
all analysis clustering at the regiment level, which is a higher, nested unit-of-analysis that
soldiers were able to report and results remain robust.17 In a deeper sense, this highlights a
tension in understanding weak institutions in conflict-affected states: institutions that are
illegible and messy are often sufficiently well-run to facilitate the selective targeting of goods.
Third, interviews with soldiers who perpetrated violence are the primary source of data
on civilian abuse and eliciting truthful responses about sensitive information remains a key
challenge to generating accurate data on conflict and violence (Blair, 2014; Blair, Imai and
Lyall, 2014). A series of strategies was used to elicit truthfulness in this survey. Ques-
tions that were particularly sensitive focused on unit-level behavior rather than individual
behavior, creating an additional layer of anonymity that may have reduced incentives to
misrepresent information. Additionally, while the survey asked questions about extortion
and violence, it did not ask about severe infractions involving military elites such as mineral
extraction, collusion with rebel groups, and the arms trade in which the FARDC is in-
volved.18 Lastly, interviews were conducted privately by Congolese enumerators trained in
sensitive survey techniques and respondents were guaranteed confidentiality.19 Importantly,
general impunity for civilian abuse has muted incentives to fabricate information and the
normalization of violence against civilians has mitigated the impact of social desirability
17This approach does not directly correspond to the correct level of clustering, but employs a conservative
version. The significance of results remain unchanged across all specifications except for the relationship
between non-payment and defection for which significance marginally drops just below the p=.1 threshold.
While I am unable to provide an estimate of the number of unit clusters, there are roughly 40 regiments,
which can be interpreted as a lower-bound estimate for the number of units. Results are not reported.
18FARDC implication in these severe forms of violence and predation are well documented by the United
Nations and human rights organizations. For a non-comprehensive review, see United Nations Security
Council (2001) United Nations Security Council (2008), United Nations Security Council (2009), United
Nations Security Council (2010).
19The fact that soldiers were interviewed in Goma where most were temporarily passing through may
have also improved the truthfulness of responses as there would be little concern that respondents would
encounter enumerators again.
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bias to misrepresent histories. As one member of the FARDC mockingly responded when
asked why he shared information about violence committed by his unit, “what will happen
if I do?”20
Fourth, a key concern is collecting precise retrospective data that minimizes recall bias.
A series of steps was taken to improve the credibility of the data, assess the magnitude
and nature of the measurement error, and validate the data. First, in the quantitative
soldier survey, data on payments and violence were collected through a broad retrospective
cross-section of the past six months, a month-to-month panel, and a survey experiment.
The time-frame was selected through piloting to reduce measurement error and ensure that
no changes to the payment structure were implemented. These three different forms of
data collection provide internal validity checks and facilitate analyzing measurement error.
Additionally, to improve recollection for the panel, a set of historical cues unique to each
month were developed and used by enumerators during the survey (de Nicola and Gine,
2014). These cues were developed in conjunction with members of the FARDC and reflect
military-specific events familiar to soldiers. Table A.2 in appendix A.2 enumerates the
historical cues used during the survey.
2.4.2.2 Measurement Strategy & Descriptive Statistics
To analyze how the Congolese regime uses non-payment as a strategy to distinguish com-
mitment that also results in defection, violence, and loyalty, I draw on a series of measures
that capture each of these phenomena. To assess how payments are used as a technology of
discrimination, I collect data on whether soldiers received their monthly wages for six months
preceding the survey. Figure 2.1 visualizes the number of months during this time frame for
which soldiers did not receive their salary. Only 40% of soldiers consistently received wages
over the six-month period and soldiers averaged missing 1.59 (SD = 1.86) months of salary
over the window.
Analyzing how the government uses non-payment to distinguish loyalty requires that
the regime targets specific units with wages. To understand the logic of strategic payment
targeting, I draw on and operationalize four salient cleavages within the Congolese army and
20Interview with FARDC in North Kivu, 2014.
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Number of Missed Payments
Note: This plot visualizes the number of months soldiers reported not receiving their salary over the past
6 months.
Congolese society more broadly. I first operationalize whether units are co-ethnic with the
regime; presidential co-ethnicity is a binary variable that takes a 1 if the soldier comes from
the same group as the president. Second, I draw on whether units are Banyamulenge or
ethnic Rwandans, a marginalized group in the DRC. I differentiate between these two ethnic
groups because one is historically privileged and the other historically discriminated against.
Third, I draw on the ex-rebel status of units which captures whether soldiers participated in
previous armed insurrections; ex-rebel is a binary variable that takes a 1 if a soldier belonged
to a rebel group prior to joining the military. Lastly, I operationalize a measure of authority
to capture “big-man” politics that dominates Congolese society and rank of soldiers.
I operationalize two broad families of predation: extortion and violence against civilians.
While extortion and abuse similarly cause harm, I define them as two analytically distinct
categories. Extortion includes stealing a civilian’s goods, illegally taxing a civilian (either
at a roadblock or at a private home), or forcing a civilian to perform labor (such as carrying
army supplies). Moreover, I distinguish extortion from other revenue-generating activities
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by its coercive nature. For example, revenue-generating activities may include providing
dispute resolution services or engaging in small trade, while extortion includes levying illegal
taxes. Violence against civilians includes illegally detaining a civilian, torturing a civilian,
or sexual abusing a civilian.21 Following Anderson (2008), I construct mean effects indices
for each family of predation.
This classification departs from recent treatments of civilian abuse that aggregate various
types of predation for two reasons (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006). First, separating the
two families provides additional leverage to rule out the mechanisms through which non-
payment works: if non-payment only increases violence but not extortion, this may suggest
motivations beyond alternative arguments such as survival. Distinguishing these families of
predation illuminates potentially rival explanations for violence that aggregation may mask.
Second, this approach responds to calls for disaggregation in the study of violence in order
to more clearly analyze the micro-dynamics of conflict.
To operationalize defection, I create a binary variable for whether soldiers within a unit
defected over the relevant time frame. Defection refers to soldiers who have left units, either
voluntarily or by force. While I am unable to disaggregate these two types of defection,
qualitative interviews with active soldiers suggest that the vast majority of defection oc-
curs voluntarily. Defection by force captures situations in which commanding officers eject
soldiers. Note that this measure does not seek to distinguish between soldiers who have
left and returned home or soldiers who have left the army to join adversaries, though this
may be a possibility. Lastly, to capture loyalty, I use reported opinions about how prideful
soldiers feel about their units and the FARDC on a 1-4 scale where higher numbers are
positive. These measures provide insight into how different behavior generates allegiance
and devotion to the group. One concern about these measures is whether they reflect true
beliefs or preference falsification that may be driven by fear of reporting. Here, I buttress
these measures with qualitative evidence to ensure these capture loyalty. Lastly, I draw
on measures of army sanctioning in the conclusion to interrogate alternative mechanisms
that may explain abuse and operationalize this as whether the military hierarchy directly
21While sexual violence is broad and complex, I operationalize it as rape against women. This by no
means is exhaustive or nuanced, but rather a clear and salient form of violence.
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sanctioned individuals within a unit.
In soldier interviews, I collected a subset of measures by month for the previous six
months as well as a subset of measures for the full six-month period that were not broken
down by month. Both sets of questions were answered by all respondents in one sitting.
While the month-to-month panel provides more refined data over a series of select measures,
the cross-section offers an aggregate view over a more expansive set of measures. Drawing
on both sets of measures provides a within-subject approach that can be used to assess
measurement error. This design choice was primarily due to logistical constraints as soldiers
were unwilling to spend the time responding to a survey in which each measure was recorded
by month. The ‘source’ of the data is specified when reported throughout the analysis.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for these measures. Appendix A.3 details the survey
questions used for these measures.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Var Min Max Mean SD N
Rank 0 18 6.35 3.80 338
Ethnic Rwandan 0 1 0.06 0.23 326
Presidential Co-ethnic 0 1 0.10 0.30 344
Ex-rebel 0 1 0.29 0.45 337
Missing Payments 0 6 1.59 1.86 327
Defection 0 1 0.29 0.45 325
Extortion 0 1 0.22 0.41 341
Illegal Taxation 0 1 0.31 0.46 341
Forced Labor 0 1 0.34 0.47 338
Forced Detention 0 1 0.40 0.49 339
Torture 0 1 0.22 0.41 331
Sexual Violence 0 1 0.14 0.34 324
Unit Pride 1 4 3.26 0.87 342
FARDC Pride 1 4 3.21 0.94 336
Military Sanction 0 1 0.51 0.50 338
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the cross-sectional data.
The variables associated with the extortion and violence families are used
to construct a means effect index respectively.
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2.4.3 Estimation Strategy
My empirical analysis proceeds in four steps. I first analyze which units are paid in
which month to establish the strategic targeting of non-payment. I then demonstrate that
non-payments are associated with higher levels of defection. Third, I establish that non-
payment is associated with higher levels of extortion and civilian abuse. Lastly, I show that
units who are not paid and engage in violence exhibit higher levels of loyalty than their
counterparts. In each of these steps, I estimate the following model:
Yi = αi + β1Si + εi
where Y captures the relevant dependent variable, Si is a vector of unit-level covariates
that capture theoretical quantities of interest, and εi is the error. All models are estimated
using ordinary least squares.
In analyzing these core dynamics, a set of challenges threaten unbiased estimation. First,
the analysis I provide is fundamentally endogenous. Indeed, I argue that payments are
strategically allocated and do not follow a random logic. In examining the relationship
between non-payment and violence, I include the covariates that predict non-payment in
estimation to approximate conditional unconfoundedness. One mitigating factor is that the
characteristics over which targeting occurs are time invariant pre-treatment characteristics,
which tempers concern over introducing post-treatment bias into estimation (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008).
Second, bias may also be introduced through imprecision in recall. Specifically, if report-
ing error is systematically correlated with the key treatment variable — in this case, if error
is correlated with non-payment when estimating violence — coefficients may be biased. To
assess the extent of bias, I use internal validation techniques to analyze measurement error
in appendix A.5. Third, concerns about reverse causality arise. Throughout the analysis,
I draw on qualitative evidence, and where available quantitative data, to rule out these
concerns. I explicitly consider alternative arguments that may explain similar empirical
patterns in section 2.6.3.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 The Logic of Selective Payments
Leadership in the Congolese military is charged with distributing monthly payments and
rations to 144,000 active soldiers. The Congolese army is divided into regional divisions, and
within each regional division, a command structure oversees administration. Soldiers within
each region are entitled to the same official monthly payment by rank as well as a small
quantity of rations. The average monthly salary of rank-and-file members of the FARDC is
85 USD and soldiers typically receive one “goblet” of rice per month. Table A.4 in appendix
A.4 enumerates the official monthly salary by rank for members of the Congolese army. As
evidenced above, payment delivery is irregular. Soldier expectations are in line with this
inconsistency. Of the soldiers interviewed, 37% of soldiers have little or no confidence that
payments will be delivered in full or on time and only 32% of soldiers are highly confident
that they will consistently receive their salary. This section unpacks the behavior behind
these expectations and evidences the strategic allocation of non-payment by unit type as
the first step in the screening process.
The bureaucratic structure of payment allocation highlights who makes key decisions
about payment targeting at various points during the process. At the first node, the central
government makes monthly transfers to provincial commands; however, these transfers fail
to provide salaries for all active soldiers. In an interview with a senior administrative official
in North Kivu, he confirmed that the regime, rarely, if ever transfers sufficient funds for full
payment.22 While the central government determines how much to send each province, the
more relevant targeting occurs at the provincial level as they must decide how to distribute
limited funds among units operating in their region. Provincial level administrators work
with region-specific Chefs de Bureau du Comptabilités (CBCs), who are responsible for deliv-
ering and tracking payments to all soldiers, to determine how to allocate wages.23 Payments
22Interviews with FARDC in North Kivu, 2014 and 2015.
23CBCs are the equivalent of runners and take on the risky, and sometimes lucrative, job of distributing
payments to soldiers. At the beginning of every month CBCs return from various field locations to provincial
capitals to collect large sums of money for distribution; despite the fact that monthly payments are small,
a weak currency makes monthly payments bulky.
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are delivered by CBCs directly to battalion leaders who distribute money internally.24
In practice, decision-making occurs at the beginning of each month when cash is trans-
ferred directly to the provincial headquarters and then distributed to the CBCs.25 Within
regions, payment targeting occurs at the unit level. The poorly implemented process of rein-
tegration that occurred in the Congolese army preserved highly segregated units in which
dominant characteristics are common knowledge within the military hierarchy. For example,
certain units are known as predominantly comprised of ex-combatants from a previous rebel
group, while others are known as units hailing from the same geography and tribe as the
president.26 Using these unit-level characteristics, cash constrained provincial leaders must
strategically allocate payments, but must do so carefully as they want to generate defection
through non-payment but not so much that it fosters rebellion.
Ultimately, this creates incentives to allocate non-payments across types of units, spread-
ing out the burden of non-payment while allowing within unit-level dynamics to reveal who
is indeed loyal. To examine whether these patterns exist, I analyze the correlation between
non-payment and unit type by month, which I use to draw inferences about how non-
payment is allocated over time. Table 2.2 presents results for the correlations underlying
monthly payment targeting; the final column aggregates over the periods.
Beginning in December of the survey period, units are differentially paid by month:
in December, units with high-ranking commanders are associated with reductions in pay-
ment;27 in January, units that are presidential co-ethnics are associated with substantially
lower payments; in February, units that are predominantly ethnic Rwandans are correlated
with reductions; and in March, units comprised of ex-rebels are associated with increases in
payment. While the results are marginally statistically significant, they highlight a rotating
24The army has also launched a process of bancarization, in which payments are made electronically to
individual soldiers; however, it has yet to be rolled out consistently through the DRC and at the time of this
study, approximately 6% of soldiers in North Kivu had been formally enrolled in the program.
25During April, I observed a large block of cash about 6 feet by 10 feet delivered to the provincial
headquarters and distributed accordingly.
26The logic of targeting units by an index does not require that cleavages based on identity are used and
the same predictions would hold if the military used unit identifiers or other information for this process. In
the Congolese army, these are the relevant cleavages that the army uses in categorization.
27It’s important to note that not all units are commanded by officers of the same rank as would be standard
in other militaries. As such, rank is relevant.
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Table 2.2: Payment Targeting by Unit Type
Month to Month Non-Payments
(Oct) (Nov) (Dec) (Jan) (Feb) (Mar) (All)
Intercept 0.899∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034) (0.050) (0.022)
Rank 0.001 0.005 −0.008∗ 0.001 0.007 −0.004 0.0002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
Co-ethnic −0.059 −0.078 0.042 −0.114∗ −0.016 −0.069 −0.049
(0.056) (0.068) (0.062) (0.061) (0.055) (0.081) (0.036)
Rwandan 0.102 −0.035 0.015 −0.059 −0.193∗∗∗ −0.087 −0.043
(0.075) (0.090) (0.083) (0.082) (0.073) (0.107) (0.048)
Ex-rebel −0.009 0.022 0.013 −0.006 −0.010 0.102∗ 0.019
(0.038) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.037) (0.054) (0.024)
Observations 315 315 315 315 315 315 315
R2 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.031 0.015 0.009
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Month-to-month panel data are used
for estimation. ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
system of non-payment in which the regime strategically allocates non-payment by month
by unit type.
Three interesting trends emerge in the analysis. First, in the months preceding Decem-
ber, there are no differential effects. One plausible explanation for the lack of any correlation
during October and November may be that there were sufficient resources distributed at the
province level; indeed these results only capture within-province variation. If these cor-
relations are indeed sought to reflect strategic non-payment, this suggests that a strategy
of non-payment might not always be in use, but selectively employed from time to time.
Second, while non-payment is the general experience, in March, ex-rebel units are associ-
ated with increases in payment. Indeed, while the general screening mechanism discussed in
this paper leverages non-payment, this falls within a broader family of differential payment
allocation. Third, identifying selective targeting requires disaggregating these correlations
by month. The final column in the table, which aggregates over all months, masks the
differential effects that emerge with the more refined monthly analysis. This highlights that
selective targeting occurs at the unit- and month-level.
These quantitative correlations are generally consistent with a strategy in which leader-
ship targets specific types of groups over time for non-payment and spreads non-payment
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out by month. As one official with the European Union mission to provide assistance for
security sector reform (EUSEC) stated, “payments sporadically affect 20% of soldiers” at
any given time such that, “the problem does not exist at the same time, for all soldiers.”28
One challenge in assessing a theory of ‘optimal allocation’ is that many trends may seem to
ex-post fit this argument, making it difficult to falsify. Here, however, the results suggest
that payments rotate frequently by unit-type: each month, different unit types experience
relatively higher or lower payments.
This strategy provides an ample way to spread risk of mutiny or rebellion between
units by reducing incentives for cross-cleavage mobilization. However, it simultaneously
allows non-payments to serve a deeper function of distinguishing between committed and
uncommitted soldiers within units. Interviews with high ranking military officials suggest as
much. Officials charged with financial allocation highlighted the importance of using money
to induce hardship among soldiers as a test of their loyalty as well as forms of defection.
Indeed, as one senior official claimed when asked about the impact of non-payment: “we’ll see
who’s left.”29 Generating forms of trial and tribulation to identify loyalty and make sure that
soldiers were “true patriots” was a key concern aired by all officials. Interestingly, officials
were unconcerned that non-payment may drive talented individuals to defect, leaving the
army with a pool of poor-quality soldiers who had relatively worse outside options. Given
that the army sought to maintain soldiers committed to the regime, this may suggest that
loyalty and talent are not positively correlated.
Moreover, given the lack of training or initial recruitment exams, officials were keen
to identify alternative screening mechanisms. It is important to note that non-payment
as a screening mechanism largely emerged due to a lack of other effective mechanisms.
Training programs and recruitment exams require large capital investments unavailable to
the Congolese army while leveraging non-payment transforms endemic financial constraints
into a useful strategy. By spreading non-payment across unit types, the regime is able to
both solve a fundamental financial constraint without generating too much risk. The next
section analyzes whether non-payment is associated with defection and brings in voices from
28Interview with EUSEC official in North Kivu, 2015.
29Interviews with FARDC in North Kivu, 2014 and 2015.
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the rank-and-file to further evidence this process.
2.5.2 Payments & Defection
For non-payments to operate as a technology that distinguishes the committed from
the uncommitted within units, they must generate sufficiently difficult times to ultimately
drive those who are not loyal to defect. This section documents that missing payments
are correlated with increases in defection and that weathering times of non-payment is
understood as a test of loyalty.
As demonstrated above, non-payments rotate quickly and expectations among the sol-
diers interviewed are aligned with this system. One reason that monthly shocks are severe
and weathering them a sign of costly commitment is because soldiers have very little savings
that would enable them to smooth consumption over these periods. Repeatedly, soldiers
claimed they had little to no savings and would survive month-to-month. Multiple respon-
dents reported that even when they were paid, they would often have to pawn their cell
phone by the middle of the month in order to make ends meet.30 As such, those willing
to weather times of non-payment remained and those unwilling to burden these challenges
defected.
In general, defection takes a few forms. Most often, soldiers described defection as a
simple choice: they could and would simply leave the unit. In more severe situations, indi-
viduals deemed untrustworthy would be forcefully discharged by commanding officers (see
the vignette in section 2.5.3 as an illustrative example). Individuals who defect are identified
by the regime, struck from the payroll, and generally cast as untrustworthy. Indeed, those
unable to weather challenging times are fundamentally ignored by the regime. In an inter-
view in the provincial capital of Goma, one soldier recounted that after forgoing payment
for two months, he left his unit to return to the city and attempted to collect payment yet
was consistently ignored and taunted by all military officials.31
It is in the way that soldiers interpret and understand non-payment that buttresses it as a
screening process. While I primarily draw on data from active soldiers rather than those who
30Interviews with FARDC in North Kivu 2015.
31Interviews with FARDC in South Kivu and North Kivu, 2015.
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Figure 2.2: Missing Payments & Defection
did defect, soldiers described periods of non-payment as ‘trials’. Indeed, many soldiers saw
the ability to persevere through these “tests of patriotism” as signals of their commitment.
While all soldiers complained about the fact that they weren’t paid, they understood this
to be one of the core challenges they faced in making it as a soldier. This is where the
core logic of strategic non-payment rests: it provides the ability to distinguish those who
are committed to the army and its cause from those who are not. To provide more formal
evidence, table 2.3 analyzes the relationship between missing payments and defection and
figure 2.2 visualizes the least-squares fit controlling for a battery of pre-treatment variables.
Analysis shows that non-payments are positively correlated with defection, a relationship
which strengthens when controls are included. The impact is non-trivial: a unit moving
from always paid to missing a single month of payment is associated with a 10% increase in
defection.
It is important to note that not all soldiers remain for reasons of loyalty. Indeed, the
relative wages of soldiers are fairly strong and few outside opportunities exist. While the
average soldier makes only 85 USD per month, which provides an annual salary of 1,020
USD, this is more than twice than the gross national income per capita of 410 USD (World
Bank Group, 2014b). Multiple survey respondents despaired that while their situation was
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dire, there were no other opportunities for them to take.32 Alternatively, soldiers may have
remained for aspirational purposes and in hope of greater access to the goods associated
with authority (Verweijen, 2013).
It is similarly important to note that in no interview with senior or mid-ranking officials
did respondents suggest that units would not be paid as a punishment for any defection that
took place. While I do not have monthly panel data on defection and payment to formally
test this proposition, qualitative evidence tempers concerns over reverse causality.
These results also beg the question of whether non-payments separate the loyal from the
disloyal or more dubiously operates to retain those with fewer exit options. Given that better
exit options likely correlate with greater opportunity, assets, or competency, defection may
ultimately reduce the overall competency of the military. However, the language soldiers use
to describe periods of non-payment resonates with notions of commitment to a greater good
or nation. This suggests that those who are intrinsically motivated by the idea of service and
state are more likely to stay. Second, the regime may be indifferent to competent soldiers
leaving if they ultimately prize loyalty. It may be a preferable outcome if those with better
exit options leave, resulting in a less competent, but loyal body.
It is important to note that this study was conducted after reintegration policies had
been implemented and at a point in which surveyed soldiers were aware of non-payment.
As such, much of the screening I examine may have occurred prior to the launch of the
survey. This may introduce sample selection into estimation. The key implication is that
the estimates from this survey are valid to the time frame examined. However, this selection
bias also suggests that the analysis conducted is a hard test of the relationship between
non-payment and defection if those who stay are indeed the most loyal. This requires that
the effect of non-payment on loyalty is linear.
In this section, I documented that non-payment is associated with increases in defection
drawing on survey data. Importantly and as told by the soldiers, periods of non-payment
are seen as trials of commitment to the nation and broader nation-building project remain.
This suggests that non-payments serve as a technology that the regime uses to discriminate
between the committed and uncommitted.
32Interviews with FARDC in South Kivu and North Kivu, 2014 and 2015.
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2.5.3 Civilian Abuse
The tragic implication of using non-payment as a screening strategy to identify loyal
soldiers is that non-payment is correlated with higher levels of extortion and violence against
civilians. While these forms of predation are largely the byproduct of screening for loyalty,
suggestive evidence from qualitative interviews highlights that violence plays a similar role
in screening out disloyal soldiers. In this section, I profile the nature of civilian abuse
committed by the Congolese army, establish that non-payment is associated with extortion
and violence against civilians, and analyze evidence about the mechanisms through which
violence occurs.
The Congolese army is notoriously responsible for high levels of violence and extortion.
Data from ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010), which provides a broader overview of abuse than
my dataset, underscore the extent of violence meted out by the Congolese army: on average
there are 2.78 acts of violence against civilians attributed to the army each month between
1996 to 2014, which result in an average of 15.27 casualties per event.33 Researchers and
activists alike have documented similar trends (Stearns, Verweijen and Baaz, 2013) and
certain studies have even found that the military is responsible for comparatively more
violence than armed groups operating in the Eastern DRC (van der Windt and Humphreys,
2014). Of the soldiers I interviewed, between 22% and 34% report engaging in some type
of extortion, including theft, illegal taxation, or forced labor, and between 14% and 40%
report engaging in some sort of violence against civilians, including detention, torture, or
sexual violence.
A few notes are in order about the type of civilian abuse analyzed here. First, violence
is rarely used to suppress dissent in order to further regime interests. While the Congolese
regime is only democratic in name, its authoritarian tendencies are easily implemented
given the lack of an effective opposition and the particular irrelevance of the state in the
eastern part of the country. As such, rarely is violence exacted on the order of high-ranking
authorities to further related agendas. Second, despite ongoing conflict in the Kivus, little
33They are likely an underestimate of overall abuse as they do not include instances of extortion or violence
against civilians that were not were not severe enough to receive media attention, nor do they include events
for which attribution to an actor was unclear.
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violence is the direct result of adversarial battles. Instead of engaging in direct violence,
the Congolese army and many rebel groups softly collude given that these arrangements
generate more stable and productive territories to govern. In an interview with a soldier
freshly returned from deployment, for example, the respondent claimed his unit had been
drinking beers with the adversaries they were sent to fight.34
The organization of abuse, however, speaks to its causes. In interviews with soldiers,
respondents underscored that extortion and violence are organized by unit-level commanders
and implemented by the unit. Soldiers reported they would face punishment if they were
found to engage in extortion or violence without the permission of the unit commander.
While these responses may have been an attempt to shift the burden of responsibility, the
consistency and commonality in responses suggest otherwise. Respondents highlighted that
commanders would organize these processes, which would include identifying when and
where illegal barriers would be constructed as well as when and how more serious forms
of extortion and violence would happen. Unit commanders would often not participate in
the actual work. Rather, this was delegated to low-level rank-and-file soldiers in the unit.
Delegation to these soldiers would allow unit commanders to both monitor and, in certain
cases, test newer soldiers.
To formally assess the relationship between wages and predation, I analyze the correlation
between non-payment and a set of measures that capture low levels of extortion as well as
more severe forms of violence. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report results and figure 2.3 visualizes
these relationships.35
The results highlight the substantial and significant impact of missing payments on
predation: missing payments are associated with higher levels of all types of extortion
and violence against civilians, even when controlling for a set of key characteristics. The
magnitude of the effects are large as well. When a unit moves from missing no payments to
missing a month of payment, there is an a 15% - 35% increase in all forms of extortion and a
34Interview with FARDC in North Kivu, 2015.
35In these regressions, I use measures of missing payments and violence that occurred over the previous
six months. Appendix A.5 assesses the measurement error for month-to-month reports of missing payments
compared to aggregate reports over the previous 6 months and provides analysis that suggests the error is
classically distributed.
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Table 2.4: The Impact of Non-Payment on Extortion
Theft Taxation Forced Labor Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.149∗∗∗ 0.072 0.259∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗ −0.262∗∗
(0.030) (0.055) (0.034) (0.063) (0.035) (0.064) (0.061) (0.113)
Missing Payments 0.046∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.025) (0.026)
Controls X X X X
Observations 322 299 323 299 321 298 327 303
R2 0.041 0.078 0.020 0.049 0.027 0.054 0.041 0.078
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Controls include rank, ethnic Rwandan,
presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel status. Cross-sectional data are used for estimation. ∗ significant
at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
Table 2.5: The Impact of Non-Payment on Violence
Detention Torture SGBV Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.352∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.023 0.084∗ −0.214∗∗∗−0.194∗
(0.036) (0.065) (0.029) (0.054) (0.024) (0.045) (0.056) (0.105)
Missing Payments 0.038∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.024)
Controls X X X X
Observations 321 297 314 290 307 284 327 303
R2 0.020 0.086 0.087 0.100 0.153 0.185 0.114 0.132
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Controls include rank, ethnic Rwandan,
presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel status. Cross-sectional data are used for estimation. ∗ significant
at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
10% - 340% increase in all forms of violence.36 It is important to note that the relationships
estimated here are endogenous correlations; indeed, the very fact that missing payments are
targeted suggests non-payment is not random. To mitigate concerns about endogeneity, I
include a set of pre-treatment controls to account for unobserved heterogeneity.
To provide an additional check that missing payments are associated with increases in
violence, I draw on a survey experiment I embedded in the soldier interview. The goal
36These estimates are based on predicted probabilities holding pre-treatment covariates at their mean.
In moving from 0 to 1 month of missing payments, there is 34.7% increase in extortion, 14.1% increase in
household taxation, 20.6% increase in forced labor, 13.6% increase in forced detention, 56.1% increase in
torture, and 342.8% increase in SGBV.
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Note: This figure visualizes the impact of non-payment on the core forms of predation analyzed: household
extortion, taxation, forced labor, detention, torture, SGBV, and mean effects indices for extortion and
violence. The figure plots least square fits with 95% confidence intervals accounting for the following controls:
rank, ethnic Rwandan, presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel status.
of conducting the survey experiment was to leverage randomization to generate a set of a
clean, causal estimates on the effect missing payments have on violence as well as probe the
mechanisms through which this relationship emerges.
The survey experiment described a tactical situation in which soldiers were deployed to
a remote village to fight rebels and then asked whether, and the extent to which, they would
predate. In one condition, the unit had been paid and received rations while in another
condition they had not. The survey experiment was designed to maximize realism and
validity: the experiment described a hypothetical tactical scenario that Congolese soldiers
often experience, and both the experimental variation and contextual characteristics were
authentic to experiences soldiers described in qualitative interviews. Nonetheless, this survey
experiment serves as a measurement strategy more than an intervention that aims to alter
the behavior of respondents: it is used to validate the observational work and provide causal
estimates of the precise magnitude of predation that do not suffer from endogeneity or recall
issues. It also provides the ability to test whether there is a direct causal pathway between
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missing payments and violence without concerns over reversal causality that are present in
the observational data. The two different tactical situations described to soldiers in the
survey experiment were as follows:
Imagine that you are deployed in
North Kivu for operations. Your
unit has been deployed in a remote
area to weed out rebels...The
village is far from Goma but you
and your unit have received
rations and your salaries for the
last two months. Operations are
ramping up.
Imagine that you are deployed in
North Kivu for operations. Your
unit has been deployed in a remote
area to weed out rebels...The
village is far from Goma and you
and your unit have not received
rations nor your salaries for the
last two months. Operations are
ramping up.
Given this scenario, soldiers were asked to identify how many barriers they would erect
in the village and how much they would tax civilians in each household in the village. Table
2.6 reports results for the survey experiment; appendix A.6 reports summary statistics for
these variables as well as balance tests.
Table 2.6: Experimental Impact of Non-Payment on Predation
Barriers Erected Extortion Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 1.150∗∗∗ 1.445∗∗∗ 211.409∗∗∗ 61.381
(0.193) (0.309) (43.494) (72.052)
Missing Payments 0.615∗∗ 0.412∗ 143.463∗∗ 143.684∗∗
(0.271) (0.219) (61.510) (64.284)
Controls X X
Observations 311 305 298 275
R2 0.016 0.108 0.018 0.055
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares.
Controls include rank, ethnic Rwandan, presidential co-ethnic,
and ex-rebel status. Cross-sectional data are used for estimation.
∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
These results demonstrate that soldiers would erect significantly more road-blocks and
increase their household taxation rate when unpaid. The magnitude of these results are
stark: soldiers report that they would on average erect half another roadblock and that
they would increase their household taxation rate by around 145 Congolese Francs, which
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is equivalent to 30% of a Congolese daily salary. The sign and significance of these results
resonate with the observational findings and provide complementary estimates on the mag-
nitude of extortion. It is important to note that the observational data capture unit-level
behavior; the survey experiment captures individual-level behavior. The similarity in re-
sults suggest the relationship between non-payment and predation is a powerful dynamic
that operates at both units of analysis.
While both the observational and survey-experimental data highlight the striking rela-
tionship between non-payment and violence, a crucial question is whether violence operates
as an additional screening mechanism to determine loyalty. One respondent’s experience
underscores the role of violence as a screening process.37 The respondent was integrated
into the army from an armed group that he joined just prior to reintegration in order to
inflate the ranks of the rebel group and reap the subsequent benefits.38 During a deploy-
ment in North Kivu, the respondents’ unit did not receive wages and the unit commander
instructed the soldiers to pillage and loot local houses.39 In the interview, the respondent
recounted that he found the looting objectionable and brought back an insufficient number
of goods to his commander. The commander, who judged this as a signal of disloyalty,
broke the soldier’s arm as a punishment, which resulted in his discharge. The respondent
repeatedly described the situation as a trial in which he was unable to prove himself to his
commanding officer and was therefore ejected. Other in-depth interviews reported similar
stories: violence was used as an exercise to determine the true type of soldiers and often
resulted in defection by those who were not committed.
This vignette resonates with other soldier experiences and provide suggestive evidence
that violence is used as a further screening process. To further assess whether violence is
indeed used as a unique screening process, I analyze whether non-payment change norms
around the admissibility of predation or the level of discipline soldiers believe should be as-
sociated with predation with data from the survey experiment. Soldiers were asked whether
37Interview with ex-FARDC in North Kivu, 2015.
38The reintegration process allocated rank within the army according to the size and seniority of armed
groups prior to their entrance. As such, armed groups exaggerated their size and conducted broad and
indiscriminate recruitment campaigns in the months leading up their reintegration.
39The precise locations are withheld to protect the identity of respondents and provide anonymity.
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extorting or injuring a civilian would be admissible and how soldiers engaged in this behav-
ior should be punished.40 If violence were indeed another screening mechanism, violence
should be seen as a more admissible and punished less. Table 2.7 analyzes this relationship
and reports results.
Table 2.7: Mechanisms Underlying the Effect of Non-Payment on Predation
Extortion Violence
Admissibility Discipline Admissibility Discipline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 1.346∗∗∗ 1.320∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗ 2.600∗∗∗ 2.668∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.105) (0.079) (0.132) (0.039) (0.064) (0.074) (0.123)
Missing Payments 0.057 0.050 −0.045 −0.054 −0.006 −0.015 −0.080 −0.055
(0.089) (0.094) (0.111) (0.117) (0.054) (0.057) (0.104) (0.109)
Controls X X X X
Observations 331 303 344 315 331 304 344 315
R2 0.001 0.055 0.0005 0.016 0.00004 0.054 0.002 0.015
Note: These results leverage data from the survey experiment. Models are estimated using
ordinary least squares. Controls include rank, ethnic Rwandan, presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel
status. ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
The data show surprisingly little movement: missing payments fail to shift norms around
admissibility or punishment for abuse. Coupled with the result that soldiers report that they
would engage in higher levels of predation, these quantitative data suggest that violence
might not operate as an additional screening mechanism. One alternative argument may
be that violence is the byproduct of extortion that escalates. In this case, we would not
expect norms around violence to change given that it may just follow from extortion. While
this might explain the lack of change around violence, it fails to explain the lack of change
around extortion. The interpretation of results on these mechanisms warrants caution. First,
these results derive from a survey experiment and the treatment may not have been strong
enough to change reported norms. Second, the experiment was fielded with soldiers who had
previously experienced non-payment but did not defect. As such, the results are censored
and may look different had those who defected been apart of the sample.
40While the number of barriers erected and the extortion rate are the dependent variables for assessing
direct effects in the survey instrument, more severe forms of predation are used to test issues around norms.
This provides a harder test of mechanisms and also more closely approximates violent behavior
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Ultimately, when considering both qualitative and quantitative data on the role of vio-
lence as a screening mechanism, evidence is mixed. However, the qualitative data provide a
more principled test, speaking directly to experience and behavior. A relatively conservative
interpretation that integrates these inferences suggests that violence is only partially used
as a screening mechanism to assess loyalty and that it may also stem from prior screening
mechanisms. Nonetheless, the relationship between non-payment and violence against civil-
ians is clear: non-payment is systematically associated with higher levels of predation. The
consistency of these results across various types of extortion and violence underscore the
striking robustness and intensity of this relationship.
2.5.4 Predation & Loyalty
While the evidence is mixed on the role that civilian abuse plays in distinguishing the
committed from the untrustworthy, it does play another role: generating cohesion within
units and the military more broadly. Indeed, engaging in both extortion and violence against
civilians when unpaid helps cultivate the very quality that regimes seeks to screen for in the
first place. In this context, cohesion may not only reflect fidelity to the regime, but also a
reduction in exit options for soldiers whose dependence on the regime increases by engaging
in abuse. To evidence this effect, I draw on the correlation between the interaction of
non-payment and violence on reported levels of loyalty.
Social psychology has long cited the ability of violent acts to generate cohesion and
loyalty to a given group (Littman and Paluck, 2015). Exacting violence increases in-group
affinity with other members of the unit, increasing the relative benefit to staying with that
group. This resonates with recent work by Cohen (2013), in which she shows that one of
the causes of sexual violence is the need to create in-group solidarity. Engaging in violence
may also increase loyalty by increasing the costs of departure. Those who have participated
in combat or are responsible for civilian abuse may not be easily welcomed back into local
communities. This may be particularly important when soldiers serve in the areas from
which they hail or ethnic homelands where information about their behavior is more visible.
Reducing exit options may increase cohesion by increasing dependence on the military.
Conceptualizing loyalty and cohesion in this way illuminates how the process of culti-
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vating these qualities shapes the institutional profile of the army. If cohesion captures a
reduction in outside options, screening for loyal soldiers may ultimately generate a group of
predatory soldiers. Indeed, those who predate effectively will increase their dependence on
the regime compared to those who do not.41 This may explain how cultivating cohesive and
loyal forces ultimately generates predatory institutions.
In multiple interviews with soldiers, many professed pride over the abuse they had com-
mitted, even if they were simultaneously able to acknowledge the fact that it was wrong.42 In
interviews, soldiers connected violence to the challenging times of non-payment weathered,
deepening the relationship between predation and very process of distinguishing loyalty.
Many soldiers invoked the phrase, “I did it for the unit” and highlighted the importance of
aiding the unit.43 In this sense, violence may have genuinely generated loyalty or served as
a justification to engage in violence, which in turn, cemented this notion. While soldiers
did not directly attest to a reduction in exit-options created through violence, the loyalty
expressed may indeed be a function of this mechanism.
To formally interrogate the impact of non-payment and predation on loyalty, tables 2.8
and 2.9 interact missing payments with predation and analyze whether this is correlated
with increases in reported pride in the FARDC for both extortion and violence against
civilians. The same regressions are estimated to analyze the impact of missing payments
and predation on reported pride in one’s unit and are presented in appendix A.7; results are
similar to those for FARDC pride. Figure 2.4 visualizes the interaction of non-payment on
the mean effects index for extortion and violence for both pride in the FARDC and pride in
the unit.
The positive interaction effect that engaging in various forms of predation when not paid
has on loyalty demonstrates that soldiers who do engage in abuse during these challenging
times are significantly more likely to report pride in both their units and the FARDC. This
is particularly clear in figure 2.4 in which the red lines estimate the impact of non-payment
and predation for individuals who are paid (e.g. no missing payments) and the blue lines
41This assumes that exit costs are individually internalized rather than collectively internalized.
42Interviews with FARDC in North Kivu, 2015. See Baaz and Stern (2008) for further interviews with
soldiers in which they acknowledge norms against civilian abuse despite participating in this type of violence.
43Interviews with FARDC in North Kivu, 2015.
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Table 2.8: Extortion & Non-Payment Generate Loyalty
Outcome Variable: FARDC Pride
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 3.421∗∗∗ 3.118∗∗∗ 3.406∗∗∗ 3.109∗∗∗ 3.463∗∗∗ 3.199∗∗∗ 3.345∗∗∗ 3.024∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.127) (0.079) (0.133) (0.081) (0.131) (0.067) (0.125)
Missing Payments −0.123∗∗∗−0.113∗∗∗−0.116∗∗∗−0.110∗∗∗−0.189∗∗∗−0.185∗∗∗−0.094∗∗∗−0.081∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.028) (0.029)
Extortion Typei −0.365∗∗ −0.499∗∗ −0.199 −0.248 −0.313∗∗ −0.400∗∗∗−0.201∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.199) (0.155) (0.167) (0.145) (0.154) (0.086) (0.092)
M. Payment × Theft 0.162∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.069)
M. Payment× Taxation 0.114∗ 0.122∗
(0.060) (0.063)
M. Payment × Labor 0.238∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.057)
M. Payment × Index 0.114∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033)
Controls X X X X
Observations 315 294 316 294 314 293 320 298
R2 0.045 0.082 0.035 0.070 0.081 0.119 0.063 0.100
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Controls include rank, ethnic Rwan-
dan, presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel status. Cross-sectional data are used for estimation. ∗
significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
estimate the impact of non-payment and predation for those who are not paid: while the
red line is always decreasing, the blue line is always increasing.
There are two important features of these results. First, it is the interaction between
non-payment and engaging in violence that is associated with these loyalty effects. Results
not reported here suggest that engaging in violence is not directly correlated with increases
in loyalty within units. This departs from the extant literature which holds that violence
has a direct and positive impact on loyalty. Rather, it is only when violence is a part of a
screening process sanctioned through the unit does is it associated with increases in cohesion.
This highlights the importance of identifying scope conditions for when violence may serve
to increase group-affinity.
Second, results show that there are increases in loyalty to both the unit and the military.
If the joint effect of non-payment and predation were associated with increases in cohesion
to the unit without increases in loyalty to the military and regime more broadly, this process
may be self-defeating. Indeed, soldiers who are loyal to their unit more so than the army
may be more willing to follow commanding officers into a coup. The cohesion that the army
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Table 2.9: Violence & Non-Payment Generate Loyalty
Outcome Variable: FARDC Pride
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 3.418∗∗∗ 3.175∗∗∗ 3.417∗∗∗ 3.159∗∗∗ 3.437∗∗∗ 3.133∗∗∗ 3.360∗∗∗ 3.046∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.133) (0.072) (0.128) (0.070) (0.128) (0.068) (0.124)
Missing Payments −0.163∗∗∗−0.166∗∗∗−0.130∗∗∗−0.125∗∗∗−0.137∗∗∗−0.135∗∗∗−0.112∗∗∗−0.104∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031)
Violence Typei −0.164 −0.270∗ −0.182 −0.252 −0.409 −0.398 −0.181∗ −0.236∗∗
(0.141) (0.152) (0.197) (0.209) (0.260) (0.283) (0.098) (0.105)




M. Payment × Torture 0.161∗∗ 0.170∗∗
(0.064) (0.067)
M. Payment × SGBV 0.202∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.073)
M. Payment × Index 0.102∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030)
Controls X X X X
Observations 314 292 307 285 300 279 320 298
R2 0.056 0.091 0.047 0.075 0.055 0.097 0.065 0.105
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Controls include rank, ethnic Rwan-
dan, presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel status. Cross-sectional data are used for estimation. ∗
significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
seeks to cultivate is only useful insofar as it increases loyalty to the broader regime. These
results highlight a set of correlations that suggest that this is indeed the case.
It is important to note that measures of reported pride are only a partial measure of
loyalty and cohesion. Rather than directly capture fidelity to the regime or willingness to
refrain from participating in a coup or rebellion, pride reflects emotional and psychological
satisfaction with the military. While this does translate into a deeper level of devotion for
the military, this measure is incomplete. Nor does this directly capture the ways in which
cohesion may be the product of reducing exit options. This in part stems from challenges
of capturing loyalty in reported survey measures as well as the inductive approach used in
this project. These results are suggestive in nature and the consistency and robustness of
results across reported levels of pride speak to one component of loyalty.
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The Impact of Violence & Missing Payments on Unit
Pride
Note: This panel plots the interaction of non-payment on the mean effects index for extortion and violence
for both pride in the FARDC and pride in the unit. The interactions are estimated using ordinary least
squares with the following controls set at their means: rank, ethnic Rwandan, presidential co-ethnic, and
ex-rebel status. 95% confidence intervals are plotted around the estimates.
2.6 Discussion
Drawing on a mixed-methods approach, I analyze how the Congolese regime uses tar-
geted non-payment as a screening mechanism to distinguish loyalty and detail the civilian
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abuse that this process generates. The evidence garnered here is imperfect, and corrobo-
rative rather than decisive in nature. As such, I in turn discuss and empirically examine
the critical assumptions underlying the model, assess rival explanations, and consider the
generalizability of the findings.
2.6.1 Are Those Who Stay, Loyal?
Screening mechanisms are only effective insofar as they adequately distinguish individ-
uals by type. The critical assumption in the screening model developed here is that non-
payment separates the loyal from the disloyal, or that enduring periods of non-payment are
negatively correlated with loyalty. While I provide evidence that shows how engagement
in violence among non-paid units is associated with increases in cohesion, I lack direct ev-
idence on the type of soldiers who defect. Ideally, I would compare the profile of soldiers
who remained in the army to those who had defected; however, I’m limited in this approach
given the challenges of identifying and tracking defectors.
Instead, I draw on the sentiment and content soldiers used in interviews to buttress this
argument. The language soldiers use to describe periods of non-payment resonates with
notions of commitment to a greater good. Indeed, the soldiers interviewed cast times of
non-payment as trying, but as a requisite hardship that was ultimately minor in the broader
state-building project. This was furthered in language used by high-ranking officials, who
highlighted that soldiers who didn’t leave were truly part of the national project.
2.6.2 Non-Payment and Violence as a Screening Mechanism
An important question is why the military doesn’t use less costly processes to generate
signals of loyalty. Indeed, even if abuse is only the byproduct of screening soldiers for loyalty,
there is broad awareness that non-payment is associated with higher levels of predation.
Civilian abuse has drawn international condemnation and more importantly, violence against
civilians may reduce support for units who require the cooperation of local communities or
may even erode popularity for the regime. While high levels of civilian abuse has drawn
criticism from the international community, it has also repelled their interventions into the
security sector. Donors who previously supplied the army and invested in the military have
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shut down their programs out of frustration with the inability of their work to reduce abuse.
This has only benefited the regime, which seeks to avoid interference in the institution that
poses the greatest internal threat.
Moreover, as soldiers, activists and security sector experts repeatedly claimed in inter-
views: “impunity rules.” The general lack of accountability for violence has driven the costs
of engaging in violence low. This is true for soldiers, who rarely face retribution for abuse,
as well as for the autocratically oriented regime that is fundamentally unconcerned with
being replaced at the ballot box. Only in extreme cases is punishment meted out and even
then, it is often more performative than substantive: in the case of Minova in which soldiers
systematically raped 130 women and girls in 2012, for example, 39 soldiers were tried for
sexual violence and only 2 were convicted of rape.
To bring additional evidence to bear here, I interrogate how sanctioning may play into
this strategic logic by analyzing whether soldiers who are not paid and are violent face differ-
ential levels of punishment. Sanctions capture official military punishment, which as noted
above, is limited and only partially reflects the underlying dynamics of military behavior. If
regimes do indeed use non-payment as a strategy to discriminate loyalty with the knowledge
that it will generate defection and violence, then they should refrain from punishing them as
this would render the core strategy ineffectual. Given the lack of formal punishment, using
these measures provides a conservative test of this strategy. Table 2.10 interacts missing
payments with predatory behavior and reports the results for the mean effects indices for
extortion and violence. The results do not change across the constituent components, which
are presented in appendix A.8.
Here, analysis suggests that increases in abuse among those who are not paid are associ-
ated with reductions in sanctions. These correlations may signal to soldiers that when they
go unpaid, they will not be punished for predation. This buttresses the general logic that
violence serves to generate loyalty as sanctions for behavior that was ultimately encouraged
or induced by the regime would undercut its purpose.
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Table 2.10: Sanctioning Unpaid Soldiers Who Predate
Extortion Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.494∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.067) (0.036) (0.066)
Missing Payment 0.029∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Mean Effects Index 0.207∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.049) (0.051) (0.055)
Missing Payment × Index −0.047∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016)
Controls X X
Observations 323 299 323 299
R2 0.078 0.090 0.090 0.102
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Controls include
rank, ethnic Rwandan, presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel status. Cross-
sectional data are used for estimation. ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05;
∗∗∗p < .01.
2.6.3 Alternative Explanations
Three alternative theories that explain similar patterns in the data should be addressed.
First, while I argue that non-payment screens out disloyal soldiers, it may also drive high-
quality soldiers to exit if loyalty is correlated with better exit options. In this case, non-
payment would result in units dominated by ‘low-quality’ soldiers who are opportunistic or
abusive. This story is consistent with findings on the relationship between missing payments
and violence and resonates with theories forwarded by Weinstein (2006). Evidence to refute
this story is largely qualitative: soldiers repeatedly cited loyalty as the key characteristic
of those who were willing to weather challenging times of non-payment. More importantly,
these stories are not necessarily mutually exclusive as loyalty may be not be associated
with soldier efficacy. Indeed, if better exit options are correlated with competency more
so than loyalty, it’s plausible that non-payment creates loyal but incompetent units. Risk-
averse regimes probably prefer loyal but incompetent soldiers over disloyal competent ones
(Egorov and Sonin, 2011).
Second, missing payments may operate as a mechanism to provide wage cuts to units
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with low marginal productivity. In this story, the regime observes the performance of soldiers
and downwardly adjusts their wages accordingly. However, if this were true, you would likely
observe periods of non-payment extend beyond a single month and rotate in a less consistent
pattern. It’s quite unlikely that soldier performance would exhibit such systematic staggered
patterns. Moreover, if the regime were to engage in this type of wage reduction, they would
likely reduce how much specific units get paid relative to rank. However, the Congolese
army has an established wage floor and in practice consistently fulfills these payments when
delivered. In the sample of interviewed soldiers, 81% of respondents said they were always
paid in full when they were paid. Lastly, rather than cut pay according to performance, the
regime is known to provide additional bonuses for better behavior known as primes. Neither
commanding officers nor soldiers reported that they would be docked for their behavior
or performance. While this doesn’t decisively rule out this alternative story, evidence on
payment rotation, coupled with complete wage fulfillment as well as the presence of a bonus
mechanism, suggests that the army is not downwardly adjusting wages.
A third concern is that a simpler argument of risk management may be sufficient to
explain the results. Indeed, analysis that illustrates the army selectively allocates non-
payment by unit type over time also reveals a story in which the army is solely attempting
to spread risk rather that distinguish loyalty. Here, these theories are non-rival. Rather,
this is a story in which under-resourced bureaucracies leverage institutional weaknesses to
further serve them strategically. Evidence suggests that faced with the inability to pay all
forces, provincial-level officers use this constraint to solve the core guardianship dilemma as
well. Similarly, rather than argue that predation is solely caused by this process, I argue
that this process explains substantial variation in extortion and violence against civilians. It
is important to note, however, that a simpler argument fails to explain the extent to which
military officials, high-ranking and low, cast non-payment as a form of trial and tribulation
that screens out loyalty.
2.6.4 Generalizability
A crucial question is the extent to which the findings in this paper help explain current or
historical trends in militaries or institutions in fragile states. First, while the context seems
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particularly challenging given that the Congolese army is an amalgamation of previously
warring factions, 40% of the civil wars that took place between 1945 and 2006 resulted
in reintegrated militaries (Hartzell, 2014). In addition to this contemporary similarity with
other armies, reintegration remains a key component of negotiated settlements and analogous
militaries are likely to emerge in the future. In a salient cross-national study on the effects
of military reintegration, Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) find that reintegration has no
positive impact on short- or long-term peace. The findings in this paper, which suggest
that strategies used to deal with the challenges of reintegration ultimately results in civilian
abuse, may provide a micro-level explanation to these broader trends.
Additionally, reconciling competing factions with questionable loyalty is a common chal-
lenge in all post-conflict institutions, not just militaries. Indeed, the guardianship dilemma
is a case of a principal-agent problem that vexes all leaders who must effectively identify
loyal individuals who will faithfully implement delegated tasks. It is the similarity in the
structural conditions that generate this strategic environment that render these findings in-
sightful to other contexts. However, the novelty of the screening mechanism identified in this
paper makes assessing its generalizability difficult. Indeed, while the literature on screen-
ing mechanisms in advanced bureaucracies highlights the role of educational investments
(Spence, 1973) or political affiliation (Calvo and Ujhelyi, 2012), rarely do weak institutions
have the capacity to meaningfully implement these mechanisms. Identifying and analyzing
alternative screening mechanisms is key to understanding how leaders manage these problem
in weak institutional settings.
What of the findings on violence? While the focus on broad conflict-level characteristics
has dominated the study of civilian abuse in political science (Valentino, 2014), this work
highlights the role of violence in both testing and generating loyalty within institutions.
These findings resonate with results from both case studies and laboratory experiments in
social psychology that emphasize the ability for violence to generate cohesion, and in doing
so, speak to the more broadly generalizable role of loyalty in the study of civilian abuse
(Littman and Paluck, 2015). Perhaps more relevant, cross-national results that highlight
the relevance of this mechanism in the determinants of civilian abuse (Cohen, 2013) suggest
that the results on violence may indeed travel to other contexts.
CHAPTER 2. PAYMENT AND PREDATION: THE POLITICS OF WAGES AND
VIOLENCE IN THE CONGOLESE ARMY 59
Yet, the scope conditions that shape this analysis are similarly important to highlight.
These findings more directly speak to weak states wracked by conflict in which regimes
fear the destabilizing power of their military. Moreover, the strategies highlighted here are
particularly important in heterogeneous societies and institutions and may provide weaker
analytic leverage in understanding stable, homogeneous contexts.
2.7 Conclusions
Regimes across the world face the same dilemma: they must build armies effective enough
to foil external threats, yet in doing so create forces that are powerful enough to depose
them. In this paper, I develop and test the argument that the Congolese regime uses non-
payment as a screening strategy to distinguish loyal soldiers from uncommitted soldiers in
order to solve this problem. I contend that this screening process fuels civilian abuse, which
is managed by commanding officers and used to cultivate loyalty and internal cohesion. To
empirically illustrate this argument, I draw on a set of correlations that suggest the regime
selectively allocates wages, which drives both defection by soldiers who are disloyal and
abuse exacted by loyal soldiers who remain. Soldiers who engage in abuse during the trying
times of non-payment are substantially more likely to report higher levels of pride in both
their unit and the army.
This article contributes to a rich literature on the political economy of institutions in
fragile states. By analyzing how regimes leverage financial constraints to develop novel
screening strategies in order to distinguish loyalty among soldiers in the military, this paper
illuminates the institutional foundations of regime survival. The tragic implication is that
the very strategy the state uses to ensure protection from within generates high levels of
abuse towards its own citizens. In detailing this cause of predation, this paper contributes a
novel explanation for civilian abuse to scholarship that seeks to understand the determinants
of this type of violence. Lastly, in demonstrating that violence perpetrated by soldiers
generates internal cohesion, this article illustrates how this type of abuse may generate the
very loyalty that regimes seek to cultivate in order to maintain their power. In this sense,
violence against civilians may ultimately generate and reinforce predatory institutions.
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I close by considering the policy implications of this study. First and foremost, effectively
supporting weak institutions requires making investments in mechanisms that enable leaders
to overcome core principal-agent problems. This is particularly salient in fragile states
and settings in which regimes inherit heterogeneous institutions where they face a larger
challenge of screening out those they distrust. Establishing formal screening mechanisms
such as recruitment exams or training programs may allow regimes to substitute out of
pernicious screening strategies such as non-payment. Crafting policies and aid packages
that help leaders overcome the challenges posed by building strong institutions is key to the
broader statebuilding exercise (Krasner and Weinstein, 2014). These investments are not
only crucial to reducing the impact of armed conflict by strengthening institutions in these
contexts, but are necessary to making progress on development given that half of the world’s
poor live in countries afflicted by violence (World Bank Group, 2014a).
This study also provides insight on security sector reform and military assistance. One
direct implication of this research is that providing budgetary support to help regimes pay
their soldiers may not be effective if regimes use non-payment to assess soldier loyalty. More
broadly, identifying how actions that appear to reflect bureaucratic mismanagement serve
other strategic purposes is key solving underlying problems. Second, military reintegration
as a policy may generate more distrust and dysfunction than it resolves. At the very least,
reintegration amplifies the guardianship dilemma by bringing combatants with opposing
loyalties under a unified command. In cases in which reintegration is a requirement for a
negotiated peace, actors must be aware of the downstream consequences of this choice and
implement policies that provide countervailing balance.
Lastly, this study illuminates new ways to reduce civilian abuse. Analysis here demon-
strates that violence against civilians is at least partially a function of strategies used to
solve the guardianship dilemma. While a wide variety of programs have been launched by
international organizations to prevent civilian abuse perpetrated by military forces, to the
best of my knowledge, none analyzes violence as an outcome of this particular problem.
Accurately diagnosing the cause of civilian abuse is key to prescribing appropriate solutions.
In this sense, combating this type of violence may lie in helping regimes solve the very
screening dilemmas that drive this abuse.
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Abstract
Exposing atrocities has long been a key strategy used by human rights advocates and
international organizations to document and deter violence in conflict zones. However,
does establishing evidence of atrocities through the systematic monitoring of war affect
the strategic use of violence during conflict? Does monitoring conflict ultimately deter
crimes against humanity before they take place? To answer this question, I analyze the
impact of “Eyes on Darfur”, the first-ever satellite intervention implemented by Amnesty
International USA amidst a brutal genocide with the objective of reducing violence. To
examine whether this project changed the behavior of the Sudanese Government in Darfur,
I estimate the impact of monitoring using a novel dataset I construct of high-frequency, sub-
national data on genocidal attacks. Using difference-in-difference and matching estimators,
analysis suggests that monitoring resulted in pernicious and persistent effects: Amnesty’s
intervention increased violence in monitored villages and neighboring villages during the
program as well as in subsequent years. Coupled with qualitative evidence, results suggest
that the Government of Sudan increased violence to retaliate against Amnesty’s advocacy
efforts. This study highlights the potential for well-intentioned advocacy efforts to generate
perverse effects.
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3.1 Introduction
Human rights activists and advocacy organizations seek to expose atrocities that occur
during conflict in order to deter the atrocities, violations, and violent conflict that have
exacted a profound toll on human and physical capital globally (Ghobarah, Huth and Rus-
sett, 2003). Indeed, the battle cry of anti-genocide advocates has long been, “The world
is watching,” (Power, 2003). By producing evidence of violence, organizations are able to
publicize the actions of perpetrators and decry their behavior. The underlying logic is that
by bringing attention of abuse to the public, violators will reduce their transgressions out of
fear of negative repercussions that may come in the form of restricted aid, increased turmoil
at home, and in severe cases, international criminal warrants.
Scholars hold that this advocacy-based model of collecting and publicizing information
not only reduces human rights violations around the world, but operates to change inter-
national norms globally (Rise, Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, 1999). Monitoring remains the
backbone of human rights organizations waging a battle of information politics (Keck and
Sikkink, 1998; Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 2005), and “information strategies” are crucial
to deterring violations (Hafner-Burton, 2012). A growing literature empirically examines
the impact of these strategies and finds support for these claims: Hafner-Burton (2008)
demonstrates that the documentation and release of reports by NGOs, the UN, and media
decreases human rights violations broadly; Hendrix and Wong (2012) show that naming and
shaming campaigns generate particularly strong impacts in democratic states; and Murdie
and Davis (2012) illustrate that these campaigns are powerful when complemented by local
human rights organizations that are able to apply pressure domestically. Even in the most
dire of situations, naming and shaming has been shown to reduce the severity of genocidal
violence and state-sponsored killings (Krain, 2005; DeMeritt, 2015).
Human rights advocacy and naming and shaming strategies has grown exponentially
and become commonplace in the international arena. As Hafner-Burton (2008) points out,
while only 25 countries were annually shamed by Amnesty International in 1975, more than
100 countries were shamed by 2000. This reflects a rise in a sort of ‘NGO-Diplomacy’
in which activists directly engage in domestic and international policy-making processes
through alternative forms of statecraft (Betsill and Corell, 2008). This sea-change is in part
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due to a fundamental shift in postwar politics that resulted in comparatively more structural
opportunities for NGO engagement (Reimann, 2006). The results have been profound: these
forms of activism have shaped international armes treaties (Carpenter, 2011), environmental
regulations (Wapner, 1995), woman’s rights legislation (Hughes, Krook and Paxton, 2015),
and intellectual property regimes for essential medicines (Epstein, 1996; Shadlen, 2007), as
well as other issues.
Despite these changes, the impact of human rights activism and interventions are not
straightforward, particularly in the context of conflict, where these efforts may lead to worse
outcomes (Autesserre, 2014b; de Waal, 2015). These well-intentioned strategies may in fact
increase violence for a set of theoretically grounded reasons. First, launching advocacy-
driven monitoring efforts may increase violence by allowing actors to credibly signal their
resolve or suggest they are willing to ratchet up the costs if the international community in-
tervenes (Fearon, 1998), which, in some cases, may prolong violence by reducing exit options
for those involved (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002). Second, launching advocacy efforts that
track and publicize transgressions may legitimize actors who would not have engaged in these
transgressions in the absence of coverage (Bob, 2005; Kuperman, 2008; Kydd and Straus,
2013). Third, in cases in which governments or non-state actors delegate violence to proxies
(Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014), advocacy driven-monitoring may provide a method by
which principals can effectively assess whether their agents will execute the performance
of allocating violence. Fourth, advocacy efforts may generate perverse effects by increas-
ing retaliation against already targeted groups as governments or non-state actors fear that
the allegiance formed between communities and international human rights organizations
may shift the balance of power against them (Narang and Stanton, 2013). Alternatively,
monitoring certain types of violations or areas may simple drive down the specific form of
violence in observed locations but displace it into other areas (Hafner-Burton, 2008).
This study brings novel evidence to bear on the debate over whether advocacy-driven
monitoring works and uses a unique test to illuminate the ways in which it changes behavior
in the context of violent conflict. I analyze the impact of “Eyes on Darfur”, the first-ever
satellite intervention implemented by a human rights organization amidst a raging conflict
with the objective of deterring violence. Between June 2007 and January 2008, Amnesty
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International USA selected a set villages in Darfur, monitored them using satellites, and
notified the Government of Sudan that those villages were monitored and that any atrocities
committed in them would be globally publicized.1 To examine whether this innovative
program changed the behavior of the Sudanese Government in Darfur, I estimate the impact
of monitoring using a novel dataset I construct of high-frequency, sub-national data on
genocidal attacks. I assess whether the program reduced or amplified violence and whether
it generated any unintended consequences by displacing violence. To do so, I use difference-
in-difference estimators over the full population of all villages in Darfur as well as a smaller
set of counterfactual villages that I identify by leveraging Amnesty’s initial village selection
criteria.
My analysis proceeds in two steps. I first estimate the direct effect of monitoring on vio-
lence and demonstrate that Amnesty’s intervention is associated with substantial increases
in the likelihood that the Government of Sudan attacked monitored villages. I find that
Amnesty’s advocacy effort was associated with between a 15 and 20 percentage point in-
crease in violence. A deep empirical challenge in analyzing monitoring is that violators
may alter their behavior to go undetected; while a cursory analysis may suggest that a
monitoring intervention works or not, it may have just displaced violence. In the second
step, I address these concerns and analyze whether the program caused temporal or spa-
tial displacement effects. Specifically, I assess whether the Government of Sudan attacked
villages in anticipation of the intervention or refrained from attacking monitored villages
until they believed monitoring had ended, as well as whether they avoided monitored vil-
lages and attacked neighboring villages. I find that the impact of the program was not only
pernicious, but persistent: monitored villages experienced a 20 percentage point increase in
attacks in the year after the program ended. Moreover, the program increased violence in
neighboring villages by 8 percentage points, tempering hope that these monitoring interven-
tions may generate geographically protective enclaves. These results are robust to a series
of alternative regression specifications, matching strategies and placebo checks.
To explain why these results diverge from current research that highlights the amelio-
1I use Amnesty International USA, Amnesty International, and Amnesty interchangeably throughout
the paper, however it is important to note that the program was conducted by Amnesty International USA
(AIUSA).
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rative effects of naming and shaming on genocidal violence (Krain, 2005; DeMeritt, 2015),
I draw on suggestive, albeit limited, qualitative evidence to analyze why the Government
of Sudan targeted these villages. The Government’s public behavior suggests that they
increased violence in monitored villages to retaliate against Amnesty’s advocacy efforts.
While the Government consistently targeted the limited number of aid workers that they
let into Darfur, Amnesty used satellites and did not maintain a field presence because of
these challenges. As such, retaliating against Amnesty could only be done by targeting the
communities they aimed to protect. These results underscore the perverse effect that human
rights campaigns which aim to deter violence may have on conflict.
A series of challenges that complicate analysis merit discussion. First, Amnesty only
monitored 10 villages in Darfur due to feasibility constraints. While I draw on a dataset
of 10,000 Darfuri villages to increase precision in estimation, underlying concerns over sta-
tistical power warrant caution. Second, I analyze data that is observational in nature.
To address this issue, I 1) implement a matching algorithm to pre-process data in order
to account pre-treatment covariates and trends in violence, 2) use difference-in-difference
estimators to account for geographic- and time-fixed effects, and 3) conduct a series of
robustness checks to ensure that results are not artefactual to any single regression specifi-
cation. Third, to increase symmetry in the treatment and unit of analysis, I aggregate data
to square grids, which may introduce bias. I conduct analysis against a variety of grid sizes
to ensure these biases don’t drive results. Lastly, I rely on secondary data for analysis as
collecting first-hand accounts from perpetrators or victims in active conflict remains a key
obstacle to understanding the dynamics of violence. Where possible, I integrate interviews,
project documentation, and history of the conflict to assess the validity of the findings and
buttress the results.
While Eyes on Darfur was a unique satellite program launched amidst an ongoing geno-
cide in a single region of Sudan, the findings are not limited to this case. The underlying
characteristics of the this program resonate with a broader family of advocacy efforts that
human rights organizations implement during conflict. Moreover, while the use of satellite
technologies are new, traditional concerns about the credibility, accuracy and precision that
characterize debates around monitoring similarly framed the debate in this case. And, given
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that this intervention took place at the height of the Darfuri genocide, this paper provides
a hard test of monitoring conflict: evidence that human rights organizations can shape the
behavior of governments engaged in genocide may provide a lower- or upper-bound estimate
of the impact of these interventions more broadly.
This article contributes to a broad literature that analyzes the impact human rights ad-
vocacy efforts. It responds to scholarly appeals to generate causal estimates of interventions
that seek to reduce violence (Hafner-Burton, 2014), and to the best of my knowledge, pro-
vides the first micro-level quantitative study that examines whether monitoring atrocities
incentivizes governments to refrain from violence. This study also builds on data-constricted
scholarship on the Darfuri genocide and provides the first comprehensive analysis of patterns
of genocidal violence in this case (Olsson and Siba, 2013; Hazlett, 2013).2 It does so while
appropriately accounting for spillover effects, which are more than just nuisance parameters
and are key to understanding the unbiased impact of human rights interventions. The results
highlight the potential for monitoring interventions implemented by NGOs to amplify vio-
lence and align with a limited, but important set of estimates that highlight the deleterious
effect of advocacy efforts (Charli Carpenter, 2005; Hafner-Burton, 2008). Importantly, it
discusses the conditions under which these interventions work. Paradoxically, these results
demonstrate that even states entrenched in the most severe forms of violence are sensitive
to human rights organizations that monitor their behavior. This is particularly important
given the limited tools available to shape the behavior of actors engaged in conflict.
The findings of this study also contribute to a rich literature on the dynamics of civilian
abuse and illuminates the internal workings of violent regimes (Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein,
2006; Wood, Kathman and Gent, 2012; Cohen, 2013).3 While the majority of scholarship
on civilian abuse comes from civil wars, this article provides a set of estimates on the
strategic use of violence during genocide for which there exists limited micro-level work
(Harff, 2003; Valentino, 2004). Additionally, rather than analyze individual unit commanders
or soldiers, the empirical approach I leverage examines the use of violence between villages
2As a matter of comparison, the only village level analysis on Darfur to date examines patterns in around
500 village (Olsson and Siba, 2013).
3For a recent review of the vast literature on the determinants of civilian abuse see Valentino (2014).
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as a portfolio choice of the Government and in doing so assesses the nature of command
and control within states. This case offers a sort of ‘statistical forensics’ for identifying and
implicating those responsible for violence. While Sudanese officials continuously claimed
they were not responsible for violence and did not have any control over Janjaweed militias
who were exacting violence in Darfur, it was the only actor notified of the intervention.
Evidence provided here highlights that monitored villages were strategically targeted and,
as such, suggests that either the Government was indeed responsible for violence or that
there was a command and control structure between the Government of Sudan and the
militias. These findings suggest that violence is the source of deep structure rather than its
absence (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006).
Lastly, this article provides the first set of estimates on the effect of a new technology
championed by human rights activists as a groundbreaking tool to enhance human rights,
and in doing so provides early evidence on the impact of an increasingly democratized
form of surveillance. While this itself is non-trivial, the core question remains whether
and how these new technologies change the strategic dynamics between those who monitor
and those monitored. Theory offers guidance in answering this question and understanding
the importance of this case. Collecting information in conflict zones remain deeply difficult,
particularly in countries that deny access to monitors in order to avoid the documentation of
their behavior. Sudan did not consent to Amnesty’s presence, yet Amnesty was nonetheless
able to monitor a set of villages. By removing the decision-node at which the government
could accept or reject monitoring, this case illuminates the impact of monitoring for a broad
family of conflicts that often go unexplored. In doing so, this article contributes a set
of estimates that get past the selection bias in evidence that monitoring often produces
both within conflicts and across conflicts. As such, it moves beyond a key impediment in
understanding the role of human rights interventions in conflict and more broadly expands
the scope of evidence on the effect of human rights monitoring.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 lays out a theoretical framework for why
advocacy interventions may increase or reduce violence during conflict. Section 3.3 discusses
Amnesty’s interventions and grounds theoretical predictions in the local context. Section 3.4
introduces the data and section 3.5 discusses the empirical strategy. Results are presented
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in section 3.6. Section 3.7 analyzes why the program increased violence and considers the
generalizability of these results. Section 4.6 concludes.
3.2 Theory
3.2.1 Direct Effects
While methods vary, the core activities of human rights organizations and actors that
monitor conflict to deter violence remains constant: produce, document, and disseminate
evidence about the behavior of a given regime or non-state actor. The goal of advocacy-
driven monitoring is to generate accurate, credible and impartial information and increase
the probability that violence is detected in order to reduce the expected utility of engaging
in violent behavior (Hill, Moore and Mukherjee, 2013).4
Advocacy-driven monitoring may deter violence through three unique mechanisms, all
of which follow from a rationalist paradigm in which targeted actors carefully weigh the
costs and benefits of engaging in violence and react accordingly. First advocacy efforts may
reduce violence by generating evidence of atrocities that mobilize third party actors to take
actions against those responsible (Kydd, 2010). These are often meted out in the form of
economic sanctions or international criminal court warrants, and in severe cases, military
intervention. The lack of evidence of atrocities is often cited by third parties as a barrier
to appropriate reprisal: without reliable evidence, it is difficult to justify action. In these
cases monitoring may provide sufficient information to trigger action or mobilize domestic
bases to pressure states to take action (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). A large component of
advocacy efforts focus on mobilizing these audiences to pressure governments to intervene
in targeted conflicts. Often, these efforts are successful. Mobilizing the base has resulted
in outcomes that range from financial policies that seek to undercut violent actors engaged
in illicit mineral trading in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Seay, 2012), to American
military intervention that has aimed to neutralize the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda
4A given actor’s expected utility over an action is expressed as follows: E(u) = pU(B−C)+(1−p)U(B),
where E(u) is the expected utility, p is the probability of sanction, B are the benefits of a given action, and
C is the cost of sanction. This follows from the core model of expected utility that Becker (1968) originally
proposed an individual faces when deciding to engage in a crime.
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(Schomerus, Allen and Vlassenroot, 2011).
Second, the vast majority of contemporary conflicts ends in negotiated settlements me-
diated by third parties (Walters, 2002; Toft, 2005; Sisk, 2009). At the negotiation table
itself, parties make claims to the division of goods based on their bargaining power, which
is often shaped by what happened during the conflict. Cases in which one side committed
mass atrocities or were particularly harmful may have a weaker position at the bargaining
table. Additionally, while international criminal law remains weakly institutionalized, ev-
idence suggests that actors may incorporate potential future legal implications into their
decision-making (Sikkink, 2011). If advocacy efforts effectively monitor conflict and collect
sufficient evidence to alter negotiation status or generate indictments, they may deter vio-
lence. For these types of material sanctions to motivate change, actors must have something
to lose or feel vulnerable to intervention. This suggests that advocacy may be relatively
effective in nascent conflicts in which states have not yet been isolated or in states that are
of particular strategic value in the international arena.
Alternatively, the infrequently-considered mechanism of ‘legacy effects’ may prevent vi-
olence as actors engaged in conflict may not want to be remembered for their behavior.
Shaming strategies may indeed have an effect on the decisions actors make if they are con-
cerned with the legacies they leave behind. In this sense, advocacy efforts may deter violence
by producing evidence with which actors do not want to be associated. This is uniquely dif-
ferent from economic or legal reprisal as it encompasses non-material losses. While research
on the legacies of war for victims has received increasing attention (Blattman, 2009), un-
derstanding perpetrator legacies remain scant and the ‘shaming’ component of naming and
shaming strategies may generate significant impacts. Identifying when ‘legacy effects’ may
be at play is more idiosyncratic given that they occur at the individual-level, but may be
relevant when conflicts are cast as unnecessarily brutal rather than strategically necessary.5
A challenge of advocacy efforts launched amidst violence is that they require monitored
parties are ultimately responsible for, and capable of, restricting violence. Models of human
5In a fourth, but less relevant mechanism in the context of human rights advocacy, monitoring may deter
conflict by reducing the information asymmetries that lead to war in the first place. Potential adversaries
may wage war due to information asymmetries in which one or both sides don’t know the true capabilities
of their foe and therefore over-estimate their ability win a emerge victorious from a conflict (Fearon, 1995;
Powell, 2002). Monitoring conflict may serve to correct these asymmetries and therefore reduce conflict.
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rights advocacy typically ascribe responsibility for violations to a command structure within
a state or non-state actor. This is not an innocent assumption given findings that civilian
abuse and human rights violations are often the source of institutionally weak actors unable
to restrain violence (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006), and many contemporary critiques of
transnational conflict advocacy emphasize the potential danger of assuming unitary actors
(de Waal, 2015). Irrespective of command and control structures, advocacy efforts seek to
reduce violence through one of these two mechanisms and suggest the following hypothesis:
H1: Advocacy deters violence by increasing the probability of detection.
However, this hypothesis is contentious precisely because the theoretical predictions over
the impact of advocacy efforts are not clear and in many cases may operate to amplify
conflict. There are three unique motivations for increasing violence in response to advocacy-
driven monitoring. First, advocacy efforts may increase violence by allowing actors to signal
their strength or commitment to an issue either to local audiences or the international
community. A key challenge of warring factions in low-information environments is signaling
their capacity or resolve to their adversaries. While violence is a costly act used to induce
a certain type of behavior in victims and others, actors would prefer to use less violence
to generate the same behavior if possible (Cohen, 2013; Downes, 2008; Esteban, Morelli
and Rohner, 2015; Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay, 2004). If advocacy efforts produces
and transmits the type of information that actors wish to inform their enemies of, it may
amplify violence in certain areas by incentivizing actors to “send a strong message.” To local
audiences, this may signal resolve to stay in power while to international audiences, it may
signal a willingness to ratchet up costs in the face of international intervention.
Related, advocacy efforts may increase violence by reducing ambiguity in actor’s trans-
gressions and producing sufficiently incriminating evidence. This may be imposed, or fa-
cilitated, by monitoring. In the former case, monitoring may generate information about
violent behaviors that reduces the possibility of reaching a negotiated settlement or exiting
quietly; here actors may pursue conflict if outside options for peace have been reduced. This
may be particularly relevant at the beginning of a conflict when the culpability of certain
actors remains opaque. Scholarship on the impact of the international criminal court has
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debated whether issuing warrants extends the duration of conflict by reducing available exit
options (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003; Jo and Simmons, 2014), and advocacy that furnishes
the evidence requisite to launch indictments follows the same logic. In the latter case, ac-
tors who want to signal commitment to an issue, but are unable to do so in the absence
of monitoring, may use it to generate that exact type of evidence: by actively removing an
outside option, actors commit to a path of conflict. Here, monitoring solves the problem of
credibly committing to violence (Fearon, 1998).6
Second, if concerns over fragmented command and control structures are taken seri-
ously and monitoring is sought to provide communication channels through which to signal
behavior, then monitoring may also solve internal principal-agent problems. Research con-
sistently demonstrates that the delegation of violence to forces that are difficult to monitor
and control is a source of civilian abuse and atrocities across conflicts (Salehyan, Siroky
and Wood, 2014; Gordon, 2015; DeMeritt, 2015). If advocacy efforts provide a monitoring
service that principals are unable to perform themselves, then they may task agents with
exacting violence in monitored areas as a test of their willingness to implement a delegated
task. If agents seek to signal ‘good behavior’ to their principals, they will increase violence
in monitored areas. While this mechanism is theoretically plausible, no empirical evidence
about its use exists to the best of my knowledge.
Third, advocacy efforts may increase violence by incentivizing governments to retaliate
directly against human rights organizations or the communities that these activists seek
to protect. In an attempt to prevent advocacy-driven monitoring from generating incrim-
inating evidence, actors may ramp up violence on the hopes that organizations will cease
their activities. This is particularly common for organizations that spotlight repression in
authoritarian regimes (Christensen and Weinstein, 2013), but is also increasingly common
in conflicts in which aid workers are targeted in order to expel these organizations (Narang,
2013). And, retaliation is a rational strategy: Murdie and Davis (2012) show that domes-
tic actors or communities that are supported by international organizations are much more
6Salient to conflicts with multiple non-state actors, monitoring may increase violence by legitimizing
actors who would have otherwise gone unnoticed or not engaged in violence. Here, monitoring solves the
key challenge that non-state actors face in being recognized as a group with legitimate policy or ideological
goals. This logic of legitimization highlights the potential for third parties to breed conflict due to the moral
hazards they produce (Kuperman, 2008; Kydd and Straus, 2013).
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effective in achieving their goals. As such, the very process of advocating on behalf of a
community may generate broader forms of violence and retaliation.
Ultimately, advocacy interventions launched amidst conflict generate theoretically am-
biguous predictions and limited micro-level quantitative work provides little help in adju-
dicating between these mechanisms. While human rights activists aim to reduce violence,
results that tell the opposite story are themselves illuminating: skeptics of these campaigns
believe they have little effect in changing the arc of conflict, but evidence that violence is
amplified suggests that they do indeed shape the strategic behavior of intended targets.
3.2.2 Substitution Effects
A significant challenge to assessing the effect of advocacy campaigns of any sort is deter-
mining whether they have indeed deterred these violations or simply displaced them. While
failing to appropriately account for spillover effects may generate spurious results (Gerber
and Green, 2012), spillovers are more than just nuisance parameters. The presence, or
lack thereof, of spillover effects illuminates the strategic choices that actors make in light
of advocacy-driven monitoring. While actors who shift their violence reveal that they are
fundamentally sensitive to these interventions, actors who make no adjustments reveal a
total lack of sensitivity.
While analysis of naming and shaming campaigns that account for spillovers is limited,
those that do suggest that governments indeed substitute into different strategies in re-
sponse to the ‘spotlight’ of monitoring (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Evidence from multiple fields
suggests that monitoring interventions similar to those of advocacy efforts often induce
displacement. Criminological analysis of various policing programs suggest that these inter-
ventions generally displace violence (Dills, Miron and Summers, 2008; McCarthy, 2002).7
Highlighting the empircial importance of acccounting for these effects, Donohue, Ho and
Leahy (2013) re-analyze the seminal study of Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) on the im-
pact of policing in Argentina and show that the core result that it reduced crime drops
out once displacement is accounted for in analysis. Similarly, electoral monitoring has been
consistently shown to displace vote irregularities (Hyde, 2010; Inchino and Schundeln, 2012).
7See Levitt and Miles (2006) and Nagin (2013) for reviews on policing interventions that discuss spillovers.
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In the context of conflict, evidence suggests that actors are often sensitive to the production
of information about crimes against humanity and invest in substitution strategies; mass
graves are one example of how actors engage in costly behavior to conceal their actions.
Specifically, armed actors can draw on three strategies in light of advocacy campaigns
that generate information about their behavior beyond increasing or decreasing violence:
1) wait to commit violence until they believe monitoring has ended, 2) re-target their vi-
olence to unmonitored areas, or 3) alter the type of violence used in order to camouflage
their behavior. Because the relative value of substitution decreases as the marginal cost of
relocation increases, the presence of displacement illuminates the elasticity of targeting in
conflict. The most commonly analyzed form of displacement is spatial. In this case, actors
shift their targeting to unmonitored villages in order to pursue their goals without the clear
production of evidence around these issues. The core logic is that exacting violence in a
close, and therefore similar, location, achieves the same goals without incurring any of the
potential costs. This dynamic generates the following hypothesis:
H2: Advocacy efforts displace violence to neighboring areas or transgression by increasing
the probability of detection.
While monitoring may indeed displace violence to neighboring areas, it may also provide
protection. If actors are sensitive to monitoring and seek to minimize their exposure to
risk, they may avoid broader swaths of areas encompassing monitored sites. In this case,
monitoring may generate positive externalities and create a ‘halo effect.’ An alternative
form of displacement is temporal: actors may simply wait to exact violence in villages until
they believe monitoring is completed. As Franklin (2008) finds, the duration of naming and
shaming campaigns is limited — they reduce transgressions during campaigns, but actors
return to violating rights quickly after these campaigns end. During military operations
deployed over vast areas, the cost of waiting may be high; troops remain stationed and must
be re-supplied. However, the cost of culpability may outweigh these logistical concerns.
Given a prior that monitoring does change behavior, this suggests the following hypothesis:
H3: Advocacy efforts delay violence within communities by increasing the probability of
detection.
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This type of displacement reveals an underlying patience that resonates with actors’
investment in long-term strategic planning. Indeed, if actors are sensitive to advocacy-
driven monitoring, yet face urgent time constraints, they may solely change the location
rather than the timing of the targeting. Alternatively, if actors seek to leverage monitoring to
amplify violence, monitored sites will be targeted more swiftly than planned. An alternative
concern is that actors are notified that monitoring will take place prior to implementation
and incentivize actors to engage in violence prior to monitoring. This is common occurrence
in the deployment of peacekeepers and human rights monitors in simmering conflicts where
the delay between the announcement of the program and its launch are substantial. In
anticipation of monitoring, actors may target communities that are future areas of scrutiny.
A last form of displacement is one in which actors substitute into alternative forms of
violence, most commonly, by shifting from publicly observable forms of violence to private
forms of violence.8 This form of camouflage is often employed in conflicts where actors
attempt to obscure their behavior. In the context of satellite monitoring in Darfur for
example, actors may stop burning villages, which are detectable by satellites, and instead
commit atrocities that leave no visual signature. This type of substitution is untestable with
the data I use in this paper and highlights a key challenge is analyzing spillovers: correctly
estimating spillovers requires articulating and testing models of spillover, yet, the failure to
identify the appropriate model may leave other estimates biased.
3.3 Eyes on Darfur
In February 2003, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) launched an attack on a Sudanese airbase in Al Fashir, the capital of North Darfur.
While this is attack has become the commonly accepted marker for the beginning of a
brutal conflict that would subsume the Darfuri region over the next few years, violence in
the region has long historical roots (Flint and de Waal, 2008). Both the SLA and JEM
formed in response to a campaign of systematic oppression and discrimination waged by the
8Monitoring may also incentivize two other types of camouflage: one in which actors use monitoring to
send false signals to their adversaries as was famously done during World War II when the allied forces built
an army of inflatable tanks to deceive Axis forces, and another in which actors camaflouge themselves as
their adversaries and commit atrocities in order to reduce the credibility (Gambetta, 2009).
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Sudanese Government against the Region of Darfur, demanding regime change and equal
rights for all Sudanese citizens.
In response to attacks by the SLA and JEM, the Government of Sudan launched a
vicious counter-insurgency operation in collaboration with mercenary fighters known as the
Janjaweed (Prunier, 2008). With the support of indiscriminate aerial bombings dropped
by the Government of Sudan, the Janjaweed conducted ground attacks throughout Darfur,
burning villages, killing livestock, raping woman, and massacring villages (Hazlett, 2013).
Between 2003 and 2008, an estimated 450,00 deaths were directly attributable to the conflict
and 3.2 million people were displaced (de Waal et al., 2014). The nature, intensity and intent
of the violence sparked a broad debate over whether the conflict should be classified as a
genocide (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2008).
The conflict in Darfur mobilized unprecedented amounts of activism throughout the
United States and Europe. Anti-genocide advocates, human rights organizations and hu-
manitarians championed intervention in Darfur and an immediate stop to violence. Core to
the movement was collecting information about the conflict and using that information to
change the behavior of those involved in the conflict. This project itself was deeply contro-
versial. In the muddy landscape of information politics, organizations charged that other
groups weren’t collecting accurate information or were manipulating information for politi-
cal ends, over-simplifying complex narratives to achieve campaign goals without concern for
unintended consequences (Mamdani, 2009; Lanz, 2009).9
While multiple organizations engaged in various forms of information collection and
advocacy over the arc of the conflict, Amnesty International USA was the first organization
to use satellite technology to monitor violence in Darfur. In June of 2007, Amnesty launched
Eyes on Darfur. The goal of the project was to deter violence in a set of monitored villages
by generating evidence of atrocities that could be used to mobilize the base back home,
as well as to document violence in order to provide historical record of the conflict. The
motivation for using satellites was simple: the Government of Sudan’s denial of entry visas
9The information gathered and used by the Save Darfur Coalition, for example, moved SamWorthingtion,
then head of Interaction, to send a letter to David Rubenstein the head of the Save Darfur Coalition in 2008
that stated, ‘I am deeply concerned by the inability of Save Darfur to be informed by the realities on the
ground and to understand the consequences of your proposed actions,” (Strom and Polgreen, 2007)
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to human rights organizations and researchers reduced the ability to collect information
about the conflict on the ground and satellite imaging offered an opportunity to circumvent
these barriers to ‘groundtruth’ the genocide.
The project monitored ten villages spread out across Darfur and two refugee camps in
Chad. Amnesty developed a set of criteria for village selection and chose who would be
monitored in consultation with experts on conflict and the Darfuri crisis more generally,
as well as specialists in satellite technology. Amnesty aimed to maximize the scope of the
program, yet selected ten villages due to financial and technological constraints and out of
concern that the intervention may generate unintended outcomes. The process was largely
qualitative in nature. Ultimately, three criteria were used to determine participation in the
program: 1) proximity to the frontline of conflict in 2007, 2) proximity to natural resources
such as water, 3) geographic location. Ten villages close to active conflict but geographically
dispersed throughout the region and endowed with resources were included in the program.
The Eyes on Darfur project was officially launched on June 6, 2007 with an event at
the Fifth International Symposium on Digital Earth at the University of California. At this
point, villages were selected and monitored, the Government of Sudan was notified, and a
website that activists could access with information about the project was established. Over
the next six months, Amnesty waged a continuous campaign that targeted the Government
of Sudan to stop violence in these monitored villages.
3.3.1 Defining the Treatment
To monitor villages in Darfur, Amnesty tasked high-resolution satellites to image moni-
tored villages prior to and after their mobilization campaign. Satellite images provide static
aerial snapshots, that compiled over time, can be used to detect changes in the landscape.
These images offer the ability to identify destroyed infrastructure, bombings and mortar
shellings, and mass livestock death or theft. They err towards capturing highly visible forms
of violence. Given that this was the first time a human rights organization launched an
ongoing satellite monitoring intervention, it was important that the Government of Sudan
understood the scope and nature of the program.
As such, the project was accompanied by a series of actions common to activist cam-
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paigns and coordinated through a publicly accessible online platform. The Eyes on Darfur
website10 included satellite evidence of genocidal destruction that had taken place in Darfur
to demonstrate the capacity of aerial surveillance to generate evidence of atrocities, an anal-
ysis of the conflict provided by academics and policymakers, a list of the villages that were
monitored, and the option to take action. Figure 3.1 provides screen shots of the Eyes on
Darfur website. The top panel captures the home website and the bottom panel visualizes
the mapping of selected villages that were monitored.
The Eyes on Darfur project was a composite of monitoring and activist action taken
by thousands of individuals. Within the first two months, the website received over 550,00
visits and nearly 7,5000 letters were sent to the Government of Sudan calling on it to
protect the monitored villages, 2,500 letters were sent to Russia calling on it to use it’s
alliance with Sudan to protect civilians, and 1,300 letters were sent to the Government
of Chad requesting that it accept peacekeeping deployments to protect civilians in border
areas. Figure 3.2 provides the text of the notification that was sent to the Government of
Sudan by thousands of activists.11
The design and delivery of the treatment have two important implications for assess-
ing the impact of Eyes on Darfur. First, participating villages were not notified that they
were being monitored. While it is possible that their status was transmitted through other
channels, this remains unlikely given the challenges of communication and low levels of
technological access in Darfur during the genocide. As such, the common alliance between
human rights organizations and the people for whom they advocate was not forged. There-
fore, if the intervention did change patterns of violence, it is unlikely that these effects would
be driven by villagers who acted differently in light of being of monitored. This suggests
that evidence of impact can be attributed to top-down change. Second, the campaign was
directed at the Government of Sudan rather than the Janjaweed forces the officials asserted
they had no relationship with, much less any command and control over. Letters were sent
directly to Government offices and the main concern with these types of interventions remain
10Link to the Eyes on Darfur Website.
11It is important to note that the treatment notification did not specify an end date. Thus, while we can
assess whether there were anticipation effects or delays, it provides suggestive evidence as it is difficult to
attribute this to a sharp program ending.
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Figure 3.1: Eyes on Darfur Website
Note: This figure captures screen shots of the Eyes on Darfur website that was used during the advocacy
campaign.
uptake of treatment rather than its over-disbursement. As such, evidence of impact provides
a sort of statistical forensics that connects any changes in the villages to the Government of
Sudan. Establishing this implication is integral to appropriately assigning responsibility of
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Figure 3.2: Amnesty International Letter to Government of Sudan
Action: Act to Protect 12 Towns and Villages in Darfur and Eastern Chad 
Target: President al-Bashir 
 
Instruction to Activists: Amnesty International USA has identified 12 towns and villages in Darfur and 
eastern Chad that are at risk of attack by Janjawid militia, the Sudanese Government, and/or armed 
opposition groups. Using satellite technology, AIUSA is closely monitoring these sites and others in the 
region. Action must be taken now to prevent these sites from joining the long list of towns and villages 
utterly destroyed in Darfur and eastern Chad. Tell Sudanese President al-Bashir the world is watching and 
that we will know if harms comes to these civilians and ask him to take all necessary steps to prevent 
attacks on these sites. The message is: 
 
I am writing to bring your attention to the imminent danger facing the following 12 villages and towns in 
Darfur and Eastern Chad: 
 
  1. Malam al hosh in North Darfur 
  2. Boldong in West Darfur 
  3. Bir Dagig in West Darfur 
  4. Silea in West Darfur 
  5. Saraf Jidad in West Darfur 
  6. Bulbul in South Darfur 
  7. Sanam el Naga in South Darfur 
  8. Deleba in North Dafur 
  9. Hashaba in North Darfur 
  10. Kafod in North Dafur 
 
These villages and towns are at high risk of attack by Darfur opposition groups, Janjawid militia, and 
potentially the armed forces of Sudan. I implore you to protect the civilians of Sudan, and take all steps 
necessary to ensure these villages do not come under attack.  
 
Additionally, I am writing out of concern for the Habile and Goz Amir camps in eastern Chad, both of 
which are very close to the Sudan border. These sites are at risk of attacks by Janjawid militia crossing 
over from Darfur and their Chadian allies. I further ask you to prevent militia who identify themselves as 
aligned with the Sudanese government from targeting civilians in Chad, and to take all necessary steps to 
disarm the Janjawid and prevent their incursions in Chad as you have committed to do in the past.  
 
As you know, the insecurity facing these 12 towns, villages and camps for internally displaced persons and 
refugees is grave. Amnesty International has collected testimony and other documentation demonstrating 
the terrible effects of this vulnerability. Sudanese families have been displaced throughout Darfur, 
countless civilians have been killed, and the insecurity faced by humanitarian aid providers further 
threatens millions of civilians desperately dependent on such aid.  
 
Using new public and satellite technology, people all across the globe are watching these 12 towns, 
villages, and camps and other sites throughout Darfur and Eastern Chad with grave concern for the well-
being of concerned people across the globe who wish to see a secure and prosperous Sudan, I ask you to 
ensure the protection of these sites.  
Note: This figure captures the text of the advocacy letter sent to the Government of Sudan by activists.
the crimes against humanity that took place in Darfur.
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3.3.2 Calls Unheard?
A key question about Eyes on Darfur is the extent to which Sudanese officials were
aware of the monitoring intervention. Establishing their knowledge of the program is key
to illuminating a causal chain of impact and whether it indeed worked through government
officials. Importantly, in the case that the program did not have an impact, it rules out the
possibility that the intervention was unsuccessful because officials were unaware. Moreover,
providing this type of ‘first stage’ allows us to analyze the strategic response of actors in the
public arena.
The magnitude and novelty of Eyes on Darfur drove substantial press coverage. In addi-
tion to articles in the New York Times, Washington Post, Al Jazeera and other international
new sources, the project was reported by the Sudan Tribune (Mejia, 2007; AP, 2007). The
most direct acknowledgment of the program came shortly after it’s launch on June 6, 2007,
when the Sudanese Ambassador to the US, John Ukec, publicly decried Amnesty’s program
on National Public Radio. Asked what he thought about Eyes on Dafur, Ukek responded,
“we will check it out, but, you know, it will not give me anything which is sufficient, be-
cause how do I know if it is somebody dressed in a military uniform, if it is a janjaweed,”
(Kelemen, 2007). This suggests that senior government officials were aware (or made aware)
early in the intervention and that they had considered the underlying parameters of the
intervention. Additionally, Chad’s Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Mahamoud Adam
Bechir, contacted Amnesty to acknowledge that their advocacy had changed the Govern-
ment of Chad’s policy on the presence of UN forces in Chad, which would be used to protect
Sudanese refugees.
Corroboratory evidence also suggests that the advocacy letters sent may have reached
the executive office in the Government of Sudan. In a public statement at the African Union,
President Omar al-Bashir called on member states to establish an African Space agency to
protect its air from spy satellites (Beckhusen, 2012). This statement, however, came in 2012
after Amnesty’s project had ended and other satellite interventions in Darfur had begun, but
nonetheless suggests that there was executive knowledge of these types of interventions more
broadly. While the ideal evidence would not only indicate whether the Government of Sudan
was aware of the program but which villages they believed were monitored, weak evidence
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does suggest general knowledge of the program. Indeed, the very reasons that motivated
launching a satellite intervention from afar due to a lack of access make it challenging to
assess whether the Government was fully aware of the program.
3.3.3 Context and Expectations
While theoretical predictions over the impact of a monitoring intervention like Eyes on
Darfur are ambiguous, the context provides clues for how the Sudanese Government may
have responded. Specifically, the command and control structure between the Government
of Sudan and Janjaweed forces, the technology of violence used during the conflict, and
the timing of the intervention all suggest that the Sudanese Government was able to adjust
levels of violence in monitored villages and was a priori sensitive to the monitoring.
Understanding whether the Sudanese Government had the control and capacity to change
violence in Darfur is key to identifying how Amnesty’s intervention may have shaped vio-
lence in monitored areas. While the Government of Sudan denied they had control over
Janjaweed forces during the conflict, qualitative evidence suggests otherwise. According to
interviews with both Janjaweed and Government officials, Ahmed Mohamed Haroun, who
was in charge ‘Darfur Security Desk’ for the Government over the course of the genocide,
frequently traveled to Darfur to hand deliver cash to support militias and oversee Janjaweed
operations (Prunier, 2008; Flint and de Waal, 2008). Other senior ranking officials in the
Sudanese Government were also involved in strategic and tactical decision making. The
fact that all, “raids [...] needed authorization from the chief of staff’s office in Khartoum,
gave the lie to the government’s insistence that it was not supporting Janjawiid operations
at the highest levels,” (Flint and de Waal, 2008, pg. 132). This type of command and
control highlights the Government involvement in decision-making about when and where
Janjaweed forces would attack villages. And, this command and control was not limited
to removed decision-making between offices in Khartoum and remote forces in Darfur. As
the notoriously brutal Janjaweed militia leader Musa Hilal reported, the Government of
Sudan embedded top army commanders into local militias to oversee operations (Flint and
de Waal, 2008, pg. 38). Indeed, command and control was so thoroughly entrenched that
when ICC indictments for officials in the Sudanese Government were issued, scholarly and
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policy debates focused not on whether they were accurate or could be proven, but rather
if they might extend the war by reducing options for negotiated settlements among leaders
who could not escape trial and conviction (de Waal and Stanton, 2009). The Government
of Sudan, however, was not a monolithic actor able to restrain undisciplined units and it
also remains unclear if the Government cared whether forces were violent in unsanctioned
areas as long as they fulfilled other orders (de Waal, 2004). Rather, there is overwhelming
evidence that the Government of Sudan was broadly responsible for the behavior of the
Janjaweed and actively able to direct their targeting.
Over the course of the conflict, the Government of Sudan relied on aerial bombardments
and Janajweed-led ground forces to exact violence in targeted communities. The Sudanese
Airforce used Antonov bombers to drop barrels of explosives at the beginning of the war
that were indiscriminate. However, the Government acquired increasingly precise bombing
capacity by the time Amnesty launched their intervention (Flint and de Waal, 2008). This
is particularly important because it provided the ability to accurately target specific areas in
Darfur, such as monitored villages. Aerial support was complemented by Janjaweed forces
who would raid villages, burning structures, slaughtering inhabitants, and decimating live-
stock. The extent of atrocities were so severe that satellites observed fundamental increases
to the vegetation index because of reductions in human and livestock presence (Schimmer,
2008). Given the genocidal motivations of the Government, it would have been difficult to
substitute into types of violence that may have gone unnoticed. Overall, this suggests that
the Government was engaged in attributable and observable forms of violence that it had
the control to direct.
Amnesty’s intervention was launched late into the the genocide, some four years after
it began at times when overall levels of violence and violent-related deaths were decreasing
(Degomme and Guha-Sapir, 2010; de Waal et al., 2014). International awareness of the
genocide was high, the United Nations Security Council had already referred Darfur to the
International Criminal Court, and the African Union had already deployed a peacekeeping
mission to Darfur. While this implies that the Government of Sudan had little to lose
from Amnesty’s intervention, anecdotal evidence suggests that the Government of Sudan
was sensitive to external monitoring and sought to mask their behavior at this point in the
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conflict. As recounted by African Union troops in 2006, for example, the Sudanese Air force
repainted an aircraft in the colors of the African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS) to evade
blame for the military activities they conducted (Flint and de Waal, 2008). Moreover, during
this time, the Government continuously denied visas and travel permits to humanitarians
who attempted to deliver relief aid to Darfuris. This served the dual purpose of obfuscating
behavior and using starvation as a weapon of war. Lastly, despite the ICC referral, Omar
Al-Bashir had not yet been indicted by the ICC and South Sudan had yet to vote in their
independence referendum. Violence raged on, though at lower levels than previous years,
and the Government of Sudan was still invested in concealing their behavior.
These factors highlight that the Government of Sudan was largely able to direct tar-
getable violence at a moment in the conflict when it was somewhat sensitive to external
intervention. While a savvy strategy the Government may have used would be to com-
pletely ignore the intervention so to buffer Government denials that it was unable to control
Janjaweed violence, this suggests that Amnesty’s hopes of reducing violence were well-based
and that Eyes on Darfur would have reduced violence, or plausibly displaced it elsewhere.
3.4 Data & Measurement Strategy
3.4.1 Assessing Violence in Darfur
Assessing the impact of a satellite monitoring intervention launched amidst a genocide
requires high-frequency, micro-level data on violence. While the use of this type of data has
grown in the study of conflict (Gleditsch, Metternich and Ruggeri, 2013), collecting accurate
and timely information on violence remains a challenge. This is particularly true in Sudan,
where humanitarians, human rights organizations and researchers were systematically denied
access to Darfur. To overcome these challenges, I leverage a novel dataset generated by the
US Department of State Humanitarian Information Unit (henceforth HIU) on damaged and
destroyed villages in Darfur. The HIU dataset enumerates the full population of villages in
Darfur with precise geo-coordinates and identifies the year in which they experienced conflict
between 2003 and 2010. I use this dataset to estimate the impact of Eyes on Darfur and
couple this with informal interviews conducted with staff who worked at Amnesty during
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the program as well as project documents.
A combination of classified and non-classified information collated from satellite images,
military and civilian intelligence, and human rights organizations was used to construct this
dataset (classified information was stripped of all sensitive content prior to its inclusion).
Classification of damage was done internally and according to the State Department, “the
methodology employed is a conservative one” and only records of damage and destruction for
which there was a high degree of confidence were coded as such. Three important notes are
in order. First, given the sourcing and coding process, the data is biased towards publicly
observable forms of violence such as village burning and marks left by aerial bombardments.
While this doesn’t capture all forms of violence, it is particularly well-suited to analyze a
satellite program because these measures of violence broadly correspond to the appropriate
unit of analysis for this intervention. While this data makes it impossible to identify whether
Eyes on Darfur incentivized actors to substitute into non-observable forms of violence, it
does increase certainty in conflict incidences for observable violence. As such, the coding
provides a hard test of the hypotheses. Second, this dataset is unique because of its focus
on village-level damage and destruction rather than deaths. While this makes it difficult to
validate against other mortality estimates that have been produced for Darfur, it measures
severe attacks that were likely the product of organized, genocidal planning rather than
smaller inter-personal feuds.12 Third, the data collected does not include evidence of violence
directly generated through Eyes on Darfur. This assuages concerns that results may simply
be driven by better measurement that results from satellite monitoring.
The dataset contains 9,183 observations. Villages enter the dataset at least once if they
were never attacked and can enter the dataset multiple times if there were attacked more
than once; attacks are recorded at the year-level. Violence is coded using a binary variable
indicating if it was ever damaged or destroyed and the data highlight the brutality of the
conflict: 38% of all villages in Darfur were violently attacked at least once over the arc of
the war. Figure 3.3 visualizes the the distribution of violence in Darfur and also identifies
the monitored villages that were apart of the Eyes on Darfur campaign; note that that the
12It is also worth noting that mortality estimates from the genocide in Darfur vary widely and generally
have levels of inter-source correlation (Degomme and Guha-Sapir, 2010; de Waal et al., 2014). One advantage
of this data set is that it relies on a conservative classification of violence during the genocide.
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white space in the figure captures unpopulated areas.





Note: This figure visualizes the distribution of violence in Darfur between 2003-2009. Villages are visualized
as points; gray villages were not attacked, pink villages were attacked, and blue villages were monitored.
The white space in between villages captures unpopulated areas.
3.4.2 Unit of Analysis
Using the HIU data, I aggregate yearly village outcomes over a geographic area to con-
struct a panel of units of grid i in year t between 2003 and 2009. The motivation for
constructing this type of panel is twofold. First, it more accurately reflects the unit of
analysis associated with Eyes on Darfur. Indeed, the geographic scope of the satellite im-
ages taken by Amnesty extended beyond the borders of the villages they monitored. While
Amnesty did not inform the Government of Sudan which satellite it tasked with imaging
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the villages in Darfur, there were three commonly used high-resolution satellites available
to task that ranged 9 - 16.5km when Eyes on Darfur was launched.13 While the Govern-
ment of Sudan didn’t know the exact size of the images taken, a liberal estimate would
have been around 16km in length and a conservative estimate would have been around 9km
in length. As such, using grids that cover broader swaths of territory rather than a single
village more accurately reflect the true unit of analysis monitored.14 As discussed below,
I use 9km to construct a theoretically informed and conservative version of grids and also
conduct additional robustness checks over alternative grid sizes.
Second, this unit of analysis more flexibly allows for measurement error and impreci-
sion generated through the data collection process. While the HIU dataset captures the
full population of villages in Darfur over time and stores them using geo-coordinates, 68%
of geo-coded villages do not include written village names. To assess the extent of mea-
surement error, I analyze the distance between villages with the same names that enter in
multiple years but have different geo-coordinates; see appendix B.2 for a discussion of mea-
surement error. This analytic approach reduces concerns of measurement error that would
be introduced if I conducted analysis at the village level.
I therefore create a panel in which data is aggregated to the year-grid unit; see appendix
B.3 for a detailed description of grid construction. While this increases confidence treatment-
measurement symmetry and in accurately classifying the same set of villages in one grid
overtime, it may introduce aggregation bias. For example, if a monitored village is located
in grid i, that grid takes a 1 for its treatment assignment, assigning treatment the other
villages in that same grid. To mitigate against this loss in precision and ensure that results
are not artefactual to grid size construction, I estimate all regressions against various grid
sizes. The core analysis presented uses grids of 9, 10 and 11 kilometers in length and
robustness tests are provided throughout.15 Figure 3.4 visualizes the panel construction
13This includes the Quickbird, GeoEye and Orbview-3.
14In the HIU dataset, the average distance between a village and its nearest neighbor is 2.61 kilometers
and this distance increases by half a kilometer to each next village. This suggests that small units would
include roughly 5 villages.
15These constructions contain 4.98, 5.79 and 6.69 villages on average for grid sizes of 9, 10, and 11km
respectively.
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process for violence in a given year.










Note: This figure visualizes the panel construction process using data for villages from 2004 only. In the
first step, a grid is projected onto the map in Darfur and used to create a spatial overlay. Second, within
each grid, the average value of destruction is taken. Third, a grid is created for each year across all of Darfur
and merged to construct the panel. While a binary measure of violence is used in analysis, a continuous
variable is used here for visual intuition. This process is repeated for each year to generate a panel.
3.4.3 Leveraging Amnesty’s Selection Criteria & Identifying Controls
Amnesty’s objective was to reduce genocidal violence in high-risk villages and as such,
tried to select villages they believed would experience higher levels of violence. Figure
3.5 plots the proportion of damage over the arc of the conflict in villages they monitored
and villages that went unmonitored. The figure suggests that Amnesty was savvy in their
selection: the proportion of violence afflicting those communities is much higher than the
other places in Darfur on average (e.g. the pink trend lines is higher than the blue trend
line).
The figure also shows that pre-treatment trends in violence substantially differ between
monitored and unmonitored areas, introducing concerns over the viability of the parallel
trends assumption invoked in a difference-in-difference estimator. In addition to this con-
cern, another key challenge to generating accurate and unbiased estimates of the impact of
Amnesty’s program is identifying appropriate control villages from the 9,183 possible coun-
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Figure 3.5: Violence in Darfur Over Time
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Note: This figure plot violence by monitoring status. Violence data is jittered for presentation and fitted
with a cubic spline.
terfactuals to compare to the 10 monitored villages. To identify appropriate controls and
account for pre-treatment trends, I rely on Amnesty’s selection process. Amnesty used three
criteria for village selection: 1) proximity to the frontline of conflict in 2007, 2) proximity to
natural resources and 3) geographic location. Amnesty used these as broad, guiding prin-
ciples in their selection process rather than stringent quantitative metrics over which they
optimized. I draw on additional data I collect on Darfur to operationalize and leverage these
criteria, as well as an additional set of variables, to implement a principled selection process
that uses matching as a pre-processing strategy (Sekhon, 2009).
I match on three sets of characteristics: variables that correspond to Amnesty’s selection
criteria, an additional set of characteristics that Amnesty did not use, and pre-monitoring
levels and trends in violence. With respect to Amnesty’s criteria, I operationalize proximity
to frontline of the conflict as minimal distance to a violent area in 2007,16 proximity to
natural resources as distance to a water source, and geographic location as distance from a
16Note that I also conduct analysis using average and maximum distance to a violent area and results
remain unchanged. Results not reported here.
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provincial boundary. In addition to these variables, I also include distance to local airbases,
distance to the closest road, and pre-treatment violence. Except for pre-treatment levels
and trends in violence, the other variables are time invariant.
I include these additional variables for three reasons. First, including these additional
measures improve precision in pre-processing and as Stuart (2010) notes, increasing the
number of variables in matching algorithms rarely has a negative impact on the process.
Second, these variables may have implicitly driven selection even if they were not explicitly
noted. For example, road access may have restricted the subset of villages considered for
selection. Third and more specifically, leveraging pre-treatment levels of violence accounts
for long-term differences in the trajectories of villages shaped by violence and is an identifying
assumption in the difference-in-difference estimator used in analysis. Table 3.1 enumerates
the variables used for matching and identifies whether they were a key Amnesty Criteria or
not; appendix B.1 sources and visualizes this data.
Table 3.1: Selection Criterion and Matching Variables
Variable Operationalization AI Selection Criterion
Distance to Frontline Distance to attack in 2007 X Proximity to Frontline of Conflict
Water Presence of water source X Proximity to Natural Resources
Location Indicator for province X Geographic Distribution
Road Network Presence of road artery
Airbase Presence of airfield
Violence 2003-2007 attack history
Note: This table maps Amnesty International’s village selection criterion to variables used to match
and pre-process the data.
Following Ho et al. (2007), I implement a nearest neighbor matching algorithm. Given
the abundance of potential controls, I implement this algorithm for a treatment-to-control
ratio of 1:125 for the core analysis and present robustness checks for the results across
a variety of treatment-to-control ratios. The benefit to this approach is that it provides
the ability to analyze robustness to various matching ratios without ex-ante adjudicating
between matched data-sets that attempt to balance across a variety of covariates (e.g. the
gains across matching ratios vary by covariate). Care in analysis is crucial however given that
increasing the number of control units increases the probability of generating statistically
significant results; as such, I focus on the magnitude of effect size.
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Using this matching procedure, table 3.2 reports summary statistics across monitored
and unmonitored units after the data is matched. Table B.4 in appendix B.4 presents
descriptive statistics for the pre-balanced panel. The matching procedure generates a well-
balanced set of units. The only variable for which treatment and control units substantially
differ is on the change in violence between 2006 and 2005. Amnesty did not explicitly use
this variable for matching and the data is balanced on all other levels and trends in violence
for other years. Figure B.4 in appendix B.6 plots the standardized mean differences between
treated and control units before and after matching to visualize to illustrate the gains to
matching.
Table 3.2: Balance Table
Treatment Control Dif P-Value
Border 14,666.41 17,683.78 -3,017.37 0.53
Road 12,539.81 7,934.84 4,604.97 0.41
Water 15,283.93 21,681.44 -6,397.50 0.51
Airfield 50.05 57.21 -7.16 0.38
Violence(2003) 0.20 0.19 0.01 0.95
Violence(2004−2003) 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.74
Violence(2004) 0.30 0.23 0.07 0.66
Violence(2005−2004) -0.10 -0.15 0.05 0.78
Violence(2005) 0.20 0.08 0.12 0.39
Violence(2006−2005) 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.01
Violence(2006) 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.49
Violence(2007−2006) 0.10 -0.05 0.15 0.41
Violence(2007) 0.30 0.05 0.25 0.14
Proximity to Frontline 0.23 0.32 -0.10 0.20
Note: This table reports balance across monitored and unmonitored areas. Euclidean
distances are reported for border, road, water and airfield measures. Proximity to front-
line is derived from a Cartesian minimum. P -values reported derive from t-tests.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
To assess the impact of Eyes on Darfur, I estimate a series of equations to analyze the
direct and indirect effects of this intervention using the full frame of data that includes all
villages as well as a set of frames that includes matched villages only. To examine the direct
effect of this monitoring program, I estimate the following equation:
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Yit = αi + βTit + δt + εit (3.1)
where Y is a measure of damage and destruction in grid i and time period t, Tit is a
binary indicator for whether the grid was assigned to the monitoring program, αi and δt
are location and time fixed effects respectively and εit is the error. The key parameter of
interest, β corresponds to the impact of being monitored and is used to test whether Eyes on
Darfur increased or decreased violence. The expectation is that this coefficient is negative.
To assess whether monitoring incentivizes substitution into violence in other time peri-
ods, I estimate a specification that tests for both long-term effects as well as anticipation
effects as follows:
Yit = β−2Tit+2 + β−1Tit+1 + β0Tit + β1Tit−1 + β2Tit−2 + εit (3.2)
where Y is a measure of damage and destruction in grid i and time period t, and Tit is
a binary indicator for whether a grid was assigned to monitoring or not in that time period,
Tit−1 is a dummy for whether a grid was treated in the next time period, and Tit+1 is a
binary indicator for whether the grid was treated in the previous time period, and Tit−2
and Tit+2 are dummy indicators for a lag and lead two time periods out respectively. In
this model, β0 = yt − yt−1 captures the immediate effects of monitoring. β−1 = yt−1 − yt−2
provides an estimate of any ‘anticipation effects’ in which the Sudanese Government attacked
areas in expectation of the monitoring intervention one year prior to its launch. While it is
unlikely that the Sudanese Government was aware of the program a year out, it is plausible
given that Amnesty had been discussing a possible intervention and began site selection.17
β1 = yt+1 − yt−2 tests for substitution into future violence in these areas one year out (β−2
and β2 test for these effects two years out respectively). Applied, this equation estimates
the impact of the being monitored between 2006 and 2009. To test H2 and see if monitoring
delayed violence, we expect a positive coefficient on β1; a negative coefficient may suggest
that there were long-term benefits to monitoring. If we expect that there may be anticipatory
effects, we expect a positive and significant coefficient on β−1.
17In the case that anticipation effects a priori seem implausible, estimates for these years can be interpreted
as placebo tests. A placebo analysis using a three year lead is also conducted as a cleaner test.
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To analyze the impact of Eyes on Darfur on neighboring units, I estimate the following
equation:
Yit = αi + βTit + ξtdit + δt + εit (3.3)
where, Yit is the measure of violence, Tit is an indicator for whether a grid was assigned
to be monitored, tidt is a binary variable that captures whether grid i is within a specified
distance d of a monitored grid. Extending the Rubin causal model (Rubin, 1974), let Zi
refer to a unit’s own treatment status and Zj capture the treatment status of its neighbor
within a given distance metric. There are then four potential outcomes: Y (Zi = 0, Zj = 0),
or Y00, a pure control that is neither treated or exposed to spillover; Y (Zi = 1, Zj = 0), or
Y10, a directly treated unit that is not exposed to any spillover; Y (Zi = 0, Zj = 1), or Y01,
a untreated unit that is exposed to spillover; Y (Zi = 1, Zj = 0), or Y10, a treated unit that
is exposed to spillover. Using equation 3.3, β corresponds to Y10 - Y00 and ξ corresponds to
Y01 - Y00. Note that the data considered here are a unique case given that the monitored
villages were selected at an ample distance from each other such that we do not observe Y11,
where a unit is both treated and exposed to spillover.
This model of spillover relies on two assumptions: that monitoring status does not affect
violence outside of a specified distance d and that spillovers are fundamentally binary in
nature and are not a function of the degree of spillover. A variant of the first assumption
is invoked in any spillover model as correctly estimating spillovers requires operationalizing
the underlying social process. In the case of monitoring conflict in Darfur, distance provides
a reasonable model as geography is crucial to exacting violence. In application, the second
assumption suggests that the value of avoiding or attacking a given unit is the same whether
it is next to any number of monitored villages. This is a particularly reasonable assump-
tion if the Government is trying to avoid detection as monitoring doesn’t change with the
probability of spillover monitoring.
There are three key challenges to accurately and precisely estimating the impact of
Eyes on Darfur. First, the intervention was not randomized and the identification strategy
used in this paper relies on exogeneity conditional on a set of pre-treatment covariates and
location and time fixed effects. Matching improves balance across treatment and control
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units and to ensure that the results are robust, I estimate the impact using a series of
different counterfactual villages to mitigate against these issues. Second, few villages were
actually treated through the monitoring intervention, which raises concerns over statistical
power. While additional control units from the data on Darfuri violence provide substantial
leverage, the precision of the estimates remain the product of the underlying heterogeneity
in both treatment and control villages.18 Third, despite the rich information offered by
this novel dataset, the spatial and temporal precision of the data is coarse. To address
concerns about the data, I estimate a series of alternative specifications to establish that
the results are robust to this coarseness. While estimates should be interpreted with care,
these mitigation strategies should increase confidence in these results.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Direct Monitoring Effects
To analyze whether Eyes on Darfur achieved its direct goal of reducing genocidal violence
in monitored areas, table 3.3 presents results for the direct effects of this advocacy-driven
monitoring intervention. The first three columns (1-3) in the table estimate the impact of
the program over the full Darfuri population of villages for three different grid sizes: 9, 10,
and 11 kilometers in length. These difference-in-difference estimates include grid and year
fixed effects. The following three columns (4-6) in the table estimate the impact of the
intervention over the matched frames that use the same varying grid sizes and also include
grid and year fixed effects.
The results across these specifications are consistent in both magnitude and significance:
analysis suggests that the Eyes on Darfur program is associated with systematic increases in
violence in monitored villages. While the point estimates vary marginally, Eyes on Darfur
is associated with a 15-16 percentage point increase in violence experienced compared to
unmonitored areas. The consistency in effect size is particularly important as larger data
frames increase the probability of generating statistically significant results that are function
18Given that panel data has been constructed, the number of treatment units functionally doubles given
that the estimator analyzes switches into and out of treatment status.
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Table 3.3: Direct Effects
Full Frames Matched Frames
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 0.104 0.099 0.096 0.097 0.101 0.103
(0.093) (0.091) (0.089) (0.098) (0.097) (0.094)
Monitoring Effect 0.155∗ 0.156∗ 0.156∗ 0.160∗ 0.160∗ 0.156∗
(0.089) (0.087) (0.085) (0.094) (0.092) (0.090)
Grid Size 9km 10km 11km 9km 10km 11km
Year FEs X X X X X X
Grid FEs X X X X X X
N 10,456 12,104 14,048 10,080 10,080 10,080
R2 0.222 0.214 0.208 0.220 0.215 0.222
Note: This table presents results for direct effects. ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
The treatment-to-control matching ratio for all columns is 1:125.
of a larger number of units analyzed rather than the program.
The fact that the intervention increased violence in monitored areas is non-trivial. First
and foremost, this suggests that the Government of Sudan was not only aware of the inter-
vention, but that it changed its strategic calculus in village targeting in response to these
advocacy efforts. This highlights the potential for small-scale human rights interventions
to affect government decision-making during conflict. Secondly, however, the program is
associated with increases rather than reductions in violence. It is important to note that
Amnesty monitored a small number of villages at the outset given concerns that the project
might have increased violence. They decided not to expand the program given anecdotal
evidence that it increased violence, an internal decision that buttresses these findings. After
accounting for lags, leads and spillovers, I discuss the motivations for increasing violence
in section 3.7. These results nonetheless emphasize the potential for these types of inter-
ventions to generate perverse rather than salutary effects. Moreover, this analysis provides
evidence that the Government of Sudan was indeed responsible for this violence. Either the
Government directly targeted these villages through aerial bombardments, or they directed
Janjaweed militias to target these villages using ground sources. In the former case, this
provides evidence that the Government of Sudan was directly involved in genocidal violence
in Darfur. In the latter case, this provides additional corroboratory evidence of a command
and control structure between the Government of Sudan and Janjaweed militias.
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The stakes of correctly estimating the impact of Eyes on Darfur are high as evidence
of effects in either direction illuminates ways to change the strategic use of violence during
genocide. To further probe the robustness of these results, I draw on a randomization
inference framework to generate the sampling distribution of estimated average treatment
effects under the sharp null hypothesis that the intervention had no effect. In practice, this
procedure compares the actual effects to the distribution of all other potential effects sizes if
assignment to monitoring were permutated. The motivation is to provide the full sampling
distribution of potential effects and assess how the estimated effect compares. Figure 3.6
visualizes the distribution of effects sizes and true effect for both the full population frame
and matched frame.
Figure 3.6: Randomization Inference Tests
Distribution of the Estimated ATEs





















Distribution of the Estimated ATEs





















Note: Each figure visualizes the distribution of estimated effects using randomization inference. The left
panel plots this distribution across the full population frame and the right panel plots this distribution across
the matched frame, each for grids of 10km.
For both frames, we can reject the sharp null hypothesis that the estimated effect size
of Eyes on Darfur is observed by chance: the two-tailed p-value, which is conservative, for
the full frame is 0.044 and for the matched frame is 0.062.19 This randomization inference
19These results remain robust for other grid sizes as well. For the full frame, the p-values 0.038 0.053 for
9 and 11km grids respectively and for the matched frame the p-values are 0.069 and 0.058 for 9 and 11km
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provides intuition for where the mass of potential estimates lies and demonstrates that the
Eyes on Darfur estimate is large enough to reject the null hypothesis.
As a second robustness check, I estimate the impact of Eyes on Darfur across all
treatment-to-control matching ratios between 1:100 - 1:150. This ensures that the results
are not artefactual to the matching ratio selected and presented above. These results, which
are reported in appendix B.6, show that the effects size and significance of the program
remain stable and consistent across all matching ratios for each grid size. The consistency
and robustness of these effects buttress the underlying relationship between Eyes on Darfur
and increasing violence in monitored areas.
3.6.2 Persistence in Monitoring
Results above demonstrate that Amnesty’s intervention was associated with an increase
in violence in monitored areas. A crucial question is whether this human rights program
induced any anticipatory or persistent effects. Table 3.4 presents results for a set of lags
and leads that capture these dynamics. Similar to the direct effects, the first three columns
(1-3) report results over increasing grid sizes, accounting for year and grid fixed effects, and
columns 4-6 report results for matched frames; figure 3.7 visualizes the estimates over time.
It is important to note that I re-match the data without pre-treatment levels and trends
and violence so as not to match on the same variables that I then estimate. The frame
remains balanced over all time invariant covariates; I report this balance, as well as results
for lags-and-leads estimators without removing these trends, in appendix B.7.20
The results are consistent across specifications as well: while the program is not associ-
ated with any anticipation effects — e.g. the government did not change its strategic use
of violence prior to the program — it is associated with increases in violence during the
program and the the year following the program. While anticipatory effects are unlikely and
would have required that the Government of Sudan track Amnesty’s internal decision mak-
ing prior to the launch of their program, assessing whether this did occur merits analysis.
grids respectively.
20Note that the standard errors for the lags, leads, and monitoring coefficients are the same because each
indicator is perfectly orthogonal and they therefore split the mean square error evenly.
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Table 3.4: Lags and Leads
Full Frames Matched Frames
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 0.105 0.099 0.097 0.090 0.098 0.105
(0.093) (0.090) (0.089) (0.095) (0.095) (0.094)
Lead (2005) 0.070 0.061 0.055 0.052 0.061 0.072
(0.096) (0.094) (0.092) (0.098) (0.099) (0.097)
Lead (2006) 0.039 0.039 0.031 0.025 0.038 0.040
(0.096) (0.094) (0.092) (0.098) (0.099) (0.097)
Monitoring Effect 0.189∗∗ 0.185∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.187∗ 0.191∗ 0.190∗∗
(0.096) (0.094) (0.092) (0.098) (0.099) (0.097)
Lag (2008) 0.206∗∗ 0.196∗∗ 0.196∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.209∗∗
(0.096) (0.094) (0.092) (0.098) (0.099) (0.097)
Lag (2009) −0.084 −0.088 −0.093 −0.078 −0.077 −0.081
(0.096) (0.094) (0.092) (0.098) (0.099) (0.097)
Grid Size 9km 10km 11km 9km 10km 11km
Year FEs X X X X X X
Grid FEs X X X X X X
N 10,456 12,104 14,048 10,080 10,080 10,080
R2 0.223 0.215 0.208 0.209 0.215 0.223
Note: This table presents results for anticipation and persistence effects. ∗ significant at p < .10;
∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. The treatment-to-control matching ratio for all columns is 1:125.
To the extent that these anticipatory effects are theoretically implausible, they operate as
placebo checks.
The intervention is associated with increases in violence in both 2007 and 2008, suggest-
ing that monitored areas experienced comparatively higher levels of violence not only in the
year they were directly monitored, but also in the following year. This persistence reinforces
the fact that the motives for increasing violence in these areas were relatively strong. Im-
portantly, this highlights the potential for these interventions to generate long-term effects
that may indeed be pernicious.
Two concerns warrant discussion. First, despite using geo-coded subnational data on
violence, incidences are only recorded annually. This temporal resolution makes it difficult
to identify exactly when violence occurred during the year. One plausible pattern at odds
with persistent effects that would go undetected is if the Government exacted violence during
the monitoring intervention, redirected violence following this and then went back later in
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Figure 3.7: Violence in Darfur Over Time



























Note: This figure plots the impact of monitoring of violence by year in Darfur for the full frame in which
each grid is 10 km.
2008 to attack these villages again for reasons unrelated to Amnesty’s intervention. Second,
while Amnesty International USA was clear and explicit in when they launched the program,
they were less direct in when they officially ended the program. While the program internally
ended by 2008, Amnesty did not follow up with the Government of Sudan to notify them
that monitoring had stopped. As such, a conservative interpretation of the positive effects
in 2008 is that it evidences direct effects of the program rather than persistent effects. Even
if this is the case however, this means that the intervention was strong enough to incentivize
increasing attacks over an arc of two unique years, which itself highlights the impact of the
program.
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3.6.3 Spillovers in Violence
I next turn to assessing whether Eyes on Darfur displaced violence and how it effects
direct estimates of the program. Indeed, despite increases in violence demonstrated by
analyzing direct effects, overall violence may have not changed or even been relatively lower
in net had all neighboring villages suffered dramatic increases in violence. Table 3.5 presents
spillover analysis. The units included in this analysis are those that border monitored grids,
or are within a 10km distance of monitored areas.21
Table 3.5: Spillover Estimates
Full Frames Matched Frames
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 0.105 0.099 0.097 0.102 0.104 0.098
(0.093) (0.090) (0.089) (0.097) (0.094) (0.098)
Monitoring 0.157∗ 0.157∗ 0.159∗ 0.162∗ 0.158∗ 0.165∗
(0.089) (0.087) (0.085) (0.092) (0.090) (0.094)
Neighbors 0.077 0.086∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.091∗ 0.078 0.082∗∗
(0.049) (0.048) (0.033) (0.051) (0.049) (0.038)
Grid Size 9km 10km 11km 9km 10km 11km
Year FEs X X X X X X
Grid FEs X X X X X X
N 10,456 12,104 14,048 10,080 10,080 10,080
R2 0.222 0.215 0.208 0.215 0.222 0.220
Note: This table presents results for spillover effects. ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
The treatment-to-control matching ratio for all columns is 1:125.
The results from this analysis broadly highlight that Eyes on Darfur is not only associated
with increases in violence in monitored areas, but neighboring areas as well. The extent
to which violence increased in neighboring areas is between 7 and 9 percentage points or
about half as much as it increased in directly monitored areas. Even when spillovers are
appropriately accounted for, the magnitude and the significance of the direct effects remains
stable. It is important to note that these results are less consistent than estimates of the
direct effects and lag effects of the program, and should be weighted accordingly.
This suggests that Eyes on Darfur is associated with deleterious effects in both monitored
21It should be note that while the matching algorithm was conducted prior to the spillover analysis,
neighboring villages were preserved since they were most similar to monitored villages on pre-treatment
covariates.
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areas and their neighbors. There are three plausible explanations for increasing violence in
neighboring areas. First, the Government may have wanted to truly signal their resolve
to stay in power or retaliate against Amnesty for their monitoring program and therefore
increased violence in these broader areas. Second, neighboring areas may have experienced
violence because of the Government’s imprecision in targeting: in directing violence to
monitored areas, they may have simply hit neighboring areas. Finally, while they may have
been able to direct forces to exact violence in monitored areas, they may not have been able
to restrain them from targeting neighboring areas on their way to these ultimate targets.
It is difficult to adjudicate between these mechanisms and only the first mechanism is
strategically intentional in nature. Irrespective of the mechanism, however, the monitoring
intervention is associated with increases in violence in neighboring areas. The monitoring
program did not provide the protective enclave that human rights activists sought nor did
it simply displace violence. Rather it attracted and increased violence in these neighboring
areas.
3.6.4 Placebo Checks
As a final robustness check, I conduct a series of placebo checks in which I alter the
treatment assignment of which areas were monitored and when. In this series of robustness
checks, placebos should generate null effects as we a priori know there should be no sys-
tematic correlation between them and violence. I first re-estimate the impact of Amnesty’s
monitoring program assuming they had actually implemented the program in 2003 rather
than in 2007 and report these results in table 3.6. I then re-estimate the impact of Amnesty’s
monitoring on spillover effects by randomly assigning ‘neighbors’ in 2007 and report these
results in table 3.7.
Both sets of placebo tests generate null results and buttress the fact that the relationship
between Amnesty’s monitoring program and increases in violence are not spurious. This is
particularly important when assignment to monitoring is re-coded as happening in 2003, as
this was the peak year of violence in Darfur. While these placebo tests are by no means
definitive, they provide additional corroboratory evidence of the relationship between Eyes
on Darfur on increasing violence.
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Table 3.6: Placebo Test for Direct Effects
Full Frames Matched Frames
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 0.105 0.100 0.097 0.098 0.102 0.104
(0.093) (0.091) (0.089) (0.098) (0.097) (0.094)
Placebo Effect −0.120 −0.114 −0.111 −0.112 −0.117 −0.119
(0.089) (0.087) (0.085) (0.094) (0.092) (0.090)
Grid Size 9km 10km 11km 9km 10km 11km
Year FEs X X X X X X
Grid FEs X X X X X X
N 10,456 12,104 14,048 10,080 10,080 10,080
R2 0.222 0.214 0.208 0.219 0.215 0.222
Note: This table presents placebo checks for direct effects as well as anticipation and persistence
effects. ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. The treatment-to-control matching ratio
for all columns is 1:125.
Table 3.7: Placebo Test for Spillovers
Full Frames Matched Frames
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 0.105 0.099 0.096 0.102 0.104 0.098
(0.093) (0.091) (0.089) (0.097) (0.094) (0.098)
Monitoring 0.156∗ 0.155∗ 0.157∗ 0.161∗ 0.157∗ 0.162∗
(0.089) (0.087) (0.085) (0.092) (0.090) (0.094)
Placebo Neighbors 0.107 −0.030 0.036 0.043 0.029 0.028
(0.085) (0.073) (0.058) (0.047) (0.046) (0.034)
Grid Size 9km 10km 11km 9km 10km 11km
Year FEs X X X X X X
Grid FEs X X X X X X
N 10,456 12,104 14,048 10,080 10,080 10,080
R2 0.222 0.214 0.208 0.215 0.222 0.220
Note: This table presents placebo checks for spillover effects. ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05;
∗∗∗p < .01. The treatment-to-control matching ratio for all columns is 1:125.
3.7 Discussion
3.7.1 Why Increase Violence?
Eyes on Darfur generated pernicious and persistent effects: violence increased in moni-
tored and neighboring areas over the arc of the program and into the following year. Why
would these advocacy efforts lead to these counterintuitive results? I consider three primary
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mechanisms — signaling, loyalty testing, and retaliation — through which Amnesty’s inter-
vention may have resulted in violence and draw on suggestive evidence to provide a rough
cut at adjudicating between these mechanisms.22
First, the intervention may have increased violence by allowing the Sudanese Government
to signal its resolve to stay in power to the international community. In this story, the
Government may have signaled that they were indeed committed to the war and would not
be deterred by any attempt to intervene. Increasing violence in monitored areas may not only
have credibly signaled their resolve, but may also have suggested that the Government was
willing to ratchet up the costs the international community would incur if they intervened.
Indeed, the Government may have believed that increasing violence would highlight how
hard it would be for international organizations to effectively intervene and ultimately deter
them from doing so.
It’s plausible that the Government believed that generating this type of evidence was
required to credibly communicate their resolve, yet it remains unlikely. While the Govern-
ment may have truly desired that their behavior be known with the precision afforded by
satellites, sufficient evidence existed about their general behavior by the time Eyes on Darfur
was launched. Moreover, Janjaweed militias had previously engaged in this type of signaling
in a much less costly way. Brian Steidle, the US representative for the African Union in
Darfur, recounted that Janjaweed militias often directly informed the AU of their violence
and, “after one such attack [...] the militia delivered to the AU a letter ‘in which they said
they’d attack this village and this village and this village and they’d burn the villages, steal
whatever they wanted, and kill everybody they could. They laid it out for us.” ’ (Flint and
de Waal, 2008, pg. 133). The Government could have easily engaged in less costly signaling
like this if they so desired.
Alternatively, the intervention may increased violence by allowing the Government to
credibly signal their resolve to stay in power to local communities. This is qualitatively
different from signaling to the international community because the motivation would be
to deter potential uprisings rather than external intervention. However, this also remains
22I draw on qualitative and historical evidence rather than turning directly to the data given the constraints
of examining mechanisms through interaction effects and effectively splitting a small sample of 10 monitored
areas further.
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improbable. Because monitored communities were not informed that they were under the
surveillance of Amnesty, they would have been unable to deduce that the violence exacted
against their communities was done so because of the monitoring. It is likely that targeting
easier-to-reach communities would have had the same effect. Coupled, this suggests that
while Eyes on Darfur may have increased violence through signaling mechanisms, alternate
and less costly ways of reaching this same goal were available and make it unlikely.
A second mechanism through which Eyes on Darfur may have increased violence relates
to core principal-agent challenges the Government of Sudan may have faced in delegating
violence to Janjaweed militias. In the case of Darfur, the Government of Sudan claimed that
the Janjaweed forces they initially controlled in 2003 had broke rank with the Government
by 2007 and no longer followed their orders. If the Government’s claims were believed true,
Eyes on Darfur may have provided the Government a way to test the loyalty of Janjaweed
forces. Given the challenges of monitoring Janjaweed forces and assessing whether they
executed tasks assigned, Eyes on Darfur may have provided a low-cost way for the Gov-
ernment of Sudan to assign a task of exacting violence in these villages and visibly assess
whether the Janjaweed had completed their task. In this sense, Eyes on Darfur may have
increased violence by providing a mechanism to overcome principal-agent dynamics between
the Government of Sudan and Janjaweed forces.
While this mechanism may explain increases in violence, it’s unlikely. First, historical
evidence suggests that the Government of Sudan was largely in control of the Janjaweed
over the entire arc of the conflict and claimed no control to avoid culpability (Prunier, 2008;
Flint and de Waal, 2008). Second, the costs to monitoring the Janjaweed were relatively low:
Darfur was close to the capital of Khartoum, the Government was well-equipped to oversee
the Janjaweed, and there were well-established relationships between forces. The costs of
potential incrimination generated through Eyes on Darfur would have had to outweigh the
costs of using alternative monitoring tools. That said, this by no means attempts to portray
the Government as a unitary or monolithic actor, and doubt cast upon this mechanism
remains speculative in nature. Rather, this speaks to a unique mechanism through which
Eyes on Darfur and similar interventions may generate perverse effects.
A final and more plausible explanation that explains why Amnesty’s intervention in-
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creased violence may simply have been retaliation. The Government of Sudan may have
increased violence to retaliate against Amnesty International USA for monitoring areas in
Sudan for which they did not provide access. The Government of Sudan had long made it
difficult for aid workers and activists alike to operate in Darfur and as a first line of defense
against external intervention, the Government of Sudan prohibited most organizations from
operating in Darfur or made it prohibitively costly to do so. For many NGOs delivering aid
in Darfur, personnel were actively targeted and organizations withdrew staff out of safety
concerns (Polgreen, 2007). Retaliating against Amnesty may have been Sudan’s attempt
to dissuade them from continuing to monitor areas and to deter other human rights or-
ganizations from engaging in the same behavior. Indeed, burgeoning research in political
science documents an increasing number of attacks against aid workers and contends that
one explanation for this rise is that armed actors wish to expel aid organizations out of a
given area (Narang and Stanton, 2013; Narang, 2013).
One crucial difference between aid organizations operating in Darfur and Amnesty’s
work, however, was that Amnesty maintained no field presence in Darfur. Therefore, while
aid workers could be directly targeted for engaging in work that the Government did not
approve of, Amnesty could not. Rather, retaliating against Amnesty could only be done by
targeting the communities they aimed to protect. In response to Amnesty circumventing
typical protocols needed to gain consent to operate in Darfur, the Government of Sudan may
have punished the population they aimed to protect in order to pressure them to withdraw
given that the Government could not directly target Amnesty. This resonates with a strategy
of targeting that the Government used elsewhere during the conflict and is the most in line
with their established behavior.
Understanding why the Government of Sudan increased violence in monitored interven-
tions is key to identifying the mechanisms through which human rights interventions may
generate violence more broadly. With limited access to Government and Janjaweed officials,
it remains challenging to definitively adjudicate between mechanisms. Anecdotal evidence
from behavior outside Amnesty’s provides clues as to which mechanism is more plausible,
and suggests that the Government may have been engaging in retaliation. If indeed retali-
ation is at play, one key implication for at-distance monitoring through new technologies is
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that it may perversely affect the local communities it aims to serve.
3.7.2 Generalizability
A key question is whether these results are generalizable and what their broader signifi-
cance is in the study of human rights and conflict. Eyes on Darfur was undoubtedly unique:
it was the first-ever satellite intervention launched amidst an ongoing genocide in a small
subset of villages in the western region of Sudan. Genocides are few and far-between, the
scope of the intervention was limited, and the very fact that an innovative technology was
used reduces the extent to which these results can be validated. Yet, these results speak to
a broader set of human rights advocacy efforts and provide insight on the conditions under
which these efforts positively or perniciously shape conflict.
Human rights advocacy efforts have become commonplace in the international arena
and activists often engage in policy-making processes and international diplomatic efforts
(Betsill and Corell, 2008). While results from the literature on naming and shaming gen-
erally suggest it has positive effects (Hafner-Burton, 2014), there are a growing number of
articles to which this research contributes that highlight its deleterious effects (Bob, 2005;
Charli Carpenter, 2005; Hafner-Burton, 2008). More specifically, in the context of violent
conflict, evidence generally suggests that these types of campaigns have beneficial effects:
Krain (2012) finds that naming and shaming efforts reduce the severity of genocides and
politicides and DeMeritt (2012) buttresses these results in analysis suggesting that human
rights campaigns curtails state-sponsored killings amidst conflict.23 My analysis may di-
verge from these cross-national studies by unbundling advocacy interventions, unpacking
micro-level behavior, and analyzing its impact on sub-national trends.
Additionally, while the technology used in this intervention is new, few of the underlying
characteristics of this information are; questions about credibility, accuracy, and precision are
core to human rights monitoring and affect satellite monitoring in the same ways they affect
more traditional forms of information collection. Moreover, the growing use of satellites
in monitoring areas inaccessible to human rights researchers — Syria, Northern Nigeria,
23Scholarship on the impact of military interventions during ongoing conflict finds similarly ameliorative
effects (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014; DeMeritt, 2015).
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and elsewhere — increase the relevance of the findings in this paper. As these technologies
become more affordable and more common, so too will this type of monitoring. These results,
therefore, present an important estimate of what may become a prevailing intervention.
Moreover, documenting and disseminating evidence about transgressions in order to
change behavior is not unique to human rights monitoring, but is a common strategy used in
the in the international system: monitoring is integral to bureaucracies implementing peace
accords and ceasefires (Fortna, 2008; Fortna and Howard, 2008), third parties assessing the
quality of elections (Hyde, 2011; Inchino and Schundeln, 2012), and states enforcing bilateral
or multilateral agreements (Maggi, 1999; Martin, 1992). While the results from this study
stem from advocacy efforts, they share many of the underlying characteristics with these
other monitoring interventions and suggest, that under certain conditions, these monitoring
approaches may generate similar incentives and lead to deleterious effects.
Analyzing the timing and type of violence that characterized the Darfuri genocide pro-
vides insight on two scope conditions under which advocacy-driven monitoring may fail.
First, the Government had little to lose by the time Amnesty launched their efforts and
were determined to deny access to, or retaliate against, those who attempted to intervene.
Speculatively, other human rights interventions may be more successful in the early days of
conflict when actors are still invested in their reputations and believe negotiated settlements
are still in sight. Second, the Government of Sudan was engaged in genocidal violence, which
by its very definition, entailed the intent to fully exterminate a group. In these contexts,
actors have strong beliefs and are unlikely to care about international audience costs that
fall short of inciting a military intervention. Monitoring these types of conflicts may rarely
generate ameliorative effects. Interestingly however, the results here also speak to the under-
lying potential for limited external interventions conducted by human rights organizations
to change the strategic calculus of actors involved in genocide, even if they cause violence.
The impact of the Eyes on Darfur project speaks to a set of questions about when and
why human rights advocacy efforts affect patterns of civilian abuse and provides a point
of departure to speculate when they fail to reduce abuse. The analysis presented here,
nonetheless, provides one estimate from one case, which is a modest, but crucial step in
analyzing the conditions under which these interventions alter the strategic use of violence.
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3.8 Conclusions
While monitoring has long-been a traditional tool of statecraft that nations use to fur-
ther their interests, NGOs and human rights activists have increasingly embraced it as
a key strategy to pursue their own agendas (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Rise, Ropp and
Kathryn Sikkink, 1999). Human rights organizations consistently document and disseminate
information about violations in order to pressure those responsible for violence to change
their behavior. Yet, the impact of advocacy-driven monitoring efforts is not straightforward,
particularly in the context of violent conflict.
To contribute to this debate, I marshal unique evidence and a test of the first-ever satel-
lite intervention implemented by Amnesty International USA during the Darfuri genocide.
Amnesty selected a set of villages, tasked satellites to monitor these villages and informed
the Government of Sudan that the world was watching. While the objective of this project
was to reduce violence in monitored villages, analysis suggests that the project increased
violence by 15 percentage points during the intervention and roughly 20 percentage point
in the following year. This advocacy effort also increased violence in neighboring areas by
8 percentage points. Evidence suggests that the Government of Sudan retaliated against
monitored communities in an effort to shut down the program and deter other activists from
involvement in Darfur.
Caution in interpretation is warranted. The analysis presented here is observational and
while the results draw on novel, high-frequency, geo-coded data, the data themselves are
noisy and subject to error. Whereas sensitivity analysis suggests the results are robust to
various model specifications and approaches to cutting the data, these robustness checks are
themselves limited by underlying blemishes in the data. More broadly, the analysis assesses
the strategic behavior of a singular actor, the Government of Sudan. Rather than analyze
individual unit commanders or soldiers, this approach examines the use of violence between
villages as the portfolio choice of the Government. Nonetheless, these results provide an
important insight onto the deleterious impact that monitoring conflict to deter violence may
have.
There are three key implications of this research. First, this analysis highlights the
perverse outcomes that advocacy interventions may generate. The fact that a fairly com-
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monplace human rights strategy had pernicious effects speaks to the broad range of outcomes
that these interventions may fuel. Understanding when and why monitoring increases vio-
lence is integral to reducing the impact of conflict and this paper provides suggestive evidence
about the conditions under which these strategies result in unintended consequences. Ad-
vocacy efforts may lose its deterrent-capacity when it incentivizes governments to retaliate
against the very communities it aims to serve. While the findings in this paper are discour-
aging, they nonetheless suggest that even actors engaged in the most brutal of conflict are
sensitive to international pressure that generates evidence of their behavior.
Second, these findings illuminate ways in which human rights monitoring can be re-
designed to mitigate risk. Given that these interventions provide a platform for actors to
credibly signal commitment through violence, projects that seek to document conflict to
ultimately hold those to account may keep the information they collect private to avoid
providing any signaling opportunities. Additionally, analysis suggests that the impact of
Eyes on Darfur endured beyond the scope of the intervention. While this type of persistence
is beneficial when outcomes are positive and detrimental when outcomes are negative, these
long-term effects should influence investments into monitoring.
Lastly, these findings garner much-needed evidence on the role and impact of new tech-
nologies in human rights monitoring. First and foremost, the use of satellite technology to
monitor conflict increased violence in this case, which should temper excitement over new
technologies championed as silver bullets. However, these satellite technologies facilitated
collecting credible, high-frequency, sub-national data on violence in a set of villages for which
the Government had denied organizations and activists access. Indeed, it is in the ways that
new technologies restructure the strategies available to actors and the decision-nodes at
which they act that fundamentally reshape the monitoring game. In this sense, the analysis
in this paper speaks to ways in which new technologies have altered the strategic interactions
between human rights organizations and their targets, and in doing so, provides the first set
of estimates on the impact of advocacy in previously unexplored areas of conflict.
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Abstract
Cultivating cooperation with local populations is crucial to peacekeeping mission success.
Peacekeepers must generate cooperation in order to solicit information about local political
actors, social networks and violence in order to overcome the asymmetries of operating
in foreign and unfamiliar theaters. Under what conditions do local populations decide
to cooperate with peacekeepers? How does exposure to peacekeeping security, relief, or
abuse — three of the primary ways that local communities experience peacekeepers —
affect the likelihood that local populations will provide information to peacekeepers? Using
an original survey of a random sample of residents living in metropolitan Port-au-Prince,
Haiti, we show that exposure to security and relief activities improves public opinion and
is associated with substantial increases in the willingness to cooperate with peacekeepers
whereas exposure to peacekeeping abuse dramatically undermines civilian attitudes and
cooperation. Interestingly, while the impact of abuse is larger than that of security and
relief activities in explaining beliefs, the impact of security and relief activities outweigh the
effect of abuse in explaining cooperative behavior. These findings present an opportunity
and challenge for peacekeepers: if public opinion and cooperation are strongly responsive to
peacekeeper programming and policy, then peacekeepers must deliver services and prevent
abuse in order to solicit the cooperation that they need to achieve their mandates.
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4.1 Introduction
United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are a key tool used by the international
community to maintain peace and security in countries plagued by violence and instabil-
ity. Between 1948 and 2015, seventy-one UN peacekeeping operations were launched and
deployed to a broad set of global crises (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Princi-
ples and Guidelines, 2008). Deployments face myriad obstacles in altering the underlying
dynamics of conflict and establishing avenues for domestic actors to pursue peaceful transi-
tions. One core challenge to peacekeeping operations, as well as foreign military operations
more broadly, is eliciting cooperation from local civilians. To effectively operate in foreign
environments, militaries require information about local context, including knowledge about
political actors, social networks, cleavages, and incidents of violence. While a growing con-
sensus in the policy world holds that cooperative relationships with local civilians is key
to mission success, many deployments remain deeply unpopular with populations who view
them as impotent or abusive (Johnstone, 2006).
In response to these challenges, the United Nations has shifted the operational focus
of peacekeeping missions over the past two decades to emphasize community cooperation.
While first-generation missions emphasized military efforts and elite-level mediation, second-
generation multidimensional missions deliver a basket of services that attempt to build peace
from the bottom up (Goulding, 1993; Fortna, 2008; Howard, 2008). To do so, peacekeepers
now engage in a broad range of activities, all of which build on community cooperation:
peacekeepers provide security, which depends on obtaining information from local popula-
tions on the activities of armed groups or gangs to prevent and respond to threats; they
conduct civic and human rights education programs as well as engage in institution build-
ing, which requires individual participation and an underlying degree of confidence in the
mission administering the program; and peacekeepers endeavor to revitalize post-conflict
economies, which calls for investment in the sustainability of peace by community members.
As peacekeepers increasingly engage communities through multidimensional programming,
cooperation with local population has become paramount.
Despite the growing commitment to civilian engagement, little is known about the condi-
tions under which local civilians cooperate with peacekeepers and what strategies peacekeep-
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ers can draw on to generate cooperation. In this article, we examine how the the day-to-day
experiences that individuals have with peacekeepers through exposure to security efforts,
relief services, or abuse — three of the primary ways that local communities experience
peacekeepers — affect the likelihood that local populations will share information with
peacekeepers. We argue that the incentives between peacekeepers and local populations
are often aligned — peacekeepers provide security and relief services that civilians desire
— but barriers to cooperation persist for three reasons. First, there may be uncertainty
around peacekeepers’ true interests and whether they are aligned with the population. Sec-
ond, individuals may doubt peacekeepers’ abilities to effectively deliver security, reducing
incentives to cooperate and increasing fear of retribution from third parties for doing so.
Third, individuals may fear that they themselves might become victims of abuse by undis-
ciplined peacekeepers. Ultimately, civilians make decisions about cooperation without full
information about the capabilities and intentions of peacekeepers. As such, the strategies
that peacekeepers draw on to engage civilians shape their personal experiences and inform
their decisions as to whether they should cooperate or not.
In light of these barriers, we assess how exposure to peacekeeping activities shape in-
dividual willingness to share information with, and report crimes to, the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Our focus on cooperation, as well as public
perceptions, speaks to the very behavior required for the United Nations to be effective in
peacekeeping. We marshal data from a novel household survey of 585 respondents in which
we used satellite imagery to draw a random sample to analyze information about the beliefs
and behavior of the very population that UN peacekeeping aims to serve. With this data, we
test two sets of hypotheses. First, we examine whether whether Haitians’ experiences with
peacekeepers are related to their assessments of the costs and benefits of cooperating with
them. Second, we analyze whether exposure to these peacekeeping activities are related to
the likelihood that residents will provide peacekeepers with the information they need to
carry out their mission. We conduct a formal mediation analysis to assess the extent to
which peacekeeping strategies shape behavior by changing these beliefs.
To preview our results, we find that exposure to the strategies peacekeepers draw on —
specifically, to security activities, relief activities, and abusive behavior — provides substan-
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tial explanatory power in understanding how civilians perceive peacekeepers and whether
they cooperate with them.1 Exposure to security and relief activities are associated with
significantly higher propensities to provide any type of information to peacekeepers whereas
exposure to abuse is associated with substantial decreases in the likelihood of cooperating
with peacekeepers. Perhaps more interestingly, we find that the impact of exposure to abuse
is larger than that of exposure to security or relief activities in predicting public opinion,
however the opposite is true when examining cooperation where the impact of security and
relief activities outweigh the impact of abuse by a factor of two. These findings shed light
on the differential impact of these activities and provide guidance for how peacekeepers may
allocate resources to improve public attitudes and cooperation. Results from our mediation
analysis find surprisingly little connection between beliefs and behavior; whereas beliefs over
effectiveness generally operate as a mediating causal mechanism, beliefs over abusiveness and
effectiveness do not. While direct exposure to peacekeeping activities shapes both belief and
behavior, this analysis suggests that peacekeepers should invest in improving perceptions
over effectiveness to improve cooperation. Ultimately, our analysis highlights the potential
for peacekeepers to generate cooperation when they provide security and relief services as
well as undermine cooperation when they engage in abusive behavior. This has important
implications for launching and appropriately investing in effective peacekeeping operations
and civilian engagement strategies.
While this article provides the first quantitative estimates of the impact of peacekeeping
behavior on forms of public opinion as well as civilian cooperation and behavior, a set of
caveats is in order. First, we present a set of correlations between exposure to peacekeeping
activities and civilian beliefs and the propensity to provide peacekeepers with information.
We include a set of potential confounders that condition variation in beliefs and cooperation
in our estimation strategy, present results from a set of matching estimators, and conduct
a sensitivity analysis to assess how robust our results are to unmeasured heterogeneity.
Nonetheless, our analysis remains observational and our results should be interpreted with
care. Second, we rely on a set of self-reported measures of exposure to peacekeeping ac-
1We conceptualize abuse as a comparable peacekeeping strategy insofar as abuse is a function of institu-
tional investment in restraint and discipline. We further discuss this operationalization in section 4.2.
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tivities. While the benefit of this approach is drawing on data provided by those directly
impacted, our results may be shaped by cognitive or recall biases. To reduce concerns that
individuals may misattribute activities organized by other international actors to MINUS-
TAH, we limit our analysis to clearly visible, concrete actions. Lastly, our article focuses
on the strategies that peacekeepers use to generate information sharing — one key compo-
nent of cooperation — rather than the impact of this form of cooperation on peacekeeper
behavior or mission success. While the use and utility of information varies across missions
and is weakened by challenges common to bureaucracies with broad mandates, collecting
information is the first step to acting on information. Our results therefore speak to a crucial
step by which peacekeepers can generate relevant information.
Exploring these dynamics in Haiti both provides a hard test for a theory of cooperation
with peacekeepers and a set of results that speak to a broader set of peacekeeping oper-
ations globally. At the time of our survey, MINUSTAH had been operating in Haiti for
more than seven years, providing civilians opportunities to form strong beliefs about the
peacekeepers that would unlikely be updated based on recent interactions. Furthermore,
MINUSTAH was accused of causing a tragic cholera epidemic that by the time of our survey
had killed thousands of Haitians, and had also been involved in numerous scandals involving
forced evictions, unjust use of lethal force, and transactional sex with under-aged women
(Piarroux, 2010; Harvard University School of Public Health, 2011). Thus, finding support
for the ability of peacekeepers to generate cooperation here over a limited and recent time
period may provide a lower bound estimate of this relationship across cases. Moreover, the
results from this study likely travel to other cases given that MINUSTAH shares many of
the same underlying characteristics of other missions: like many recent missions, MINUS-
TAH delivers humanitarian aid, promotes human rights, facilitates elections, and supports
domestic security forces. These similarities suggest that our analysis may provide analytic
leverage in understanding other peacekeeping operations.
This article makes two key contributions to the study of peacekeeping. First, we develop
and test a theory of why civilians cooperate with peacekeepers. Understanding why local
populations cooperate with foreign military forces is at the core of illuminating the mech-
anisms through which these interventions succeed or fail. While a rich literature estimates
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the positive impact of peacekeeping on a series of important outcomes including battle-
field deaths (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014), conflict contagion (Beardsley, 2011),
hostilities between armed groups and local populations (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon,
2013), and post-conflict peacebuilding (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Gilligan and Sergenti,
2008), we detail and analyze a micro-level mechanism underlying these relationships. More-
over, in focusing on civilian cooperation, we depart from two other schools of thought on
peacekeeping operations: the ‘informational’ school, which suggests that peacekeepers are
successful by reducing uncertainty between actors through monitoring and providing en-
forcement mechanisms through which credible commitments can be honored (Walters and
Snyder, 1999; Walters, 2002; Fortna, 2008), and the ‘institutional’ school which suggests that
institutional factors such as the level of capacity, electoral design, and norms transfer, ex-
plain variation in peacekeeping success (Paris, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006).2 Our focus
on information sharing builds on Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013), which highlights
the role of peacekeepers in reducing conflict by curtailing information sharing between civil-
ians and armed groups, and analyzes the previously unexplored direct impact of this form of
cooperation between civilians and peacekeepers. In doing so, our analysis also contributes
to a broader literature on how third party military interventions win the ‘hearts and minds’
of local populations (Galula, 1964; U.S. Army, 2007; Berman, Felter and Shapiro, 2011).
Despite the important differences between counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations,
both types of forces need information from local populations and employ similar strategies
to cultivate cooperation. The core results presented in this article shed light more broadly
on how civilians view and interact with foreign forces.
Our second contribution is methodological. By drawing on a household a survey of the
attitudes and experiences civilians in a host country hold, our article quantitatively examines
peacekeeping at the sub-national level. Our sampling strategy uses satellite imagery and
2Other studies of ‘peacekeeping from below’ have focused heavily on the role of history, the geo-political
world order, culture, and ideology in shaping opinions towards peacekeepers (Pouligny, 2006; Pugh, 2011;
da Costa and Karlsrud, 2012). Others emphasize that peacekeepers are perceived as part of a constellation
of local actors and that support for them depends on which combatant party they are seen as supporting
(Mehler, 2008; Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013; Ruggieri, Gizelis and Dorussen, 2013). Generally, these theories
give civilians little agency and do not allow for updating based on new information, as support is a function
of a fixed position in a social or economic order, or an inherited frame. In contrast to these theories, we
model civilians as responsive to new information as part of their efforts to maximize their livelihoods and
protect their lives.
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GIS information to randomly select households from across metropolitan Port-au-Prince one
year after the 2010 earthquake, including violence-affected areas such as Citeé Soleil, tent
camps of people displaced by the earthquake, and elite neighborhoods. In turning from
a broad cross-national approach to one that leverages subnational variation, we build on a
growing but nascent set of work that examines the micro-level dynamics of peacekeeping and
holds that host populations are strategic interlocutors who influence peacekeeping outcomes
through their alliances with forces for instability or peace (Mvukiyehe and Samii, 2012;
Pouligny, 2006; Autesserre, 2010). While most studies on this topic have used in-depth
ethnography to develop and support theories, our article responds to calls for quantitative
work on the topic of civilian interactions with peacekeepers by Autesserre (2014a, 495) to
‘evaluat[e] the strength and exportability of the qualitative findings.” This study begins to
fill this gap.
The framework and findings we present are salient because the stakes are high. Many
peacekeeping missions, including the one in Haiti as well as those in the Democratic Republic
of Congo and Darfur, have left policymakers and local populations disillusioned about the
prospects for humanitarian intervention. Identifying how peacekeepers can generate trust
and cooperation from local populations is key to designing the very type of peacekeeping
operations that the international community seeks. Indeed, increasing the effectiveness of
one of the most common interventions to mitigate violent conflict has the potential to vastly
improve the lives of those living in conflict-affected states around the world.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides a theoretical framework for out study
and section 4.3 sketches a brief history of Haiti and the peacekeeping mission deployed there.
Section 4.4 introduces the data and empirical approach, including the sampling strategy
and methodology used to collect and analyze data. Section 4.5 presents results. Section 4.6
concludes with a discussion of the this study’s generalizability and implications for theories
of peacekeeping and peacekeeping policy.
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4.2 Peacekeeping and Cooperation
4.2.1 Why Information Matters and Civilian Expectations
Cooperation is critical for foreign troops who face severe information asymmetries in
the countries where they operate. Peacekeepers are often deployed to areas in which they
have little knowledge of the local terrain or political dynamics. In the traditional role of
monitoring ceasefires, peacekeepers required information about the military capacity and
non-compliant actions of parties, neither of which are perfectly visible to peacekeepers. New
missions that aim to address the root causes of conflict also require up-to-date situational
awareness about sources of political instability, conflict dynamics, social support for both
state and non-state actors, and shifting coalitions in order to effectively protect civilians
and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid (Smith, 1994; Carment and Rudner, 2006;
Norheim-Martinsen and Ravndal, 2011). This type of information can generate virtuous
cycles that reinforce a peace kept: targeted security and relief activities establish the con-
ditions that provide alternative options to individuals who may otherwise participate in
violence (Leites and Wolf 1970, Crouch 2010), as well as contribute to market stabilization
that tapers civilian dependence on non-state actors who may have an interest in the contin-
uation of violence (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010). This type of information is not just
beneficial, but crucial to mission success. The lack of information has contributed to sev-
eral of the major failures of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s, including the inability to assess
factionalization in Bosnia, identify armed group leadership in Somalia, and appropriately
assess risk in the DRC (Johnston, 1997; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010).
Recent peacekeeping policy has embraced the relevance of information sharing. The need
for local information during the deployment and operation of a PKO is central to the Brahimi
Report on peacekeeping (United Nations, 2000, 43) and the 2008 peacekeeping guidelines
emphasize that ‘the experiences of the past 15 years have shown that in order to succeed,
United Nations peacekeeping operations must also be perceived as legitimate and credible,
particularly in the eyes of the local population’ (Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
2008). Other UN reports have similarly emphasized the need for better information about
local expectations and perceived needs (United Nations, 2009). Moreover, these policy
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reports have driven substantial financial investments. As a result of the increasing focus on
information, the UN created Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMACs) within peacekeeping
operations beginning in 2006, which are tasked with generating analytical products that
draw on information from a variety of sources, including governments, the media, aerial
imagery, and “human intelligence” (Ramjoué, 2011; Dorn, 2009).3 While a small share of
investment in intelligence goes into technological tools like unmanned areal vehicles, the
core mechanism for gathering information remains relationships with community members
(Blyth, 2013).
Generating this type of information-sharing requires cultivating cooperative relationships
with local populations. This a priori should not be challenging given that the interests of
peacekeepers and local populations are often aligned: peacekeepers provide protection to
local populations in situations where it is not provided by the state, deliver humanitarian
aid to communities unable to sustain markets, and secure environments to reduce violence
and create much-needed stability. This alignment rests on two assumptions. First, it assumes
civilians desire safety and security and that broad majorities benefit from stability rather
than profit from conflict. Second, it assumes that peacekeepers follow mandates grounded
in principles of protection. This is not an innocent assumption as research on peacekeeping
operations and international institutions suggest they often serve the national interests of
great powers (Neack, 1995; Bennis, 1996; Pugh, 2004). While PKOs may be launched for
motives that are not purely humanitarian, they are generally deployed with the goal of
promoting international peace and security that broadly benefit local populations (Gilligan
and Stedman, 2003).
In determining whether to cooperate with and provide information to peacekeepers at the
individual level, civilians evaluate the potential benefit of cooperation by considering peace-
keepers’ capacity and desire to provide security against their propensity to act abusively.
In volatile, highly politicized post-conflict situations, reliable information about peacekeep-
ers is difficult to obtain and civilians must form beliefs about whether cooperation is likely
to help them based on incomplete information. Therefore, civilians rely on their personal
3In Haiti, the intelligence produced by the JMAC, and particularly by local informants, was critical
during the 2006-2007 military operations against the gangs in the slums of Port-au-Prince (Dorn, 2009).
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experiences with peacekeepers to form opinions about the potential benefits of cooperation.
We posit that civilians make assessments based on three key parameters: peacekeepers’ 1)
effectiveness, 2) benevolence, and 3) abusiveness. With respect to effectiveness, peacekeepers
must meet basic expectations of providing security. Despite good intentions, if peacekeepers
are ineffective in providing this core service, cooperation may yield few benefits. Given that
civilians may face retribution for providing information to peacekeepers by armed actors,
they must be sure that peacekeepers can provide sufficient security to protect them and
avoid this form of reprisal. While individual security and collective security may diverge,
individuals must be confident that peacekeepers are effective more broadly to engender
cooperation.
Additionally, peacekeepers must be effective in engaging in activities that ultimately
serve the population. They must act benevolently and in the interests of the population
they claim to protect. Peacekeepers may indeed be seen as powerful, but if individuals
perceive the mission as self-serving or exploitative, then cooperation will not generate any
benefits. While peacekeeping mandates are fairly explicit in their goals, ambiguity around
whether they serve great powers or elite interests creates the very type of uncertainty that
may deter cooperation.
Lastly, effectiveness and benevolence may be offset by peacekeeper abusiveness. Expec-
tations over peacekeeper abuse may undermine the positive benefits of cooperation. In many
deployments, peacekeepers engage in transactional sex and commit human rights violations
(Machel, 1996; Jennings and Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2009), and the possibility that contact with
peacekeepers may result in physical abuse or extortion is very real (Odello, 2010). Ac-
cordingly, individuals may be deterred from providing information to peacekeepers due to
concern for their own well-being. In this model in which beliefs shape behavior, unless the
likely benefits of cooperation outweigh the expected costs, civilians will likely refuse to co-
operate with peacekeepers. Thus, when deciding whether to cooperate, individuals must
assess whether peacekeepers are capable of effectively providing security or relief, whether
peacekeeper intentions are benevolent, and whether peacekeepers may abuse them.
CHAPTER 4. COOPERATION, INTELLIGENCE, AND KEEPING THE PEACE:
CIVILIAN ENGAGEMENT WITH PEACEKEEPERS IN HAITI 121
4.2.2 Exposure to Peacekeeping and Local Cooperation
Peacekeeping operations are deployed in rapidly changing crisis situations where informa-
tion is scarce and misinformation is common. Their mandates are determined and updated
annually by the UN Security Council — a foreign and non-transparent body — and their
effectiveness is difficult for non-expert audiences to assess. Given these constraints, how
do civilians who peacekeepers seek to serve form beliefs about peacekeepers’ effectiveness,
benevolence, and abusiveness to evaluate the expected value of cooperation? We focus on
the three strategies peacekeepers draw on — providing security, provisioning relief, and en-
gaging in restraint from abuse — that influence individual beliefs and shape cooperation.
These strategies operate to change the material situation of local populations as well as
signal the underlying intentions of peacekeepers.
We focus on direct experience with peacekeepers for two reasons. First, there is a robust
body of qualitative scholarship that demonstrates individual experience with peacekeepers
are an important determinant of their beliefs (Talentino, 2007; Pugh, 2011; da Costa and
Karlsrud, 2012). Pouligny (2006, 108) describes how civilians assess peacekeepers based on
what they observe and experience: “There is plenty of testimony recalling in particular the
white all-terrain vehicles that invade the streets, and the hotels taken over and occupied by
people moving around hither and thither. But there is an important reservation: ‘We don’t
see what they are doing.” ’ This approach resonates with broader research that highlights how
the day-to-day experiences and citizen engagement associated with delivering aid in conflict
zones shapes local beliefs (Autesserre, 2014b). Second, we analyze individual experiences
with peacekeepers given that a crucial question missions face is how to allocate scarce
resources in order to fulfill their mandate. Missions have the latitude to invest in various
strategies to keep the peace and generate cooperation. Estimates about the relative impact of
each strategy may illuminate where and how to invest. While exposure to security activities,
relief provision, and abuse are by no means the sole determinant or deterrent in cultivating
cooperation, we examine them because they are the three most common ways peacekeepers
engage civilians. We consider how each of these shape expectations over cooperation in turn.
Security activities are core to all peacekeeping missions that seek to stop local-level
violence and prevent aggression that may escalate the potential for conflict. Peacekeepers
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construct outposts, patrol vast swaths of territory, execute arrests, and depending on mission
mandate, praoctively engage non-state armed actors. Through these activities, peacekeep-
ers provide security often absent in conflict and post-conflict societies, and indeed, evidence
highlights the beneficial impact of security provision: Hultman, Kathman and Shannon
(2013), for example, demonstrates that UN patrols are positively correlated with reduc-
tions in civilian abuse as policing operates as a physical barrier between rebels and local
communities that increases the costs of exacting violence.
Engaging in security activities may generate civilian cooperation through two specific
mechanisms. First, civilians may simply reward peacekeepers with cooperation for increasing
safety and reducing instability. In this story, civilians react directly to situational improve-
ments in safety that serves them. Second, engaging in security activities may increase coop-
eration by increasing opportunities to cooperate. The simple presence of patrols increases
the ease and access of civilians to engage peacekeepers and share information. Moreover,
maintaining a presence through security activities may signal that peacekeepers are com-
mitted to securing areas for local populations. Evidence from missions in West and Central
Africa affirm that individual satisfaction with peacekeeping missions are a direct function
of security services civilians observes (Krasno, 2006a). We therefore forward the following
hypothesis:
H1: Exposure to peacekeeping security activities increases cooperation with peacekeep-
ers.
In addition to providing security, relief provision has become a staple of missions that
assist in post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation. As the duration of missions has increased,
so to has the expansion of these services. Relief activities may similarly generate coopera-
tion by signaling good intentions and making local communities better off. This has driven
the UN to implement quick impact projects and other relief activities within communi-
ties to build trust, elicit good will and enhance cooperation. Quick impact projects are
small-scale, low-cost projects designed to build confidence in the mission, open channels of
communication between peacekeepers and local communities, and provide a rapid benefit to
the population (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support,
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2012).4
Research suggests that providing these types of relief services generally increases coop-
eration. In a study of how earthquake relief affects perceptions of foreigners in Pakistan,
Andrabi and Das (2010) show that receiving international humanitarian aid after the 2009
Pakistani earthquake increased trust in the foreigners who provided aid and conducted mili-
tary operations in the region. Moreover, counter-insurgency strategies strongly embrace the
idea that the distribution of humanitarian and development aid helps win ‘hearts and minds’
for foreign militaries (Killcullen, 2006; Cornish, 2009).5 Recent research on winning hearts
and minds, however, is somewhat mixed and suggest that local conflict dynamics condition
impact. Sexton (2016), for example, finds that delivering aid to areas controlled by armed
actors increases violence whereas delivering it to areas controlled by the government gener-
ates positive effects. Crost, Felter and Johnston (2014) suggest that aid increases instability
by incentivizing insurgents to sabotage efforts. However Beath, Christia and Enikolopov
(2011) and Berman, Felter and Shapiro (2011) find that this type of aid improves troop
security and reduces long-term violence. Public opinion polls in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and
Burundi find that relief projects such as bridges or school reconstruction generate good will
for peacekeepers (Krasno, 2005, 2006a,b). With mixed priors, we formalize and test the
following hypothesis related to relief activities:
H2: Exposure to peacekeeping relief activities increases cooperation with peacekeepers.
Lastly, citizens in the countries that host peacekeeping operations often experience abuse
at the hands of the peacekeepers. Allegations that range from engaging in transactional sex
to more directly abusing civilians plague peackeepers globally (Holt and Taylor, 2009), and
4Quick impact projects do not aim to promote long-term development, but focus on short term relief
and public opinion (United Nations, 2007). In Haiti, MINUSTAH’s budget for QIPs reached about $8
million in 2010-2011, and MINUSTAH included six companies of engineers that made up more than 1,200
of MINUSTAH’s military contingent (United Nations, 2012).
5It is important to note that information sharing with peacekeepers deviates in important ways from
intelligence sharing with other foreign or domestic military forces. First, peacekeepers tend to engage in
dramatically less active conflict, which reduces incentives for civilians to denounce enemies or manipulate
military forces to support favored political alliances (Kalyvas, 2006). Second, peacekeeping missions often
operate in post-conflict environments in which violence is less prevalent than during conflict, which similarly
mitigates the potential downside for civilians to provide information.
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in Haiti UN peacekeepers have been accused with particularly egregious forms of misconduct:
they have been charged with starting the cholera epidemic that infected over 700,000 Haitians
and killed over 8,000 (Piarroux et al., 2011; Piarroux and Frerichs, 2015), denounced for
engaging in transactional sex with underage girls that at one point resulted the repatriation
over 100 Sri Lankan troops (Gaye, 2011), and faced allegations of torturing civilians. These
issues are not unique to MINUSTAH and Beber et al. (Forthcoming) rigorously examine the
extent of this problem in Liberia and estimate that roughly 37.5% of woman aged 18 - 30
in greater Monrovia report engaging in transactional sex with UN personnel and that this
increases with the number of UN battalions deployed in country.
The literature on peacekeeping and counter-insurgency suggests that these negative in-
teractions between military forces and local populations have strong effects on how peace-
keepers are perceived and subsequent level of cooperation (Machel, 1996; Jennings and
Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2009; Odello, 2010; Condra and Shapiro, 2012). Predictions from the
broader literature on civilian abuse, however, are theoretically unclear (Kalyvas, 2006).
While engaging in abuse may reduce cooperation by generating grievances among civilians,
it may also coerce civilians into cooperation. In the context of UN peacekeeping, where
forces are expected to be neutral and refrain from abuse, we expect that engaging in abuse
chills cooperation. Formally, we forward the following hypothesis:
H3: Exposure to peacekeeping abuse reduces cooperation with peacekeepers.
In examining the impact of abuse on cooperation and comparing it to security and
relief activities, an important note is in order. First, while providing security and relief are
mandated activities institutionalized in peacekeeping missions, abuse is not.6 While security
and relief provision result from a policy architecture crafted and supported by the UN, abuse,
in part, results from failures to restrain soldiers from engaging in this behavior.7 Even though
comparing these forms of civilian engagement may seem odd, we contend that they all stem
from a portfolio choice that UN leadership face in deciding how to allocate resources between
6We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
7Literature on civilian abuse that examines non-state actors highlight the importance of disciplinary
structures and mechanisms in explaining this type of violence (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006; Cohen,
2013).
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providing relief, security or restraining abuse. Despite the fact that deterring abuse is no
small challenge, investing in the policies, procedures and mechanisms to prevent abuse is
just as much a pro-active choice as investing in security and relief services. Rather than
thinking of these forms of behavior as disparate and incomparable, we suggest that must be
unified for peacekeeping operations to comprehensively think about strategies under their
control that shape civilian behavior.
The debate over which strategies peacekeepers should engage in to elicit cooperation and
which strategies enable them to effectively fulfill their mandates remains largely theoretical
or adjudicated by anecdote. Using data from a random sample of Haitians living in Port-
au-Prince, we bring these hypotheses to the data and analyze how exposure to the impact
of various peacekeeping strategies are correlated with beliefs and cooperation. While the
hypotheses we articulate focus on cooperation, a behavioral outcome directly tied to peace-
keeping effectiveness, we forward a model and analyze data on beliefs as well. In addition to
examining the direct effects of these activities on both families of outcomes, we implement
a mediation analysis to formally assess the extent to which peacekeeping activities shape
cooperation by changing beliefs. This allows us to test whether and how shaping beliefs
truly is required to change cooperative behavior.
4.3 Peacekeeping in Haiti
Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere (World Bank Group,
2014b), plagued by political tumult and a history of foreign intervention. Elite capture
by commercial interests, unrestrained security forces, and the crippling policies of foreign
powers have all contributed to Haiti’s persistent instability (Dubois, 2012; Fatton, 2002).
The latest period of turmoil followed on the heels of inter-generational authoritarian rule by
Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier from 1957 to
1986. The overthrow of the younger Duvalier ushered in an era of social conflict between a
poor majority and elite interests that controlled political, military and economic institutions
(Naidu, Robinson and Young, 2016). After a military coup deposed the popularly elected
Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991, efforts to reinstate democracy resulted in the first UN
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peacekeeping operation in Haiti in 1993.
Since this first mission, a series of peacekeeping operations with varying mandates have
been renewed on a near annual basis. After Aristide was ousted for a second time in 2004,
MINUSTAH was created with a broad mandate by the Security Council as a preemptive
force that aimed to stave off a descent into conflict expected to have destabilizing regional
effects. Then Secretary-General Kofi Annan insisted that the peacekeeping operation go
beyond the traditional scope and contribute to nation-building and durable development
(United Nations, 2004). The mission trained police to support security sector reform efforts,
organized and monitored elections, and promoted human rights. In addition to contributing
to political stability, multiple disasters, including severe hurricanes and the devastating
earthquake of 2010, motivated the United Nations to further expand its mandate in order
to allow peacekeepers to provide humanitarian support.
Over the arc of its deployment, MINUSTAH has been responsible for a series of blunders
and transgressions, including the excessive use of force, sexual abuse and misconduct, and
the introduction of a nation-wide cholera epidemic (Gaye, 2011). Pouligny (2006, 102)
suggests that Haitians fundamentally view peacekeepers as a predatory state. MINUSTAH,
however, has also been lauded for its robust operations against Port-au-Prince’s gangs,
election assistance, and emergency relief efforts. The operation’s presence has been widely
criticized by Haitian politicians and the media (Kristoff and Panarelli, 2010; Schuller, 2012),
yet it has continued with the consent of the Haitian Government. While MINUSTAH
remains a controversial force both within Haiti and the United Nations, it’s mandate has
been continuously renewed since its inception in 2004.
4.4 Empirical Approach
To analyze how exposure to peacekeeping activities is correlated with civilian beliefs
and cooperation, we conducted a survey of a random sample of 585 individuals living in
metropolitan Port-au-Prince in the summer of 2011, just a year after the 2010 earthquake.
One contribution of this project is the application of a rigorous random sampling strategy
that leverages satellite imagery and geo-coordinates to a research area that has often been
CHAPTER 4. COOPERATION, INTELLIGENCE, AND KEEPING THE PEACE:
CIVILIAN ENGAGEMENT WITH PEACEKEEPERS IN HAITI 127
studied using purposive sampling. Our empirical approach therefore provides a new repre-
sentative understanding of perceptions of peacekeepers. In this section, we introduce the
sampling strategy, survey, and estimation approach.
4.4.1 Sampling Frame and Strategy
A key challenge to drawing a representative sample of households in post-disaster zones is
the lack of a sampling frame. The earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010 killed more
than 200,000 people and injured 300,000, and at the time of our survey, 600,000 individuals
were homeless or in temporary shelter. Additionally, 2.3 million had been homeless at some
point since the earthquake and massive displacement rendered the existing 2006 census
unusable.
To take a random and equal probability sample of households, we coupled satellite im-
agery and geographic information. In order to define a sampling frame, we used geographic
coordinates corresponding to the Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Information’s (IHSI)
definition of metropolitan Port-au-Prince to identify the city perimter.8 Using these bound-
aries, we divided the territory within Port-au-Prince into three perfectly nested gridded
layers. The top layer divided the city into 46 blocks, the middle layer contained 25 blocks
within each top layer, and each mid-level block contained 4 lower-level blocks. This process
resulted in the creation of 3,158 blocks. Blocks on the coastline or city limits were trimmed
and each block was weighted proportionate to the area it covered.
To select blocks for surveying, we stratified sampling across the gridded layers in order
to ensure a relatively unclustered distribution of units to survey. Each block was randomly
sampled with a probability proportional to its geographic coverage. Blocks that didn’t meet a
minimum housing density requirement - 20 identifiable structures within a given block - were
discarded. Structure presence was assessed manually to ensure all structures including IDP
tents and temporary residences were included. The motivation for including this criterion
was to ensure a sufficient population minimum for surveying and accessibility as certain
8To define the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, we selected all of the sections communales in the
arrondissement of Port-au-Prince categorized by IHSI as urban. Rural areas were excluded from the sample
via two mechanisms: first, we eliminated sections communales that did not include any areas marked ‘urban’
by IHSI. Second, we made a visual assessment of the post-earthquake satellite images and eliminated lowest-
level grid squares that had fewer than 20 structures.
CHAPTER 4. COOPERATION, INTELLIGENCE, AND KEEPING THE PEACE:
CIVILIAN ENGAGEMENT WITH PEACEKEEPERS IN HAITI 128
areas in metropolitan Port-au-Prince rise into mountainous areas that are inaccessible by
car or motorbike. In the case a block was discarded, a random selection was repeated at
the level at which the block was discarded. Figure 4.1 visualizes areal satellite imagery of
Port-au-Prince and a gridded breakdown of neighborhoods that follows the intuition of block
construction used for sampling.
Figure 4.1: Satellite Imagery of Port-au-Prince Used for Sampling
Note: These figure visualize the satellite imagery used for sampling neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince.
Moving from left to right captures the three levels of grids constructed for sampling.
To conduct the survey, we trained a set of 13 Haitian enumerators in survey techniques
and interview skills. Enumerators were sent to each block with GPS devices that were used
to locate the centroid of the lowest level block. Given the sampling procedure, the location
of the centroid was uncorrelated with any geographic or community level characteristics.
Enumerators surveyed the nth household along randomly assigned cardinal directions from
the centroid.9 Within each household, enumerators generated a full roster of family members
above the age of 18 and randomly selected from the list for the interview. In the case that
households were empty, replacement would be done with the neighboring household. This
ensured that both households were randomly selected as well as members within households.
This strategy generated a random and equal probability sample that captured significant
variation in neighborhood type within Port-au-Prince: in total, four IDP camps, two rela-
tively wealthy neighborhoods, and twelve neighborhoods that reflect substantial variation in
individual and community level characteristics entered the sample. Appendix C.1 includes
a list of the neighborhoods surveyed.
9This counting procedure within neighborhoods ensured that each household in the block had the same
probability of being sampled such that larger or smaller houses would not over-weighted.
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This approach provides a framework for post-disaster sampling which allows researchers
to generate random samples using available and low-cost technology. There are two con-
straints to this approach. First, this approach does not capture the pre-disaster population
which spilled beyond the administrative boundaries of the city. While tracking all pre-quake
residents was beyond the scope of this data collection effort, it is important to note this
limitation. Second, and related, this approach does not capture pre-quake characteristics
such as socio-economic status. Rather, this approach provides a rigorous snapshot of the
post-quake population.
4.4.2 Measurement Strategy and Data
Our household survey was designed to measure individual beliefs, behavior and exposure
to UN peacekeeping. The survey instrument was field-tested and refined through focus
groups and a pilot survey to ensure the measures generated accurately captured, salient
day-to-day experiences and behavior among Haitian citizens.10
To assess the impact of exposure to peacekeeping activities, we construct three measures:
i) ‘PKO Security’, which measures direct experience with peacekeeper patrols and arrests, ii)
‘PKO Relief’, which measures exposure to MINUSTAH-organized food distributions, and iii)
‘PKO Abuse’, which measures whether an individual has ever personally seen a peacekeeper
steal, unjustly use force, abuse women or pay for sex. For each of these measures, we use
the constituent pieces to construct a mean effects index (Anderson, 2008), which captures
the underlying variation between the measures and equally weights these components.
A few challenges warrant mention about measuring these independent variables. First,
we rely on self-reported exposure to peacekeeping and, as such, issues of attribution impact
these measures. Individuals may misattribute activities conducted by other international
organizations to MINUSTAH or may not identify the activities conducted by MINUSTAH
to the peacekeeping operation. To mitigate against this concern, we focus on activities
that are easy to visibly associate with peacekeepers. Moreover, this approach only captures
observable forms of these activities and does not account for the ways in which hidden
versions may similarly affect behavior; for example MINUSTAH may improve the general
10The survey instrument is posted and publicly available at this link.
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security situation and shape behavior but a citizen may not report this if they have not
directly observed security services. This is a challenge common to identifying policy effects
more broadly.
Second, identifying abuse is particularly difficult. To ensure that general security oper-
ations are not misconstrued as abuse, respondents were told that measures of ‘unjust use of
force’ required that peacekeepers were excessively abusive in how they handled individuals.
In the Haitian context, whether or not an arrest or the use of force is considered just or
unjust is fundamentally subjective. We included this measure because of its importance,
particularly in the Haitian context where peacekeepers have been accused of abusing and
even killing civilians while raiding gangs and policing protests. Second, creating a mean
effects index weights all measures of abuse proportionately to avoid any particular compo-
nent driving results and allows us to avoid over-testing a diverse set of variables. That said,
we come to this exercise with humility. These measures capture the reported experiences of
individuals and we realize that even relief activities may be construed as abusive.
Lastly, peacekeepers in MINUSTAH are not vested with the authority to arrest civil-
ians. The Haitian National Police (HNP) maintained this authority and the national police
and MINUSTAH often conduct joint operations. However, MINUSTAH does conduct solo
patrols and has the power to temporarily stop, search and detain civilians. To isolate and
avoid confounding the impact of PKO security, we include a measure of HNP patrols and
arrests. We follow the same procedure and include non-MINUSTAH food distributions to
net the impact of MINUSTAH’s relief.
The dependent variables that we use from this survey focus on the beliefs and behavior of
respondents. With respect to beliefs, we operationalize effectiveness as the extent to which
respondents believe MINUSTAH has the capacity to prevent violent crime, benevolence as
the extent to which individuals believe MINUSTAH works on behalf of their interests, and
abusiveness as the extent to which MINUSTAH is likely to engage in abusive behavior. We
operationalize two measures of cooperation. We capture information sharing by measuring
the extent to which individuals are willing to share general information with MINUSTAH
and crime reporting as the extent to which individuals are willing to report various types of
violence or crimes to MINUSTAH.
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To account for other factors that may shape individuals beliefs and cooperative behav-
ior, we include a set of potential confounders including education, religion and gender.11
Additionally, and as noted above, we include two additional confounders that allow us to
isolate the net effect of MINUSTAH’s relief and security activities: i) the total number
of non-MINUSTAH food distributions and ii) exposure to Hatian National Police security
activities. Table C.2 in appendix C.2 reports the the original survey questions used to con-
struct these variables. Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for all of the constituent parts
of each measure.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Family Variable Min Max Mean SD N
Education 0 17 9.257 4.434 561
Gender 0 1 0.507 0.5 578
Religion 0 1 0.442 0.497 574
Profile Total Food Distribution 0 26 3.229 5.028 546
HNP Patrols 0 26 6.984 9.212 552
HNP Arrests 0 26 4.752 7.202 541
PKO Patrols 0 26 3.989 7.668 552
PKO Arrests 0 26 0.949 3.222 534
PKO Relief 0 25 2.9 4.822 518
Exposure PKO Stealing 0 1 0.041 0.199 558
PKO Unjust Force 0 1 0.123 0.328 554
PKO Female Abuse 0 1 0.042 0.2 554
PKO Transactional Sex 0 1 0.069 0.253 553
Effectiveness 1 4 2.741 0.834 533
Beliefs Abusiveness 1 4 2.577 0.785 534
Benevolence 1 5 2.343 1.342 525
Cooperation Crime Reporting 1 4 1.924 0.833 513
Information Sharing 1 4 2.835 1.037 558
Note: This table present summary statistics. Mean effects indices are gener-
ated for PKO Security using PKO Arrests and PKO Patrols, PKO Abuse using
PKO Stealing, PKO Unjust Force, PKO Female Abuse, and PKO Transactional
Sex.
The summary statistics suggest that respondents generally hold a positive view of MI-
NUSTAH: most people agree or strongly agree that MINUSTAH is controlling the gangs in
Port-au-Prince and that MINUSTAH serves Haitian interests rather than those of foreign
11It is important to note that we focus on measures that we are confident are pre-treatment variables.
While it is plausible that gaining access to security and relief may affect education, given the short retro-
spective time line of capturing these activities over the past year, it is quite unlikely.
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governments. In general and unsurprisingly, exposure to peacekeepers is high. On average,
respondents have seen around four MINUSTAH patrols in their neighborhood in the last
month and witnessed peacekeepers make one arrest in the past year. Roughly 17% of our
sample has seen MINUSTAH engage in at least one abusive form of behavior, including
paying for sex, stealing, unjustly using force, or abusing women. Exposure to PKO relief
projects is lower than exposure to security activities. On average, our respondents have
witnessed roughly three food distributions secured by MINUSTAH in the past year.
Given media portrayals and qualitative evidence on negative percpetions of MINUSTAH,
respondents report a surprisingly high willingness to cooperate with MINUSTAH. Almost
three out of four respondents reported that it is ‘sure’ (30%) or ‘possible’ (41%) that they
would provide general information to MINUSTAH. On reporting information about crimes,
21-57% say that it is ‘sure’ (7-33%) or ‘possible’ (12%-24%) that they would report a crime
to MINUSTAH.12 We observe that 3.4% of our sample of Port-au-Prince residents has shared
information with MINUSTAH. 2.3% of the population reported approaching MINUSTAH
voluntarily to provide information, and another 1.9% provided information to MINUSTAH
upon request (some both approached and were approached by MINUSTAH). Though this
percentage is relatively small, if this figure from our representative sample of residents of
Port-au-Prince were scaled up to the population of the metropolitan area it would represent
a substantial number of local informants.
Our measures of cooperation are hypothetical and one concern is that they may not
reflect respondents’ behavior in reality. To test whether this might be the case we examine
whether past cooperation is predictive of prospective cooperation. People who have provided
information to MINUSTAH in the past are much more likely to report that they would do it
in the future: 88% of people who said that they had provided information to peacekeepers in
the past reported being likely or very likely to provide them with information in the future.
People who report being very likely to provide information to MINUSTAH in the future are
eight times as likely to have provided information in the past than those who say that they
are very unlikely to share information. We focus on prospective cooperation in our analysis
12Note that these are bounded since we we transform multiple types of crime reporting into a continuous
variable on a four-point scale.
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to avoid introducing post-treatment bias.
4.4.3 Estimation
To assess the impact of exposure to peacekeeping activities — security activities, relief
activities, and abuse — on individual beliefs and cooperative behavior, we estimate the
following equation using an ordinary least squares model:
Yije = αj + β1Si + β2Ri + β3Ai + φX
′
i + λe + εije (4.1)
where i is the individual in neighborhood j interviewed by enumerator e, S measures
exposure to peacekeeper’s security services, R captures exposure to peacekeeping relief, A
corresponds to peacekeeping abuse. X ′i is vector of individual level potential confounders, αn
is a set of neighborhood fixed effects, λe is a set of enumerator fixed effects, and εi the error.
In this approach, Yije is a measure of an individual’s beliefs or willingness to cooperate with
peacekeepers. In all specifications, we cluster standard errors at the neighborhood level.
Our identifying assumption is that conditioning on a set of individual-level confounders
and enumerator and neighborhood fixed effects generates unbiased estimates of the cor-
relation between peacekeeping activities and beliefs and behavior. However, we caution
interpretation in our results and emphasize the correlative rather than causal nature of our
analysis. In section 4.5.2 we implement a set of matching estimators and sensitivity analyses
to assess the robustness of our results and buttress our findings. It is also important to note
that we analyze data from a cross-section rather than a panel. As such, our inferences are
drawn from a snapshot of the correlation between exposure to activities and beliefs and
behavior rather than an over-time analysis.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Peacekeeping and Individual Beliefs and Cooperation
To examine the impact of peacekeeping strategies on beliefs and behavior, we proceed
in three broad empirical steps. First, we analyze the correlation between exposure to peace-
keeping activities and individual beliefs. We then analyze how exposure to peacekeeper
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activities is related to cooperation. We also conduct a formal mediation analysis to assess
how peacekeeping activities affect behavior through changing beliefs. Given that our anal-
ysis relies on retrospective, observational data, we conclude by assessing the robustness of
our results to a series of different estimators and alternative specifications.
We first turn to the relationship between peacekeeping activities and beliefs. Table 4.2
presents results for regressions that analyze how exposure to peacekeeping security, abuse
and relief correlate with individual beliefs over peacekeeping effectiveness, abusiveness and
benevolence. Columns 1-2 report results over effectiveness, columns 3-4 over abusiveness,
and columns 5-6 over benevolence. For ease of interpretation and consistency between the
dependent variabless in the table, we have inverted abusiveness such that higher scores rep-
resent more positive views towards MINUSTAH. In models 1, 3 and 5, we include potential
confounders and in models 2, 4, and 6, we also introduce neighborhood and enumerator
fixed effects.
Broadly, these results illustrate a strong correlation between individual experiences with
peacekeepers and core beliefs about peacekeepers. This itself is a non-trivial finding. Our
measurement strategy tracks experiences and beliefs over a cross-section of the previous 12
months yet the mission had been deployed for seven years in total when we conducted our
survey. Rather than solidify and harden beliefs, our results suggest that individual beliefs
can change over short periods of time and in relationship to peacekeeping behavior. This
highlights the opportunity for peacekeepers to continuously engage local populations in order
to change beliefs and perceptions.
Turning to the specific results, a set of consistent trends emerge. First and foremost,
peacekeeping abuse is negatively and substantially correlated with notions of effectiveness,
abusiveness and benevolence across all specifications.13 Exposure to abuse not only shapes
individual perceptions of peacekeepers’ willingness to engage in restraint, but also affects
beliefs over their effectiveness and benevolence. While it is plausible that exposure to abuse
would solely affect results over abusiveness — indeed, Haitians themselves may believe that
abuse captures a few ‘bad apples’ rather than the quality of an entire mission — the results
13Note that our preferred specification includes both neighborhood and enumerator fixed effects to account
for variation resulting from local characteristics and survey implementation.
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Table 4.2: Exposure to Peackeeping and Individual Beliefs
Effectiveness Abusiveness Benevolence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 0.279 0.300∗∗ −0.059 −0.689∗∗∗ 0.192 −0.142
(0.182) (0.142) (0.121) (0.140) (0.172) (0.197)
PKO Security 0.182∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.064 0.212∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.138
(0.070) (0.068) (0.075) (0.072) (0.072) (0.098)
PKO Abuse −0.308∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −0.528∗∗∗ −0.463∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.052) (0.065) (0.053) (0.050) (0.044)
PKO Relief 0.264∗∗ 0.188∗∗ −0.018 0.009 0.090 0.120∗
(0.122) (0.094) (0.116) (0.119) (0.083) (0.064)
HNP Security −0.053 −0.126∗ 0.005 −0.013 −0.231∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗
(0.065) (0.072) (0.069) (0.074) (0.061) (0.069)
Food Dist. −0.019 −0.023 0.013 0.007 −0.003 −0.009
(0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.015) (0.012)
Education −0.009 −0.014 0.004 −0.001 −0.011 −0.010
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
Gender −0.075 −0.060 −0.038 0.038 −0.075 0.028
(0.054) (0.072) (0.095) (0.079) (0.092) (0.100)
Religion −0.217∗ −0.077 0.056 −0.002 −0.140 −0.070
(0.114) (0.083) (0.067) (0.086) (0.101) (0.080)
Neighborhood FEs X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X
N 462 458 464 460 462 458
R2 0.120 0.371 0.165 0.368 0.087 0.307
Note: This table presents results assessing the correlation between PKO Strategies and
individual beliefs. Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level; ∗ significant at
p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. The dependent variable in models 1-2 is the respon-
dent’s estimation of peacekeeper’s effectiveness in providing security. In models 3-4 the
dependent variable is the respondent’s estimation of peacekeeper’s abusiveness towards
Haitian civilians. This measure is inverted: low scores represent high abusiveness while
high scores represent low abusiveness. In models 5-6 the dependent variable is the re-
spondent’s estimation of the extent to which peacekeepers act in the interests of Haitian
civilians.
across all dependent variables underscore the pernicious and pervasive effects of abuse. These
results speak to the importance of investments in restraint and internal policing to curb
peacekeeping abuse.
Exposure to peacekeeping security tells a generally positive story: these experiences are
correlated with increases in beliefs over effectiveness and are also associated with improve-
ments in perceptions around abuse. While exposure to security is positively and significantly
correlated with benevolence in a model without fixed effects, the magnitude and significance
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of this effect drop once they are accounted for. Given our preferences for a model with
fixed effects, a conservative interpretation suggests exposure to security activities does not
have a dramatic effect on benevolence. The relationship between security and effectiveness
is particularly encouraging as it suggests that the core activities that peacekeepers engage
in inspire the very confidence that missions seek to generate. Moreover, if citizens felt the
mission undermined Haitian security and stability, a negative correlation would emerge in
the data. The positive correlation suggests that Haitians view forms of security as violence-
reducing. Importantly, exposure to security also improves beliefs over abusiveness which
highlights the ability of peacekeepers engaging in non-abusive security provision to shape
positive perceptions of peacekeeping restraint.
Lastly, exposure to relief activities is strongly and positively correlated with perceptions
of effectiveness and benevolence, yet has no impact on perceptions of abuse. One interpre-
tation of these results is that when civilians see peacekeepers providing relief, they observe
a general signal about peacekeepers’ capacity and underlying ability to provide security or
relief. In this reading, relief may win the hearts and minds of civilians over a limited set of
capacities necessary for keep the peace, but ultimately not change perceptions around levels
of abusiveness.
This analysis tell a complex and interesting story about how experiences with peace-
keepers are correlated with beliefs. First, the substantial and robust effect of exposure to
peacekeeping abuse across each type of belief highlights the deep impact of abuse. Exposure
to peacekeeping abuse has a 3-5 times larger impact than either security or relief across
measures of effectiveness, benevolence and abusiveness.14 This underscores the importance
of not only investing in the provision of security and relief but also investing in restraint.
Second, an interesting asymmetry in the relationship between peacekeeping relief and secu-
rity and individual beliefs emerge. Whereas relief is positively correlated with perceptions
of effectiveness and benevolence, security is positively correlated with effectiveness and re-
straint from abuse. These results speak to the limited and divergent effects that security
and relief have and highlight that not all activities shape beliefs equally, an important lesson
when targeting peacekeeping efforts.
14Note that the variables are standardized for analysis.
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Beliefs that individuals have about peacekeepers are not only normatively important,
but likely affect mission success by shaping the ways in which individuals engage peacekeep-
ers; at the very least, cultivating citizen support is important in countries with free and fair
elections that operate as accountability checks on peacekeepers who must maintain consent
from host countries. Yet, it is plausible that that beliefs have little impact on missions in
cases in which citizens are are fearful to speak due to instability or risk. To more closely
interrogate whether and how exposure to peacekeeping activities affects a more concrete
form of behavior, we next analyze the relationship between peacekeeping activities and co-
operation. Specifically, if exposure to peacekeepers’ security and relief activities is related
to positive changes in peacekeepers’ effectiveness and benevolence, is exposure also similarly
related to increases in willingness to cooperate? Conversely, does the large negative rela-
tionship between exposure to abuse and the belief that peacekeepers will restrain themselves
translate into an unwillingness to cooperate?
Table 4.3 reports results for regressions that assess the correlation between exposure
to peacekeeping activities and cooperation. Models 1-2 analyze the impact of exposure on
willingness to share general information with peacekeepers and models 3-4 reports results
for the relationship between exposure and willingness to share information about specific
crimes.
Analysis of the relationship between peacekeeping activities and civilian cooperation tell
a consistent story that is robust to model specification: exposure to peacekeeping security
and relief is associated with substantial increases in reported willingness to share general
and crime-related information while exposure to peacekeeping abuse is negatively correlated
with these forms of cooperation.
While the results on cooperation are similar to the results on beliefs, the magnitude of
the effect size are different. Here, exposure to relief is associated with the greatest impact on
both forms of cooperation and outweighs the effect of both security and abuse. In contrast to
the large effect that abuse has on beliefs, abuse has a relatively smaller effect on willingness
to cooperate than relief and security. This doesn’t diminish its salience, but highlights
an important divergence that negative peacekeeping activities are associated with larger
effects on beliefs while positive peacekeeping activities have comparatively larger effects on
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Table 4.3: Exposure to Peackeeping and Individual Cooperation
Information Sharing Crime Reporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Intercept) 0.179 0.206 0.007 0.092
(0.162) (0.187) (0.155) (0.133)
PKO Security 0.129∗∗ 0.198∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.126∗
(0.064) (0.103) (0.038) (0.072)
PKO Abuse −0.096 −0.119∗ −0.082∗ −0.082∗
(0.067) (0.069) (0.047) (0.047)
PKO Relief 0.281∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.104) (0.117) (0.101)
HNP Security 0.194∗∗∗ 0.076 0.094∗ −0.082
(0.065) (0.070) (0.056) (0.063)
Food Dist. −0.041∗ −0.041 −0.025 −0.035∗
(0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021)
Education 0.003 −0.001 0.015∗ 0.008
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Gender −0.106 −0.099 0.046 0.005
(0.128) (0.110) (0.071) (0.058)
Religion −0.065 0.001 −0.104 −0.063
(0.125) (0.122) (0.078) (0.092)
Neighborhood FEs X X
Enumerator FEs X X
N 485 481 445 441
R2 0.079 0.207 0.106 0.277
Note: This table presents results assessing the correlation be-
tween the interaction of PKO strategies and cooperation. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the neighborhood level; ∗ significant at
p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. The dependent variable is will-
ingness to share information with peacekeepers in models 1-2 and
willingness to report crimes to peacekeepers in models 3-4. The
dependent variables and all exposure measures are standardized.
willingness to cooperate.
Despite the consistency in results for both providing general information and crime
reporting, these are two analytically distinct forms of cooperation. Whereas the former
captures general willingness to provide information about neighborhood characteristics or
events, the latter captures a willingness to provide tactically relevant information that may
directly be used for targeting. This difference is reflected in the data: there is only a .363
correlation between these two forms of cooperation. Moreover, providing information on
crimes is more likely to lead to direct action by peacekeepers that could be linked to an
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informer and expose an individual to social pressure or retribution. In this sense, assessing
the impact of peacekeeping activities on crime reporting provides a relatively ‘harder test’
of the correlation between peacekeeper activities and cooperation.
Coupled, these results highlight that exposure to peacekeeping activities is strongly cor-
related with individual beliefs and cooperation. Across both beliefs and cooperation, results
highlight that abusiveness can undermine civilian perceptions of peacekeepers as well as
the types of cooperation that aid peacekeeping operations. Exposure to peacekeeper secu-
rity and relief are less consistently associated with beliefs; while the former shapes beliefs
around effectiveness and restraint, the latter is associated with increases in effectiveness and
benevolence. Both, however are positively related to increases in willingness to cooperate.
These results not only illuminate the ways in which peacekeepers can shape beliefs and
civilian cooperation, but provide guidance for peacekeepers who seek to cultivate positive
and cooperative relationships.
Until this point, we have empirically treated beliefs and cooperation as two indepen-
dent set of outcomes. However, our model broadly suggests that exposure to peacekeeping
activities shapes beliefs and that these beliefs in turn affect cooperative behavior. In this
story, beliefs operate as one of the mediating causal mechanisms that impacts cooperation.
To analyze the extent to which peacekeeping changes behavior by shifting beliefs, we imple-
ment the mediation analysis procedure articulated in Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010) and
Imai et al. (2011). In this framework, average treatment effects are decomposed into two
constituent parts: the component that captures the direct effect of the treatment (ADE)
and the component that captures the effect due to the mechanism (ACME). Decomposing
the average treatment effect into these two components allows us assess the relative impor-
tance of the mechanism and the direct effect. In our application, we analyze how exposure
to peacekeeping activities shapes cooperative behavior by changing underlying individual
beliefs.
A few notes are in order about implementing this approach. First, identifying the decom-
posed estimates of the causal and direct effects requires invoking a sequential ignorability
assumption. Under this assumption, treatment assignment must be statistically independent
of the outcomes conditional on a battery of confounders and the mediator must be ignor-
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able given treatment status and confounders. These assumptions are strict and the broader
challenge of identifying mediating effects have caused some social scientists to advocate
abandoning its pursuit (Green, Ha and Bullock, 2010). Additionally, a set of conceptual as-
sumptions motivate implementing this framework. First, it assumes — and tests — a model
of cognitive processing in which beliefs map onto behavior, and second, assumes that there
are not another set of intervening factors that may suppress belief’s impact on behavior. For
example, in unstable post-conflict environments, individuals may hold a set of beliefs but
fear putting those beliefs in action. A third and final note about implementing this approach
is that we include three different ‘treatments’ on the right hand side of our estimation frame-
work. Given that we must assess the mediation effects through each treatment, we examine
each peacekeeping activity in turn, conditioning on the other peacekeeping strategies and
treating them as confounders.
We report results for this analysis in appendix C.3. The estimated ACMEs are sta-
tistically significantly different from zero for both cooperative outcomes for beliefs over
effectiveness with respect to peacekeeping security and abuse, suggesting that peacekeeping
activities shape these forms of cooperation by changing beliefs over effectiveness. The results
are not significant for these outcomes with respect to relief, nor are the ACMEs statistically
significant with respect to these outcomes over any activities for abusiveness or benevolence
(save on information sharing with respect to PKO abuse). Coupled, these results suggest
that beliefs over effectiveness operate as a mediating causal mechanism whereas beliefs over
abusiveness and benevolence do not. One simple explanation for these results may be that
not all beliefs are created equal in explaining behavior. Alternatively, individual may decide
to cooperate in spite of their beliefs. More importantly, it suggests that our model of chang-
ing behavior through changing beliefs is only empirically valid with respect to effectiveness
and that these two families of outcomes are, in part, independent. Indeed, these results
highlight that it is possible to shape behavior without necessarily shaping beliefs. This is
particularly salient if peacekeepers are looking to cultivate cooperation more so than public
opinion, or vice versa.
Lastly, it is important to note that peacekeepers rarely invest in just one of these peace-
keeping activities, but rather implement them in tandem with the goal that they may gen-
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erate multiplicative effects; indeed, the impact of relief may be amplified when married
with security. In our current estimation framework, we treat these strategies as linear and
additive. To assess whether there are any multiplicative effects between these strategies,
we estimate a series of interactions across these three strategies for all outcomes and re-
port the results in appendix C.4. We include this as an exploratory analysis over which we
have weak priors — indeed, while security and relief should have positive effect, it remains
unclear how these two strategies interact with abuse. The results are mixed. There is no
distinguishable effect on the interaction between security and relief, tempering hopes that
these two activities generate positive multiplicative effects. The only consistent interaction
effects that emerge are between peacekeeping abuse and relief as well as peacekeeping abuse
and security on perceptions of abusiveness. Both interactions are negative and significant,
suggesting that these activities may not offset beliefs about abusiveness and underscoring
the substantial and important impact that experiences peacekeeping abuse has on beliefs.
4.5.2 Robustness
Our analysis relies on retrospective data collected in a post-disaster zone occupied by
peacekeeping forces. In addition to the core challenges of accurate data collection in this
environment, failing to account for unmeasured heterogeneity and selection may bias our
results. To assess the sensitivity of our analysis, we conduct and present analysis for three
different types of robustness checks.
First, we analyze whether any particular neighborhood drives our results. There is
broad socio-economic diversity in the neighborhoods that enter our sample, and beliefs and
cooperation are likely influenced by these underlying factors. While including fixed effects
accounts for between-neighborhood variation, we also re-estimate each regression leaving
one of the twenty neighborhoods out and report these results in appendix C.7. The results
remain consistent and stable, suggesting that no specific neighborhood is responsible for
driving our results.
Second, while our estimation strategy includes a battery of potential confounders that
condition variation in beliefs and cooperation, our identification strategy relies on identifying
and including all potential confounders. We draw on two strategies to assess the robustness
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of these results. First, we conduct a sensitivity analysis based on the approach articulated
in Oster (2014) to model how robust our results are to such unmeasured heterogeneity. The
intuition behind this approach is assessing how large the effect of unobserved confounding
factors would be to change the observed results. We report these results in appendix C.8.
Our analysis suggests that our results are strikingly robust for each peacekeeping activity.
While our results are comparatively less robust on beliefs-related outcomes, our analysis on
cooperative outcomes suggest results are robust to including covariates that are twice as
strong as our individual-level controls and enumerator and neighborhood fixed effects.
Third and as an additional step, we examine the determinants of exposure to peace-
keeping to diagnose whether the confounders we condition on are orthogonal. We regress
peacekeeping security, relief and abuse on the set of confounders included in our analysis and
report results in appendix C.5. Analyzing the determinants of security reveals that it is pos-
itively correlated with exposure to Haitian National Police security activities, which makes
sense as many security activities are jointly conducted. PKO security, however, is balanced
across the other variables. PKO relief follows a similar logic and is positively correlated with
total food distributions and is balanced across all other variables. Exposure to PKO abuse
is negatively correlated with exposure to relief — e.g. those who report observing abuse are
systematically less likely to observe PKO food distributions — and women are substantially
more likely report exposure to abuse. Coupled, this analysis suggests that there is selection
into these peacekeeping activities.
Given these results, we implement a matching algorithm to generate balance across
observable pre-treatment confounders and re-run the analysis. There are two obstacles
to implementing a matching algorithm. First, our ‘treatment’ is continuous rather than
binary. Second, we face the same challenge as in the mediation analysis given that we
include three different ‘treatments’ on the right hand side of the equation for which we have
different expectations over the direction of the effect. To overcome the first challenge, we
draw on a framework provided in Imai and Ratkovic (2014) and Fong and Imai (2014),
which implements a non-parametric propensity score matching procedure across continuous
treatment regimes. To overcome the second challenge, we adopt the same approach as in
our mediation analysis and examine each peacekeeping strategy individually, matching on
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the other peacekeeping strategies and confounders. For example, when we assess the impact
of peacekeeping security, we match on exposure to peacekeeping relief, peacekeeper abuse,
and individual confounders. We report these results in appendix C.6.
Analysis from the matching estimators are generally consistent with those from the
core regressions. While there are minor changes in statistical significance for a subset of
outcomes, the direction and magnitude of the effects remain similar. More specifically,
security is no longer significantly associated with effectiveness and crime reporting but is
with benevolence; abuse is no longer significantly associated with information sharing but
is with all of the other core outcomes; and relief remains statistically associated with the
key behavioral measures. Ultimately, these results underscore the general robustness of our
results, particularly on measures of cooperation.
While we face challenges common to all retrospective observational work, implementing
this set of robustness checks buttresses confidence in the stability and consistency of our
results. In particular, the sensitivity analysis shows that unmeasured heterogeneity would
have to be substantial to change our results and matching estimates illustrate that balanced
panels generate broadly similar results.
4.6 Conclusions
Peacekeeping operations are a cornerstone of the international community’s strategy to
reduce conflict and political instability across the world. As current missions are renewed
and new operations deployed, identifying how peacekeepers can generate cooperation is
integral to preventing the recurrence of violent conflict. In this article, we provide a the-
oretical framework that explains the conditions under which civilians in conflict-affected
countries cooperate with peacekeepers and test this theory using a new dataset from a ran-
dom sample of households in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. We argue that civilians assess whether
the benevolence and effectiveness of peacekeepers outweighs the probability of abuse, as
these parameters shape the expected value of cooperation. In low-information post-conflict
environments, individuals look to their personal experiences: interactions with peacekeepers
serve as signals about their interests, capacity, and abusiveness that lead civilians to up-
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date their beliefs about these key characteristics and may thus influence their decision to
cooperate with peacekeepers.
Our analysis suggests that exposure to peacekeeping activities explains individual beliefs
and cooperative behavior. A few nuanced trends also emerge. First, exposure to positive
peacekeeping activities such as security and relief improves both beliefs about peacekeepers
and cooperation with them while exposure to negative peacekeeping activities undermines
them. While this may seem intuitive, expectations around these effects are not theoretically
clear and empirically documenting them is important. Moreover, the impact is not symmet-
ric: whereas abuse has a larger impact than security and relief on beliefs, the opposite is true
for cooperation where security and relief has a larger effect on cooperation. While exposure
to these activities shapes both beliefs and behavior, a mediation analysis suggests that ex-
posure only shapes behavior by changing beliefs over effectiveness but not benevolence or
abusiveness. This suggests that public opinion and behavior are not as clearly interwoven
as our model forwards and suggests that peacekeepers may be able to conceptualize public
opinion and willingness to cooperate as two independent families of outcomes.
Our analysis also tell a cautionary story as exposure to peacekeeping abuse consistently
and dramatically undermines civilian perceptions and reduces the likelihood that civilians
cooperate with peacekeepers. Standardizing our operationalization of peacekeeping activities
in our analysis allows us to directly compare the relative impact of each activity. Ultimately,
if peacekeepers seek to cultivate cooperation, they should invest disproportionately more in
providing relief and security services than they invest in restraining abuse. This, however,
does not account for the differential costs of each strategy nor broader implications that
these strategies have beyond these cooperative outcomes. Ultimately, these results not only
illuminate the ways in which peacekeepers can shape beliefs and civilian cooperation, but
provides guidance for peacekeepers who seek to cultivate positive and cooperative relation-
ships. They should, however, must be interpreted with caution as they capture underlying
correlations rather than evidence about causal relationships.
While these results have powerful implications for peacekeeping, a key question is the
extent to which they apply to other contexts or missions. Our study was conducted in-
side metropolitan Port-au-Prince and speaks to the experiences of citizens who reside in
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an urban capital. MINUSTAH forces were disproportionately deployed in Port-au-Prince
given that much of the political turmoil was seated in the capital and therefore captures
the majority of peacekeeper-civilian interaction. Moreover, these results may actually pro-
vide more insight globally: analyzing where peacekeepers are deployed Ruggeri, Gizelis and
Dorussen (2015) find the soldiers tend to be deployed close to capital cities and therefore
serve these populations more often. Lastly, peacekeeping operations are increasingly con-
ducted in heavily urban areas much like those of Port-au-Prince, buttressing the relevance
of these results (United Nations, 2015). Additionally, MINUSTAH was launched to prevent
Haiti from descending into a civil war, which never engulfed the country. As such, our find-
ings speak to peacekeeping operations deployed in times of unstable peace more than raging
conflicts and may not travel as well to places like the Central African Republic or South
Sudan. Furthermore, Haiti held a series of relatively free and fair elections during MINUS-
TAH’s deployment. Generating public support and cooperative behavior among citizens is
particularly important in these settings where leaders who must consent to peacekeeper’s
presence are truly constrained by an electorate. Consequently, these results may provide
particular leverage in countries in which peacekeepers operate during democratic transition,
an increasing characteristic of many missions.
Although all peacekeeping operations have unique characteristics, MINUSTAH does
share commonalities with other deployments. Like other missions, MINUSTAH was launched
with a limited mandate focused on preventing conflict that then evolved to include institu-
tion building, humanitarian assistance and service provision. The examination of how these
core peacekeeping activities affect citizen beliefs and behavior offer insight into missions
with similar evolving mandates such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is worth
noting that MINUSTAH is a mid-sized mission operating with roughly 7,000 troops and is
similar in size to missions in Liberia and the Ivory Coast. The results may very well be
limited to smaller missions where executing these strategies uniformly are comparatively
easier. Nonetheless, many of the peacekeeping strategies we assess are easily exportable to
other missions - supporting the distribution of aid and engaging in patrols are relatively
low-cost; restraining abusive soldiers, however, remains a broader challenge. Lastly, while
theses results may be limited to United Nations peacekeeping missions given their neutral
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mandates, they may provide insight onto strategies of winning hearts and minds in other
types of military interventions.
While our findings on abuse resonate with studies that highlight the negative impact
of peacekeeping operations on civilian beliefs and support (Simm, 2013),15 our estimates
on positive public support diverge from these generally negative findings. Here, we build
on findings from Liberia (Mvukiyehe and Samii, 2012) and the Ivory Coast (Mvukiyehe
and Samii, 2009), which find similarly positive evaluations of these missions in security
or humanitarian aspects. In a sense, there is a broader divide between qualitative and
quantitative sub-national research on peacekeeping, the former of which coalesces around
negative findings and the latter around positive findings.16 One unique contribution of
our article is that it moves the conversation beyond public attitudes and into behavioral
measures.
Our results are encouraging for peacekeepers, but also highlight a set of crucial challenges.
If individual exposure to peacekeepers is a factor in affecting attitudes and willingness to
cooperate, peacekeepers have the opportunity to use their programming and policies to shape
public opinion and generate cooperation, even in politicized settings where negative attitudes
towards peacekeepers are thought to be deeply entrenched. Unfortunately, performance has
fallen short of expectations in many missions around the world. Episodes of abuse, lackluster
provision of security, and inefficient relief activities are common and quickly noticed by
local civilians. Our results suggest that improving the quality of these interactions through
frequent relief activities, security activities, and respectful treatment of civilians is a powerful
way to increase local cooperation with these missions.
15See Autesserre (2014a) for a full review of these interventions.
16It is beyond the scope of this article to explain this divergence, however, one simple and plausible
explanation worth mentioning is that the quantitative papers draw on representative samples of populations
whereas the qualitative studies do not.
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The essays in this dissertation examine the causes of conflict and the impact of inter-
ventions that aim to reduce violence and improve post-conflict political stability. They are
motivated by understanding the micro-level logic of violence and draw on new data from
three violence-afflicted areas to analyze the strategic dynamics of conflict at the individual
and institutional level.
More specifically, in essay 2, I analyze how regimes in fragile states overcome the dilemma
of cultivating strong but loyal armies. Drawing on research from the Eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo, I show that regime elites withhold payments in order to distinguish
loyalty and evidence that this screening strategy drives high levels of civilian abuse. In
essay 3, I examine whether monitoring conflict reduces violence. I assess the impact of the
first-ever satellite intervention launched by Amnesty International with the goal of deterring
genocidal violence in Darfur and show that this intervention generated perverse consequences
that increased violence in monitored areas during the program as well as in subsequent years
and in neighboring areas. And in essay 4, Lauren Young and I interrogate how peacekeepers
cultivate cooperation with local populations in Haiti. We find that exposure to security and
relief activities are associated with increases in cooperation whereas exposure to peacekeeper
abuse undermines cooperative behavior. Together, these essays contribute an important set
of estimates to a rich literature on violent conflict.
While each essay forwards a set of unique policy proposals, a broader set of implications
emerge from this dissertation in entirety. First, understanding the root causes of conflict
requires accurately diagnosing individual or institutional incentives for violence. While
much ink has been spilled on the determinants of civilian abuse in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, essay 2 is the first article to root this form of violence in unique institutional
dilemmas that stem from the universal challenge of building militaries. Without identifying
abuse as the byproduct of these dilemmas, efforts to reduce violence will likely fail. Similarly,
essay 3 reveals that when well-intentioned human rights interventions are launched to reduce
atrocities, they may very well amplify violence. While no advocate, activist or policy-maker
ever hopes this will happen, a clear set of incentives existed that shaped this behavior and
should be accounted for when designing these interventions. And, as essay 4 suggests, the
correlation between beliefs and behavior is not always clear in the context of politically
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 149
unstable post-conflict settings. This highlights the importance of clearly identifying and
analyzing underlying incentives for violent or cooperative behavior.
Second, and as follows from the first implication, designing effective policies to reduce
violence and improve post-conflict cooperation may have little to do with violence. As sug-
gested by the work on the Congolese military, reducing civilian abuse may lie in helping
regimes attract and identify loyal soldiers. Here for example, establishing screening mecha-
nisms for the military such as entrance exams may directly reduce civilian abuse. Research
on Darfur points to similarly small policy tweaks that may drastically shift incentives for
violence. For example, if human rights interventions increase violence by allowing actors
to publicly signal their credibility, simply refraining from publishing the resulting evidence
may reduce motivations for engaging in conflict. Analysis from Haiti suggests that improving
cooperative behavior with local populations may lie just as much as in establishing inter-
nal policies to discipline peacekeepers as it does from actively engaging local populations
through material incentives. Ultimately, this dissertation details the importance of appro-
priately analyzing individual and institutional incentives to engage in violence in order to
craft thoughtful policy interventions to alter those incentives.
These essays suggest multiple avenues for future research that are just as salient to aca-
demic scholarship as they are policy-making. Essay 2 sheds light on the need for additional
research on military institutions in fragile states. Despite the import of these institutions
to the broader nation building project, scholarship on military bureaucracies, particularly
those in in Africa, is limited. My research shows how understanding the internal dynamics
of military institutions is crucial to analyzing levels of civilian abuse and conflict, and under-
scores the need for a new wave of brush-clearing work on militaries in the developing world.
Perhaps more importantly, this essay highlights the need to assess whether interventions
that solve institutional dilemmas for regime elites do indeed reduce violence. Given the
large financial investments are made in building military institutions globally, identifying
sustainable interventions that solve institutional issues is crucial.
Essay 3 contributes to the literature on conflict by providing rigorous quantitative re-
search on the impact of interventions that seek to reduce violence at the sub-national level.
Generating further credible, causal estimates of these impacts requires designing randomized
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controlled trials to be implemented in theaters of active conflict. While identifying when and
why these interventions work is key to reducing violence, this also requires formulating ethi-
cal guidelines for how social scientists should engage in these environments. Moreover, as the
results from this work demonstrate, human rights interventions may amplify incentives to
engage in violence. While I speculate on conflict and context characteristics that may shape
these incentives, systematically identifying the conditions under which these interventions
reduce or increase violence is imperative. This broad research agenda is no small feat as it
requires conducting a sufficient amount of sub-national research to aggregate into cumula-
tive cross-national knowledge. Lastly, the results from this study speak to a democratizing
form of surveillance and as the accessibility of these forms of monitoring increase, so to
should the study of general equilibrium effects of these broader shifts. Indeed, when human
rights activists no longer have to shine the proverbial light on conflict because information
is not a constraint, both the nature of intervention and the strategic response it generates
will change.
Lastly, essay 4 underscores the need for further research on the micro-level dynamics of
peacekeeping strategies. First and foremost, this work highlights the need to better under-
stand how to restrain UN peacekeepers from engaging in abuse and identify the comparative
impact of these activities on mission success. Timely opportunities exist in analyzing the
effect of United Nations’ recent formulation of sexual exploitation and abuse policies for
peacekeepers and troop contributing countries. Further research on this subject will not
only illuminate the effects of restraint on UN peacekeeping, but may also provide ana-
lytic leverage in understanding patterns of abuse by foreign actors. While this essay makes
progress on comparing the relative impact of various peacekeeping activities on individual
behavior, it only tells one side of the story. Future research should attempt to quantify both
the costs and benefits to various peacekeeping strategies in order to more optimally allocate
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A.1 Interview List
Table A.1 enumerates the list of qualitative interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015.
Interviews were conducted in both North and South Kivu.









Deputy First Class 1
Deputy 8












Non-Military Banking Official 2
United Nations 7
Subtotal 83
Note: This table enumerates the list of qualitative interviews con-
ducted in 2014 and 2015. Note that T-Level military officials are
not delineated to preserve anonymity. The expert category includes
humanitarian and development workers, academics and journalists.
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A.2 Survey Methodology
Collecting accurate recall data from survey respondents is notoriously challenging (de Nicola
and Gine, 2014). To facilitate recall, I identified a set of prominent historical cues associated
with each time period that enumerators would discuss with survey respondents when asking
questions. This method helped ground respondents in the relevant time period in order
to improve the accuracy and precision of their memory. Table A.2 provides the month-to-
month historical cues that were used during the survey.
Table A.2: Historical Cues Embedded in the Soldier Survey
Month Historical Cues
March 2015 The 8th of March; the month of women.
February 2015 Operations against the FDLR began; change in military hierarchy.
January 2015 The 16-17 January; The anniversary of Lumumba and Mzee Kabila.
December 2014 Noel; The change from Matata 1 to Matata 2.
November 2014 The death of General Bahuma and the funeral of Mamadou.
October 2014 Operations against the ADF launched.
Note: These historical cues were embedded in soldiers surveys to improve recall. These cues were
developed in conjunction with members of the FARDC and capture familiar historical events.
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A.3 Measure Mapping
Closed-form survey measures that capture characteristics of interest were developed
through in-depth qualitative work and piloted prior to the launch of the survey. Table
A.3 enumerates the questions that were used in the survey and are operationalized in the
quantitative analysis.
Table A.3: Operationalizing Survey Measures
Var Component Survey Question
Rank Rank in the FARDC.
Ethnic Rwandan Maternal language.
Presidential Co-ethnic Provincial Home.
Ex-rebel Participation in armed group.
Missing Payments Did you receive your payment in month X?
Defection During the last 6 months, has any soldier from your unit defected?
Extortion Have you witnessed any looting by soldiers in your unit?
Illegal Taxation Have you witnessed any civilian taxation by soldiers in your unit?
Forced Labor Have you witnessed any forced civilian labor imposed by soldiers
in your unit?
Forced Detention Have you witnessed any civilian detentions imposed by soldiers in
your unit?
Torture Have you witnessed any civilians being tortured by members of
your unit?
Sexual Violence Have you witnessed any sexual violence against a women by mem-
bers of your unit?
Unit Pride How proud of your unit are you?
FARDC Pride How proud of the FARDC are you?
Military Sanction During the past 6 months, has any one in your unit been sanc-
tioned by the military hierarchy?
Note: This table presents the measures used in analysis. The variables associated with extortion
and violence are used to construct a means effect index for analysis.
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A.4 FARDC Payment Structure
Monthly salaries within the FARDC are notoriously low and exhibit little variation be-
tween rank. Annual increases in salary are nominal and rarely keep up with inflation. While
additional material incentives and support are provided to soldiers, monthly salaries are the
financial backbone of soldier livelihood. Table A.4 details official monthly payments by rank
as of April 2015.




Sans Classe 77,000 82.99
Soldat de deuxiéme classe 77,000 82.99
Soldat de premiére classe 77,350 83.37
Caporal 77,700 83.75
Sergent 78,000 84.07
Sergent Premiére 79,700 85.91
Sergent Major 80,150 86.39
Premier Sergent Major 80,500 86.77
Adjudant 81,200 87.52
Adjudant de premier classe 81,600 87.95





Lieutenant Colonel 88,200 95.07
Colonel 91,200 98.30
Note: The top three ranks, General de Brigade, General Major and Lieu-
tenant General are not included in this table. This uses a conversion factor of
927.76 Congolese Francs to the US Dollar, dated August 20th, 2015.
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A.5 Measurement Error
A key threat to the analysis conducted is that measurement error in the recall data
may bias estimates. Measurement error is a problem that plagues survey data and has long
been an area of focus in econometrics (Black, Berger and Scott, 2000; Carrol et al., 2006;
Hausman, 2001). Assessing the presence and extent of measurement error requires multiple
measurements of the same indicator as well as the assumption that one is error-free, which
has in turn fueled investments in ‘validation’ data. Broadly, two classes of non-sampling
error emerge: classical measurement error and non-classical measurement error. To briefly
provide a framework, consider the case in which error is introduced into an independent
variable, x, when estimating the following equation:
y = βx+ ε (A.1)
In the following equation x captures the true value of a given quantity; for example, the
number of months a soldier went unpaid. However, we only observe x∗, which contains the
true value x as well as additive measurement error µ:
x∗ = x+ µ (A.2)
A model of classical error imposes two strict assumptions. First, E(µ) = 0 and var(µ) =
σ2µ. Second, µ is uncorrelated with the true dependent and independent variables, and σ2µ
is uncorrelated with ε. Identifying whether error is classical is important because given






(Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001).
Because λ is bounded between 0 and 1, when assumptions of classical error are invoked in
a linear model, point estimates are attenuated.
While the properties of point estimates in the presence of classical error are well-defined,
it is less clear when error is non-classical.1 For example, when the assumption that the








as σxµ increases, so does the extent to which the point estimates are biased, if more than
half of the variance of x∗ is caused by the measurement error. If that is not the case, it
1Measurement error is non-classical be definition for binary variables as the misclassification of 0 to 1 or
1 to 0, results in a negative correlation with the true variable. This is particularly relevant for studies of
conflict that focus on ‘onset’ or other measures dichotomous in nature.
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decreases the attenuation factor. Importantly, in cases in which the measurement error is
severe, this reliability ratio may have the opposite effect and amplify the point estimate,
plausibly changing its direction (Black, Berger and Scott, 2000).
One disadvantage to working with weak and abusive military institutions in countries
afflicted by conflict is the non-existence of validation data. As such, I crafted the soldier
survey to include internal checks that facilitate assessing measurement error. Specifically,
I asked about histories of payments in two different sections of the survey in two different
versions: one aggregate measure over 6 months and one month-to-month measures. The
motivation for this was to generate a within-respondent strategy to assess measurement
error.
The structure of the instrument provides the ability of analyzing measurement error
around payment histories. Using both reports of payments, figure A.1 visualizes the distri-
bution of measurement error for the sample of respondents.










Distribution of Measurement Error
Note: This figure visualizes the standardized mean differences in pre-treatment covariates for assignment
to treatment in the survey experiment.
This figure illustrates large heaping around 0, which reflects individuals reporting the
APPENDIX A. PAYMENT AND PREDATION: THE POLITICS OF WAGES AND
VIOLENCE IN THE CONGOLESE ARMY 180
same payment histories twice in different parts of the survey. The distribution around 0
is relatively normal, though skewed positively with some respondents provide diametrically
opposed payment histories in the same survey.2 This provides suggestive evidence that the
nature of the measurement error is normal and may not introduce large systematic biases
in coefficient estimation, but rather attenuate point estimates.
2The correlation between these measures is 0.4.
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A.6 Survey Experiment
This section presents summary statistics for the measures analyzed in the survey ex-
periment as well as analysis to assess whether the randomization was balanced across pre-
treatment covariates. Table A.5 presents summary statistics for the outcome variables ana-
lyzed in the text of the article.
Table A.5: Survey Experiment Descriptive Statistics
Var Min Max Mean SD N
Barriers 0 25 1.46 2.40 311
Extortion Rate 0 3,000 283.14 534.87 298
Extortion Admissibility 1 4 1.37 0.81 331
Extortion Permissibility 1 4 2.41 1.03 348
Violence Admissibility 1 4 1.19 0.49 331
Violence Permissibility 1 4 2.54 0.97 348
Note: This table present summary statistics for survey experiment vari-
ables.
The measures presented here are hypothetical in nature. Both barriers and extortion had
no ceiling and were determined by respondents. Measures around admissibility and permis-
sibility are ordinal variables in which higher numbers capture higher levels of admission and
permission. Table A.6 presents a balance table, which demonstrates that the experiment
was balanced across key pre-treatment covariates in both treatment and control arms.
Table A.6: Survey Experiment Balance Test
Control Treatment Difference p-value
Rank 6.28 6.41 0.13 0.41
Ethnic Rwandan 0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.02
Presidential Co-Ethnicity 0.10 0.10 -0.00 0.03
Ex-rebel status 0.27 0.30 0.02 0.05
Note: P-values reported are two-sided for the null-hypothesis of no effect.
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A.7 Unit Pride
This section reports results for how the interaction between missing payments and vio-
lence shape unit-level pride. To assess whether missing payments and violence jointly affect
reported beliefs about unit loyalty in addition to FARDC loyalty, I estimate impact of the
interaction between missing payments and violence committed on unit pride. Table A.7 and
A.8 report this analysis. Results are consistent with the findings presented in the body of
the article for FARDC pride and suggest that units that are not paid and are violent ex-
hibit higher rates of unit-pride. The consistency across both units of analysis buttresses the
interpretation that violence and missing payments jointly generate forms of loyalty within
the military.
Table A.7: Extortion and Non-Payment Generate Unit Pride
Unit Pride & Extortion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 3.419∗∗∗ 3.228∗∗∗ 3.426∗∗∗ 3.205∗∗∗ 3.400∗∗∗ 3.241∗∗∗ 3.383∗∗∗ 3.199∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.117) (0.073) (0.121) (0.074) (0.120) (0.062) (0.115)
Missing Payments −0.114∗∗∗−0.118∗∗∗−0.115∗∗∗−0.118∗∗∗−0.164∗∗∗−0.178∗∗∗−0.090∗∗∗−0.098∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.026) (0.027)
Extortion Typei −0.176 −0.176 −0.174 −0.123 −0.025 0.001 −0.085 −0.063
(0.169) (0.180) (0.142) (0.151) (0.133) (0.140) (0.079) (0.084)
M. Payment × Extortion 0.112∗ 0.107∗
(0.060) (0.062)
M. Payment × Taxation 0.112∗∗ 0.094∗
(0.055) (0.057)
M. Payment × Labor 0.179∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.052)
M. Payment × Index 0.085∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗
(0.029) (0.030)
Controls X X X X
Observations 321 298 322 298 320 297 326 302
R2 0.041 0.076 0.040 0.077 0.084 0.128 0.056 0.091
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Controls include rank, ethnic Rwan-
dan, presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel status. Cross-sectional data are used for estimation. ∗
significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
APPENDIX A. PAYMENT AND PREDATION: THE POLITICS OF WAGES AND
VIOLENCE IN THE CONGOLESE ARMY 183
Table A.8: Violence and Non-Payment Generate Unit Pride
Unit Pride & Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 3.422∗∗∗ 3.266∗∗∗ 3.425∗∗∗ 3.230∗∗∗ 3.462∗∗∗ 3.281∗∗∗ 3.403∗∗∗ 3.206∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.120) (0.067) (0.117) (0.065) (0.118) (0.062) (0.113)
Missing Payments −0.162∗∗∗−0.180∗∗∗−0.120∗∗∗−0.129∗∗∗−0.141∗∗∗−0.156∗∗∗−0.116∗∗∗−0.127∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.027) (0.028)
Violence Typei −0.058 −0.094 −0.062 −0.075 −0.326 −0.116 −0.093 −0.085
(0.128) (0.136) (0.179) (0.187) (0.235) (0.251) (0.089) (0.093)
M. Payment × Detention 0.164∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.052)
M. Payment × Torture 0.128∗∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.059) (0.061)
M. Payment × SGBV 0.206∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.065)
M. Payment × Index 0.095∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
Controls X X X X
Observations 320 296 313 289 306 283 326 302
R2 0.072 0.117 0.047 0.085 0.066 0.106 0.077 0.122
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Controls include rank, ethnic Rwan-
dan, presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel status. Cross-sectional data are used for estimation. ∗
significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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A.8 Payments, Violence and Sanctioning
To further analyze how the regime handles soldiers who are not paid and are violent, I
analyze how this joint behavior predicts sanctioning. I regress sanctioning on the interaction
between missing payment and predation. The tables in the body of the article present results
for the mean effects index for extortion and violence and table A.9 and A.10 present results
across the constituent parts of the indices. These results highlight that soldiers who go
unpaid and are violent are systematically punished less. This is consistent with a story in
which the regime uses non-payment as a strategy to discriminate loyalty and becomes more
permissive of soldiers who remain in the army even when they abuse civilians.
Table A.9: Sanctioning Unpaid Soldiers Who Extort
State Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.434∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.209) (0.041) (0.211) (0.043) (0.207) (0.036) (0.205)
Missing Payment 0.046∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.021
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016)
Extortion Typei 0.223∗∗ 0.212∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.106) (0.080) (0.088) (0.078) (0.084) (0.045) (0.049)
M. Payment × Extortion −0.052 −0.062∗
(0.035) (0.037)
M. Payment × Taxation −0.068∗∗ −0.071∗∗
(0.031) (0.033)
M. Payment × Labor −0.100∗∗∗−0.104∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031)
M. Payment × Index −0.047∗∗∗−0.049∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018)
Controls X X X X
Observations 318 291 319 291 318 291 323 295
R2 0.035 0.065 0.105 0.115 0.065 0.092 0.078 0.094
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Controls include rank, ethnic Rwan-
dan, presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel status. Cross-sectional data are used for estimation. ∗
significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table A.10: Sanctioning Unpaid Soldiers Who are Violent
State Punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.326∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.206) (0.040) (0.207) (0.038) (0.210) (0.036) (0.202)
Missing Payments 0.081∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017)
Violence Typei 0.390∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗ 0.154 0.204 0.175 0.216∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.081) (0.106) (0.113) (0.137) (0.149) (0.051) (0.055)
M. Payment × Detention −0.107∗∗∗−0.101∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.031)
M. Payment × Torture −0.099∗∗∗−0.096∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.037)
M. Payment × SGBV −0.148∗∗∗−0.148∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039)
M. Payment × Index −0.077∗∗∗−0.072∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)
Controls X X X X
Observations 317 289 310 282 303 276 323 295
R2 0.103 0.110 0.044 0.077 0.082 0.123 0.090 0.112
Note: Models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Controls include rank, ethnic Rwan-
dan, presidential co-ethnic, and ex-rebel status. Cross-sectional data are used for estimation. ∗
significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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B.1 Covariate Data
Table B.1 sources the data used for matching; figure B.1 visualizes time invariant pre-
treatment data, excluding violence, in Darfur used in the matching process.
Table B.1: Matching Variables Source
Variable Source
Violence State Department HIU Dataset
Water International Steering Committee for Global Mapping
Location Global Administrative Areas Database
Road Network International Steering Committee for Global Mapping
Airport International Steering Committee for Global Mapping
Note: This table sources the data used for matching.
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Note: This figure visualizes the covariate data used for matching, excluding violence.
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B.2 Measurement Error in Geo-Coordinates
To construct a panel based on the location of villages throughout Darfur, I leverage
reported geo-coordinates in the HIU dataset. To assess the stability of these geo-coordinates
over time, I examine the distance (km) between villages with the same name that enter the
dataset more than once for the 30% of the data that have names (Note that all villages
include a set of geo-coordinates).
Ideally, there would be no difference in reported geo-coordinates for the same village
and all villages would be accurately placed. However, given the challenges of compiling
various sources of human rights reports and satellite images, as well as correctly identifying
small villages in Darfur, reported geo-coordinates differ. There are two characteristics of
interest in this analysis: i) the magnitude of the error, which illustrates the stability of geo-
locations, and ii) the distribution of the error, which reveals whether the error is classical or
non-classical in nature. Table B.2 reports the distribution of distances for the full sample
as well as for treatment villages and figure B.2 plots the distribution of error for the full
sample.
Table B.2: Measurement Error for Named Villages (km)
Min Max Mean
Full Sample 108.31 133.29 121.73
Treatment Villages 0.00 15.02 5.66
Note: This table enumerates the measurement error in
the HIU dataset for the full sample of villages as well as
the treatment villages for villages with the same name.
The analysis suggests that the magnitude of difference is non-trivial, however is much
smaller for treatment villages. It also suggests that measurement error is non-classical in
nature. It should be noted that analysis may be artefactual to the small population of
villages that are named.
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Figure B.2: Distibution of Measurement Error












Note: This figure plots the distribution of measurement error in the HIU dataset for the full sample.
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B.3 Grid Construction
To generate the panel data, a lattice is projected onto Darfur and within each grid unit i
for year t, outcomes are aggregated. While the total territorial size of Darfur spans 493,180
km2, the lattices span 428,127 km2. This is because the lattice is created to contain villages
and many areas in Northern Darfur are not populated. While the total size of the lattice
does not change, the number and and size of grid units within each panel varies. The key
goal is to create grids that have a sufficient number of villages within each unit to address
measurement error without losing precision in assignment to treatment in order to generate
a credible panel over time. Grids of varying sizes are created to conduct robustness checks
and ensure that results are not artefactual to any single grid construction.
To assess how many villages end up in a grid, figure B.3 plots the distribution of the
distance between any two closest villages in the left panel and expands this to measure the
distance between any village and its 3rd, 4th, and 5th closest village in the right panel.
Villages are relatively close to each other in the HIU dataset and suggest that grids can
remain relatively small and therefore not over-assign treatment to too many neighboring
villages.
Table B.3 enumerates the size and number of grids as well as the number of villages
within each grid for these panels. In general, panels are constructed at an average length of
10km with an average of 4.98 villages per grid.
Table B.3: Villages Per Grid Unit
Grid Length
(Km)




9 49,928 4.24 3.90
10 40,328 4.98 4.59
11 32,768 5.79 5.44
Note: This table enumerates the size and number of grids as well
as the number of villages within each grid for these panels.
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Figure B.3: Distance Between Villages







































Note: The left panel plots the average distance between each village and it’s next nearest neighbor in the
HIU dataset. The right panel plots the average distance between each village and the next 2, 3, 4, and 5
villages. Distance is in kilometers.
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B.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.4 presents descriptive statistics. The top panel reports descriptive statistics for
the full panel. The bottom panel reports descriptive statistics for the additional variables
used for matching.
Table B.4: Descriptive Statistics
Min Max Mean SD N
Panel Variables
Border 9.34 92,150 18,770 16,560.60 12,104
Road 3.12 54,200 7,589 7,739.36 12,104
Water 5.28 153,300 24,780 30,506.59 12,104
Airfield 1.87 226.80 63.12 32.89 12,104
Violence 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 12,104
Matching Variables
Violence(2003) 0.10 1.78 0.42 0.36 1,513
Violence(2004−2003) 0 1.00 0.18 0.38 1,513
Violence(2004) -1.00 1.00 0.02 0.51 1,513
Violence(2005−2004) 0 1.00 0.20 0.40 1,513
Violence(2005) -1.00 1.00 -0.13 0.42 1,513
Violence(2006−2005) 0 1.00 0.07 0.25 1,513
Violence(2006) -1.00 1.00 0.02 0.32 1,513
Violence(2007−2006) 0 1.00 0.09 0.29 1,513
Violence(2007) -1.00 1.00 -0.05 0.33 1,513
Proximity to Frontline (2007) 0 1.00 0.04 0.20 1,513
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics. Distances are in meters. Measures are
presented for grid 10 kilometers in length. Euclidean distances are reported for border, road,
water and airfield measures. Proximity to frontline is derived from a Cartesian minimum.
Violence is pooled across all years, which includes pre-treatment trends as well as post-
treatment outcomes in the top panel. Variables in the bottom panel are reshaped for the
matching procedure.
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B.5 Balance Assessment
Figure B.4 visualizes the standardized mean differences between monitored and unmon-
itored areas across the pre-treatment variables on which they are matched before and after
matching. Perfectly balanced matches would result in a standardized mean difference of
zero; therefore gains to matching are captured by the extent to which these differences ap-
proach zero relative to their non-matched difference. The figure demonstrates that there are
gains to matching across all variables except for the change in violence between 2007 and
2006 and 2005 and 2004.









































Violence (2007 − 2006)
Violence 2007
Dist Violence 2007
Note: This plot visualizes the standardized mean differences in non-matched (blue) and matched datasets
(pink) for pre-treatment variables. Results are presented for matching based on a treatment-to-control ratio
of 1:125.
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B.6 Robustness to Matching Ratios
Identifying the optimal treatment-to-control matching ratio remains a challenge because
there are marginal tradeoffs to balance across all covariates for different ratios. As such, I
analyze how robust the direct effect estimates are across all matching ratios between 1:100
- 1:150. For each grid size — 9, 10 and 11km — figure B.5 plots the point estimates and
standard errors across all matching ratios.
Figure B.5: Robustness to Treatment-to-Control Matching Ratios
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Note: These figures visualize the point estimates and standard errors for the direct effect of monitoring
across various treatment-to-control matching ratios.
The estimates remain stable and consistent across all matching ratios for each grid size.
Specifically, the mean β associated with the monitoring effect is .161, 1.58, and .156 for
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grid sizes 9, 10, and 11km respectively. The figures also visualize the negative correlation
between matching ratio and p-values: estimates with a matching ratio of 1:100 hover just
over statistical significance and become increasingly significant as the sample size increases.
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B.7 Lags and Leads Robustness Checks
Table B.5 reports balance across monitored and unmonitored areas for pre-treatment
variables that do not include pre-treatment levels or trends in violence. These latter vari-
ables are removed to avoid estimating effects over the variables that are used for matching.
The data is balanced across these variables, which include all of the selection criteria that
Amnesty used to determine program participation.
Table B.5: Balance Table for Re-Matched Lags-and-Leads Estimator
Treatment Control Dif P-Value
Border 14,666.41 17,087.61 -2,421.20 0.61
Road 12,539.81 7,741.58 4,798.23 0.39
Water 15,283.93 24,768.75 -9,484.82 0.34
Airfield 50.05 57.28 -7.23 0.37
Proximity to Frontline 2007 0.23 0.30 -0.07 0.32
Note: This table reports the balance across treatment and control areas for the re-
matched data used for the lags-and-leads estimator. Euclidean distances are reported
for border, road, water and airfield measures. Proximity to frontline is derived from a
Cartesian minimum. P -values reported derive from t-tests.
Table B.6 reports estimates for anticipation and persistence effects over matched frames
that use all variables, including pre-treatment trends and levels of violence. Results that
suggest the program generated persistent and pernicious effects do not change.
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Table B.6: Lags and Leads (Full Matches)
Matched Frames
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) 0.098 0.102 0.104
(0.098) (0.097) (0.094)
Lead (2005) 0.061 0.066 0.071
(0.101) (0.100) (0.097)
Lead (2006) 0.039 0.040 0.039
(0.101) (0.100) (0.097)
Monitoring Effect 0.198∗∗ 0.194∗ 0.190∗
(0.101) (0.100) (0.097)
Lag (2008) 0.226∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.209∗∗
(0.101) (0.100) (0.097)
Lag (2009) −0.060 −0.072 −0.081
(0.101) (0.100) (0.097)
Grid Size 9km 10km 11km
Year FEs X X X
Grid FEs X X X
N 10,080 10,080 10,080
R2 0.220 0.215 0.223
Note: This table reports results for the lags-and-leads es-
timator run on matched frames that include pre-treatment
levels and trends in violence. ∗ significant at p < .10;
∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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C.1 Neighborhoods Sampled
Table C.1 reports a listing of neighborhoods included in our random sample of Port-au-
Prince.
Table C.1: Neighborhoods Sampled
Bolosse, Bourdon, Caradeux, Carrefour 1, Carrefour 2,
Carrefour 3, Carrefour 4, Carrefour Clercine 1, Carrefour
Clercine 2, Champs de Mars, Cite Soleil, Drouillard,
Juvenat, Morne Cavaire, Peguyville, Petionville, Petite
Palace Cazeau, Meyotte, Sarthe, Zone Predailler
Note: This table reports a listing of the neighborhoods
in Port-au-Prince that enter our sample.
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C.2 Survey Mapping
Table C.2 presents the mapping of survey questions into variables used for analysis.
Table C.2: Measure Operationalization
Variable Survey Question
Effectiveness MINUSTAH is controlling the gangs. (4-point agreement scale)
Abusiveness MINUSTAH soldiers commit acts of violence against unarmed civilians. (4-point
agreement scale)
Benevolence MINUSTAH serves primarily the interests of the Haitian people vs. MINUSTAH




If a MINUSTAH soldier asked you for information, how likely it is that you would
give it to him? (4-point likelihood scale)
If your house was robbed, how likely is it that you would report the crime to MI-
NUSTAH? (4-point likelihood scale)
Crime Reporting If you or someone in your household suffered sexual violence, how likely is it that
you would report the crime to MINUSTAH? (4-point likelihood scale)
If you saw a corrupt act committed by a MINUSTAH soldier, how likely is it that
you would report the crime to MINUSTAH? (4-point likelihood scale)
PKO Patrols During the last month, how many times have you seen the Haitian National Police
conduct patrols in your neighborhood?
PKO Arrests During the last month, how many times have you seen the Haitian National Police
make arrests in your neighborhood?
HNP Patrols During the last month, how many times have you seen the Haitian National Police
conduct patrols in your neighborhood?
PKO Abuse During the last year, have you seen a peacekeeper stealing?
... unjustly use force or agress a civilian?
... abuse a woman?
... pay a girl or woman to have transactional sex?
Education What is the highest level of education you’ve attained?
Gender What is your gender?
Religion What is your religion?
Food Distribution During the last year, how many food distributions have you seen?
HNP Patrols During the last month, how many times have you seen the Haitian National Police
conduct patrols in your neighborhood?
HNP Arrests During the last month, how many times have you seen the Haitian National Police
make arrests in your neighborhood?
Note: This table presents the measures used to operationalize the key variables of interest.
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C.3 Mediation Analysis
We formally implemented the mediation framework proposed in Imai, Keele and Tingley
(2010); Imai et al. (2011). In this framework, let:
δ(t) ≡ Yi(t,Mi(1))− Yi(t,Mi(0)) (C.1)
ζ(t) ≡ Yi(1,Mi(t))− Yi(0,Mi(t)) (C.2)
where δ̄ is the average causal mediation effect (ACME) and ζ̄ is the average direct effect
(ADE); the sum of these two effects is the average treatment effect. Decomposing the average
treatment effect into these two components assess the relative importance of the mechanism
and the direct effects. In our application, we analyze how exposure to peacekeeping activities
shapes cooperative behavior by changing underlying individual beliefs.
Table C.3 presents results for the mediation analysis. The top panel assesses the relative
impact of beliefs on general information sharing and the bottom panel analyzes the impact of
beliefs on crime reporting. Point estimates are presented for the ACME, ADE and total effect
in each column by peacekeeping ‘treatment’ and p-values are presented in the parentheses
below.
Table C.3: Mediation Analysis
Effectiveness Abusiveness Benevolence
ACME ADE Total ACME ADE Total ACME ADE Total
PKO Security 0.027 0.119 0.146 -0.003 0.145 0.142 0.029 0.12 0.149
(0.032) (0.244) (0.148) (0.784) (0.136) (0.128) (0.168) (0.26) (0.14)
Information PKO Abuse -0.039 -0.09 -0.129 0.01 -0.139 -0.129 -0.028 -0.101 -0.129
Sharing (0.008) (0.2) (0.08) (0.724) (0.072) (0.056) (0.028) (0.152) (0.052)
PKO Relief 0.021 0.125 0.147 -0.002 0.152 0.149 0.027 0.128 0.156
(0.248) (0.332) (0.272) (0.872) (0.268) (0.272) (0.216) (0.312) (0.224)
PKO Security 0.017 0.101 0.118 0.014 0.098 0.112 0.012 0.104 0.115
(0.052) (0.28) (0.18) (0.216) (0.348) (0.28) (0.248) (0.308) (0.284)
Crime PKO Abuse -0.025 -0.066 -0.09 -0.03 -0.059 -0.09 -0.011 -0.078 -0.09
Reporting (0.028) (0.164) (0.036) (0.196) (0.18) (0.084) (0.116) (0.116) (0.052)
PKO Relief 0.014 0.312 0.326 0.005 0.318 0.323 0.011 0.316 0.327
(0.268) (0.012) (0.004) (0.688) (0.008) (0.004) (0.272) (0.004) (0)
Note: ps are in parentheses.
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C.4 Interaction Effects
Despite weak priors over the interactive effects between exposure to peacekeeping activ-
ities, we estimate them given the importance of identifying multiplicative effects. Table C.4
and table C.5 assess the impact of these interactions on individual beliefs and cooperation
respectively. See section 4.5.2 for a discussion of these results.
Table C.4: The Interactive Effect of Peackeeping Actvities on Beliefs
Effectiveness Abusiveness (Inverted) Benevolence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Intercept) 0.312∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.302∗∗ −0.714∗∗∗−0.682∗∗∗−0.685∗∗∗−0.150 −0.137 −0.142
(0.146) (0.143) (0.145) (0.137) (0.144) (0.142) (0.189) (0.198) (0.196)
PKO Security 0.195∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.130 0.179 0.138
(0.069) (0.072) (0.066) (0.083) (0.074) (0.069) (0.094) (0.117) (0.095)
PKO Abuse −0.220∗∗∗−0.230∗∗∗−0.196∗∗∗−0.459∗∗∗−0.434∗∗∗−0.494∗∗∗−0.129∗∗∗−0.114∗∗−0.145∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.049) (0.047) (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
PKO Relief 0.194∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.197∗∗ −0.008 −0.008 0.001 0.116∗ 0.112 0.115∗
(0.098) (0.094) (0.099) (0.123) (0.119) (0.134) (0.060) (0.071) (0.063)






Abuse × Relief 0.105∗∗ −0.142∗∗ −0.067
(0.047) (0.062) (0.070)
Controls X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X
N 458 458 458 460 460 460 458 458 458
R2 0.372 0.372 0.375 0.370 0.375 0.374 0.307 0.309 0.308
Note: This table presents results assessing the correlation between the interaction of PKO strategies
and individual beliefs. Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level; ∗ significant at p < .10;
∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. The dependent variable in models 1-3 is the respondent’s estimation of peace-
keeper’s effectiveness in providing security. In models 4-6 the dependent variable is the respondent’s
estimation of peacekeeper’s abusiveness towards Haitian civilians. This measure is inverted: low scores
represent high abusiveness while high scores represent low abusiveness. In models 7-9 the dependent
variable is the respondent’s estimation of the extent to which peacekeepers act in the interests of
Haitian civilians.
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Table C.5: The Interactive Effect of Peackeeping Actvities on Cooperation
Information Sharing Crime Reporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 0.331∗∗ 0.204 0.206 −0.187 0.090 0.092
(0.142) (0.187) (0.187) (0.141) (0.134) (0.134)
PKO Security 0.191∗ 0.177 0.198∗ 0.145∗ 0.072 0.127∗
(0.112) (0.132) (0.102) (0.083) (0.078) (0.072)
PKO Abuse −0.072 −0.127∗ −0.112∗ −0.075∗∗ −0.100∗∗ −0.073
(0.078) (0.076) (0.061) (0.033) (0.040) (0.048)
PKO Relief 0.308∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.289∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.105) (0.104) (0.113) (0.101) (0.101)
Security × Relief −0.053 −0.019
(0.057) (0.054)
Security × Abuse 0.025 0.060∗∗
(0.048) (0.026)
Abuse × Relief 0.030 0.039
(0.067) (0.044)
Controls X X X X X X
Neighborhood FEs X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X
Observations 483 481 481 443 441 441
R2 0.110 0.208 0.208 0.189 0.281 0.278
Note: This table presents results assessing the correlation between the interaction of PKO
strategies and cooperation. Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level; ∗ significant
at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. The dependent variable is willingness to share information
with peacekeepers in models 1-3 and willingness to report crimes to peacekeepers in models
4-6. The dependent variables and all exposure measures are standardized.
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C.5 Determinants of Expsoure
Table C.6 reports regression results for the determinants of exposure to peacekeeping
security, relief and abuse.
Table C.6: Determinants of Exposure to Peacekeeping
PKO Security PKO Abuse PKO Relief
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) −0.314∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗ −0.621∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.101) (0.072)
HNP Security 0.290∗∗∗ 0.076 0.008
(0.092) (0.076) (0.041)
Food Dist. 0.004 −0.014∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012)
Education 0.001 0.012∗ 0.0002
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Gender −0.007 −0.120∗ −0.056
(0.036) (0.068) (0.049)
Religion 0.094 0.023 0.027
(0.075) (0.055) (0.031)
Neighborhood FEs X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X
N 517 518 487
R2 0.504 0.217 0.826
Note: This table presents results assessing the determinants of exposure to
peacekeeping activities. Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood in
parentheses; ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01. The dependent
variable in model 1 is PKO Security, model 2 is PKO Abuse, and model 3 is
PKO Relief.
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C.6 Matching Estimates
Table C.7 reports results that analyze a matched and re-weighted frame on the impact
of peacekeeping security, table C.8 reports results for peacekeeping abuse, and table C.9
presents results for peacekeeping relief. Matching is conducted using a non-parametric co-
variate balancing propensity score procedure following Imai and Ratkovic (2014); Fong and
Imai (2014). In addition to the potential confounders used in the main regression analysis
also includes the other peacekeeping strategies.
Table C.7: Matching Estimates for PKO Security




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Intercept) −0.211 −0.811∗∗∗ −0.291 0.070 0.193
(0.241) (0.155) (0.229) (0.216) (0.164)
PKO Security 0.130 0.297∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.159
(0.140) (0.105) (0.131) (0.136) (0.102)
N 405 405 405 405 405
R2 0.410 0.452 0.327 0.294 0.329
Confounders X X X X X
Neighborhood FEs X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X
Note: This table presents an analysis that assesses the impact of PKO security using
a matching estimator. PKO security is matched on all potential confounders, including
exposure to peacekeeping relief and peacekeeping abuse. ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p <
.05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table C.8: Matching Estimates for PKO Abuse




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Intercept) 0.018 −0.746∗∗∗ −0.285 0.046 0.145
(0.195) (0.149) (0.209) (0.168) (0.140)
PKO Abuse −0.200∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.132∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.073) (0.047) (0.091) (0.036)
N 405 405 405 405 405
R2 0.372 0.431 0.350 0.217 0.285
Confounders X X X X X
Neighborhood FEs X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X
Note: This table presents an analysis that assesses the impact of PKO abuse using
a matching estimator. PKO abuse is matched on all potential confounders, including
exposure to peacekeeping security and peacekeeping relief. ∗ significant at p < .10;
∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
Table C.9: Matching Estimates for PKO Relief




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Intercept) 0.072 −0.775∗∗∗ −0.296 0.485∗∗∗ 0.131
(0.206) (0.222) (0.260) (0.128) (0.172)
PKO Relief 0.231 0.054 0.115 0.299∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.126) (0.164) (0.149) (0.127)
N 405 405 405 405 405
R2 0.403 0.416 0.333 0.278 0.308
Confounders X X X X X
Neighborhood FEs X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X
Note: This table presents an analysis that assesses the impact of PKO relief using
a matching estimator. PKO relief is matched on all potential confounders, including
exposure to peacekeeping security and peacekeeping abuse. ∗ significant at p < .10;
∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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C.7 Leave-One-Out Estimators
To ensure that no particular neighborhood is driving results, we implement a set of leave-
one-out estimators in which we re-estimate the core regressions dropping and then replacing
one neighborhood out of each regression. Table C.10, C.11, and C.12 present results for
beliefs over effectiveness, abusiveness, and benevolence respectively. Table C.13 and C.14
present results for information sharing and crime reporting.
Table C.10: Leave-One-Out Estimator: Belief over Effectiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0.306∗∗ 0.294∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.254∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗ 0.292∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.304∗∗
(0.142) (0.147) (0.134) (0.142) (0.145) (0.253) (0.141) (0.161) (0.138) (0.154)
PKO Security 0.180∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.130∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗
(0.070) (0.070) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.078) (0.070) (0.067) (0.069)
PKO Abuse −0.208∗∗∗−0.214∗∗∗−0.227∗∗∗−0.232∗∗∗−0.212∗∗∗−0.213∗∗∗−0.231∗∗∗−0.242∗∗∗−0.213∗∗∗−0.220∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.053) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.047) (0.055) (0.054)
PKO Relief 0.212∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.176∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.186∗ 0.181∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.157 0.191∗∗ 0.219∗∗
(0.090) (0.093) (0.097) (0.098) (0.095) (0.094) (0.099) (0.099) (0.096) (0.094)
N 431 439 435 435 439 433 429 434 437 431
R2 0.355 0.369 0.386 0.368 0.366 0.397 0.355 0.372 0.380 0.371
Confounders X X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X X
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(Intercept) 0.240∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.313∗∗ 0.312∗∗ 0.248∗ 0.238∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.347∗∗ 0.281∗∗ 0.300∗∗
(0.145) (0.146) (0.148) (0.156) (0.143) (0.132) (0.144) (0.149) (0.142) (0.146)
PKO Security 0.176∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗
(0.068) (0.093) (0.064) (0.065) (0.073) (0.068) (0.072) (0.071) (0.068) (0.070)
PKO Abuse −0.216∗∗∗−0.239∗∗∗−0.223∗∗∗−0.176∗∗∗−0.212∗∗∗−0.217∗∗∗−0.230∗∗∗−0.229∗∗∗−0.212∗∗∗−0.211∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.066) (0.052) (0.047) (0.055) (0.052) (0.054) (0.050) (0.055) (0.049)
PKO Relief 0.125 0.188∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.191∗ 0.119 0.192∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.204∗∗ 0.186∗∗
(0.114) (0.098) (0.088) (0.100) (0.096) (0.096) (0.094) (0.089) (0.093) (0.092)
N 440 427 438 432 433 440 443 433 435 438
R2 0.381 0.352 0.379 0.351 0.358 0.372 0.371 0.407 0.379 0.390
Confounders X X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Note: This table presents an analysis that assesses the correlation between PKO activities and in-
dividual beliefs over effectiveness dropping one and then replacing one neighborhood in each column.
Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood in parentheses; ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05;
∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table C.11: Leave-One-Out Estimator: Beliefs over Abusiveness (Inverted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) −0.729∗∗∗−0.719∗∗∗−0.737∗∗∗−0.750∗∗∗−0.731∗∗∗−0.959∗∗∗−0.797∗∗∗−0.819∗∗∗−0.685∗∗∗−0.650∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.171) (0.183) (0.180) (0.169) (0.298) (0.158) (0.161) (0.165) (0.167)
PKO Security 0.199∗ 0.182∗ 0.159∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.187∗ 0.202∗ 0.174 0.207∗ 0.190∗ 0.198∗
(0.107) (0.105) (0.093) (0.078) (0.105) (0.111) (0.110) (0.107) (0.109) (0.105)
PKO Abuse −1.000∗∗∗−1.113∗∗∗−1.036∗∗∗−1.085∗∗∗−0.978∗∗∗−1.041∗∗∗−0.953∗∗∗−1.052∗∗∗−1.137∗∗∗−1.071∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.239) (0.228) (0.239) (0.219) (0.238) (0.215) (0.222) (0.244) (0.224)
PKO Relief 0.051 0.054 0.078 0.003 0.049 0.064 −0.038 0.049 0.058 0.077
(0.115) (0.113) (0.101) (0.118) (0.108) (0.112) (0.097) (0.109) (0.111) (0.102)
N 426 433 428 428 432 425 424 429 431 424
R2 0.312 0.317 0.309 0.333 0.315 0.310 0.324 0.323 0.327 0.295
Confounders X X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X X
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(Intercept) −0.722∗∗∗−0.708∗∗∗−0.724∗∗∗−0.693∗∗∗−0.723∗∗∗−0.699∗∗∗−0.705∗∗∗−0.798∗∗∗−0.748∗∗∗−0.757∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.170) (0.173) (0.189) (0.175) (0.185) (0.170) (0.165) (0.172) (0.165)
PKO Security 0.206∗∗ 0.161 0.171∗ 0.199∗ 0.193∗ 0.192∗ 0.199∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.194∗ 0.224∗∗
(0.103) (0.132) (0.100) (0.109) (0.100) (0.105) (0.108) (0.096) (0.105) (0.104)
PKO Abuse −1.063∗∗∗−0.997∗∗∗−1.057∗∗∗−1.004∗∗∗−1.168∗∗∗−1.065∗∗∗−1.086∗∗∗−1.116∗∗∗−1.093∗∗∗−1.072∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.262) (0.227) (0.230) (0.232) (0.225) (0.229) (0.220) (0.245) (0.221)
PKO Relief 0.058 0.057 0.071 0.039 0.052 0.051 0.059 0.075 0.030 0.019
(0.107) (0.110) (0.102) (0.117) (0.137) (0.111) (0.107) (0.105) (0.113) (0.105)
N 435 420 434 427 429 434 438 428 430 433
R2 0.320 0.307 0.310 0.295 0.341 0.306 0.313 0.359 0.315 0.342
Confounders X X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Note: This table presents an analysis that assesses the correlation between PKO activities and in-
dividual beliefs over abusiveness dropping one and then replacing one neighborhood in each column.
Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood in parentheses; ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05;
∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table C.12: Leave-One-Out Estimator: Beliefs over Benevolence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) −0.135 −0.142 −0.057 −0.105 −0.170 −0.039 −0.115 −0.155 −0.144 −0.097
(0.208) (0.208) (0.195) (0.205) (0.206) (0.327) (0.205) (0.232) (0.207) (0.214)
PKO Security 0.115 0.110 0.155 0.195 0.123 0.118 0.082 0.124 0.117 0.129
(0.100) (0.094) (0.103) (0.133) (0.095) (0.095) (0.079) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097)
PKO Abuse −0.406∗∗−0.519∗∗−0.480∗∗−0.336∗ −0.473∗∗−0.444∗∗−0.524∗∗∗−0.458∗∗−0.567∗∗∗−0.458∗∗
(0.193) (0.207) (0.197) (0.175) (0.201) (0.203) (0.196) (0.195) (0.182) (0.193)
PKO Relief 0.139∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.135∗∗
(0.067) (0.060) (0.055) (0.066) (0.060) (0.059) (0.064) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060)
N 424 432 425 426 431 422 424 427 429 424
R2 0.307 0.289 0.295 0.330 0.300 0.303 0.306 0.288 0.321 0.294
Confounders X X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X X
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(Intercept) −0.159 −0.162 −0.192 −0.114 −0.171 −0.201 −0.140 −0.309∗∗−0.145 −0.169
(0.223) (0.218) (0.210) (0.214) (0.205) (0.225) (0.204) (0.146) (0.205) (0.204)
PKO Security 0.124 0.174 0.108 0.128 0.158∗ 0.128 0.087 0.117 0.126 0.111
(0.093) (0.125) (0.093) (0.101) (0.092) (0.095) (0.084) (0.092) (0.096) (0.096)
PKO Abuse −0.471∗∗−0.437∗ −0.459∗∗−0.474∗∗−0.444∗ −0.466∗∗−0.409∗∗−0.453∗∗−0.496∗∗−0.428∗∗
(0.195) (0.231) (0.190) (0.212) (0.235) (0.193) (0.183) (0.194) (0.204) (0.194)
PKO Relief 0.142∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.106∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗
(0.081) (0.060) (0.058) (0.059) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059)
HNP Security −0.135∗∗−0.168∗∗−0.127∗ −0.145∗∗−0.145∗ −0.150∗∗−0.123∗ −0.150∗∗−0.137∗∗−0.124∗
(0.068) (0.071) (0.066) (0.069) (0.076) (0.070) (0.066) (0.070) (0.068) (0.067)
Observations 427 419 429 425 427 433 435 429 430 432
R2 0.291 0.294 0.298 0.289 0.301 0.307 0.303 0.333 0.292 0.347
Confounders X X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Note: This table presents an analysis that assesses the correlation between PKO activities and in-
dividual beliefs over benevolence dropping one and then replacing one neighborhood in each column.
Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood in parentheses; ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05;
∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table C.13: Leave-One-Out Estimator: Information Sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0.294 0.264 0.368∗∗ 0.274 0.257 0.162 0.315∗ 0.145 0.227 0.290
(0.182) (0.191) (0.157) (0.195) (0.189) (0.382) (0.183) (0.174) (0.190) (0.206)
PKO Security 0.187∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.194∗ 0.116 0.194∗ 0.184∗ 0.200∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.188∗ 0.190∗
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.099) (0.102) (0.104) (0.100) (0.105) (0.099)
PKO Abuse −0.128 −0.357 −0.284 −0.405∗ −0.325 −0.310 −0.327 −0.302 −0.295 −0.296
(0.163) (0.244) (0.223) (0.223) (0.234) (0.238) (0.236) (0.218) (0.249) (0.227)
PKO Relief 0.259∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.254∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.225∗∗ 0.238∗∗
(0.110) (0.110) (0.108) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.116) (0.103) (0.100) (0.104)
HNP Security 0.055 0.056 0.050 0.071 0.072 0.082 0.057 0.085 0.081 0.070
(0.078) (0.076) (0.068) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.076) (0.070)
N 447 453 447 449 453 445 446 447 453 444
R2 0.202 0.200 0.215 0.201 0.196 0.212 0.199 0.212 0.201 0.216
Confounders X X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X X
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(Intercept) 0.115 0.155 0.190 0.198 0.235 0.128 0.148 0.153 0.189 0.175
(0.209) (0.202) (0.201) (0.208) (0.187) (0.206) (0.192) (0.210) (0.198) (0.198)
PKO Security 0.198∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.182∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.189∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.158∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.103) (0.088) (0.099) (0.100) (0.103) (0.098) (0.100) (0.095)
PKO Abuse −0.290 −0.335 −0.292 −0.172 −0.300 −0.278 −0.278 −0.290 −0.269 −0.277
(0.222) (0.263) (0.226) (0.199) (0.244) (0.222) (0.216) (0.217) (0.250) (0.228)
PKO Relief 0.195 0.230∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.257∗∗
(0.128) (0.107) (0.105) (0.103) (0.091) (0.109) (0.108) (0.110) (0.104) (0.104)
N 450 441 450 447 450 454 458 449 451 453
R2 0.208 0.209 0.208 0.219 0.225 0.218 0.219 0.202 0.200 0.201
Confounders X X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Note: This table presents an analysis that assesses the correlation between PKO activities and in-
dividual willingness to share information dropping one and then replacing one neighborhood in each
column. Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood in parentheses; ∗ significant at p < .10;
∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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Table C.14: Leave-One-Out Estimator: Crime Reporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Intercept) 0.073 0.136 0.046 0.038 0.100 0.733∗∗∗ 0.063 0.143 0.039 0.114
(0.139) (0.122) (0.143) (0.139) (0.136) (0.267) (0.144) (0.127) (0.134) (0.135)
PKO Security 0.118∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.136∗ 0.083 0.129∗∗ 0.130∗ 0.115∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.122∗ 0.118∗
(0.061) (0.064) (0.070) (0.071) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.063)
PKO Abuse −0.035 −0.108 −0.135 −0.243∗ −0.099 −0.147 −0.134 −0.128 −0.144 −0.145
(0.152) (0.192) (0.165) (0.138) (0.167) (0.179) (0.163) (0.166) (0.173) (0.162)
PKO Relief 0.306∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.082) (0.103) (0.104) (0.098) (0.100) (0.113) (0.098) (0.103) (0.101)
Observations 409 414 412 413 414 411 406 413 413 410
R2 0.279 0.285 0.263 0.295 0.260 0.260 0.264 0.252 0.267 0.292
Confounders X X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X X
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
(Intercept) 0.226∗ 0.212 0.226∗ 0.220∗ 0.162 0.219 0.230∗ 0.198 0.186 0.222∗
(0.125) (0.130) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.134) (0.128) (0.138) (0.127) (0.129)
PKO Security 0.121∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.118∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.115∗ 0.124∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.125∗
(0.061) (0.058) (0.066) (0.065) (0.069) (0.062) (0.061) (0.064) (0.062) (0.065)
PKO Abuse −0.261∗∗∗−0.290∗∗∗−0.268∗∗∗−0.249∗∗∗−0.271∗∗∗−0.261∗∗∗−0.274∗∗∗−0.265∗∗∗−0.243∗∗∗−0.252∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.084) (0.080) (0.083) (0.085) (0.084) (0.078) (0.073) (0.080) (0.080)
PKO Relief 0.297∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.112) (0.100) (0.106) (0.107) (0.104) (0.099) (0.098) (0.108) (0.103)
N 417 402 414 412 412 415 420 412 412 415
R2 0.268 0.256 0.257 0.262 0.267 0.283 0.274 0.273 0.273 0.256
Confounders X X X X X X X X X X
Neighborhood
FEs
X X X X X X X X X X
Enumerator FEs X X X X X X X X X X
Note: This table presents an analysis that assesses the correlation between PKO activities and indi-
vidual willingness to report crimes dropping one and then replacing one neighborhood in each column.
Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood in parentheses; ∗ significant at p < .10; ∗∗p < .05;
∗∗∗p < .01.
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C.8 Sensitivity Analysis
One empirical concern is that unobserved heterogeneity may drive our results. In this
section we use an approach based on Oster (2014) that identifies the size of such unob-
served confounding factors that would be necessary to fully explain the significance of the
coefficients on our variables of interest.
Our original model used to estimate the effect of exposure to peacekeepers on both beliefs
and willingness to cooperate is:
Yije = αj + β1Si + β2Ri + β3Ai + φX
′
i + λe + εije
To simplify notation, include all observed confounders multiplied by their coefficients
in a vector W1 and isolate one of the three types of exposure as the treatment variable of
interest:
Y = βS +W1 + ε
We modify the equation to include a vector of unobserved confounding factors W2 mul-
tiplied by their coefficients:
Y = βS +W1 + W̃2 + ε
First, we assume that cov(W1,W2) = 0 and that var(X) = 1. Second, we invoke
the proportional selection assumption that δ σ1Xσ11 =
σ2X
σ22 where σ1X = cov(W1, X), σii =
var(Wi), where δ is the proportionality coefficient. Oster (2014) demonstrates that we
can identify the true β based primarily on the coefficients and R-squared values from the
regressions of Y on S with and without any observed coefficients. For values of δ close to 1:
β = β̃ − δ[β̇ − β̃] 1− R̃
R̃− Ṙ
where β̃ → β + λW2|X,W1 and β̇ → β + λW1|X + λW2|X when λY |X is the population
analog of the coefficient on X from a regression of Y on X.
To test the sensitivity of these coefficients, we vary levels of δ. Note that this test assumes
a maximum R-squared value that can be explained by the regression including both observed
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and unobserved confounders. Oster (2014) recommends using a maximum R-squared of 2.2×
Ṙ, the R-squared of the model with all observed confounders. Alternatively, the maximum
R-squared could be set to 1, the maximum possible value of R-squared in any regression. In
our analysis below, we set the maximum R-squared to the recommended 2.2 × Ṙ and vary
the value of δ over [0, 2]. Here we examine the robustness of our main coefficients of interest
from the regressions on beliefs and behavior to unobserved heterogeneity.
Figure C.1 displays results for the nine coefficients of interest in our analysis of beliefs
about peacekeepers. Figure C.2 displays the original and corrected coefficient for the six
main coefficients of interest in our analysis of the correlates of cooperation. Each graph
displays the parameter δ along the x-axis and the coefficient on the variable of interest along
the y-axis. The red line shows the original β estimate, with the original 95% confidence
interval shown by the shaded red area. The blue line shows the bias-corrected β estimate
under the assumption of varying levels of δ. Each graph also displays the assumed R-squared
under the full specification with observed and unobserved confounders, which we have set
at 2.2× Ṙ as described above. The confidence intervals on the corrected β’s are generated
through bootstrapping.
There are two criteria for assessing sensitivity to unobserved heterogeneity. First, if the
observed confounders make the β estimate fall closer to zero, one can assess when the sign
of the β estimate changes. Alternatively, if the β is increasing in magnitude with δ, one can
identify the point at which the corrected β falls outside of the 95% confidence interval of
the original estimate as the limit of the robustness of the estimate.
We find different levels of robustness across our different outcomes. We first assess ro-
bustness over cooperation and then beliefs. In the analysis of the correlates of cooperation
with peacekeepers presented in Figure C.2, the coefficient on exposure to security activities
is robust up to and beyond δ = 2 with respect to both cooperative outcome measures. The
coefficient on exposure to abuse, however, is robust to δ = 1.4 or δ = 1.8 in the regressions
of general information sharing and crime reporting, respectively. The coefficients on relief
are robust up to δ = 1.9 and δ = 1.1. These results mean that the coefficient on exposure to
security is robust to including coefficients that are twice as strong as the individual level con-
trols and fixed effects (enumerator and neighborhood) that we included in our specifications.
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Figure C.1: Sensitivity in analysis of beliefs















































































































































































































Note: These figures visualize the robustness of the results on beliefs about peacekeepers following the
procedure outlined in Oster (2014).
The coefficients on abuse and relief, however, are less robust, although in both cases adding
controls (under the proportional selection assumption) moves the coefficients farther from
zero. Oster (2014) recommends that δ = 1 is a logical standard for robustness, as researchers
will often choose the most important factors to measure and include as confounders. Our
coefficients on the correlates of cooperation with peacekeepers are robust by that standard,
suggesting that these results are unlikely to be driven by unobserved heterogeneity.
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Turning to the beliefs outcomes in Figure C.1, we find similar but slightly less con-
sistent support for our results using this sensitivity analysis. The results on effectiveness
beliefs (Column 1 of Figure C.1) show that the coefficients on security and relief exposure
are largely unaffected by the potential unobserved heterogeneity that we consider, but the
coefficient on abuse just passes the δ = 1 threshold. With respect to abusiveness, we find
that the coefficient on security exposure is not robust to unobserved heterogeneity (although
if anything this analysis suggests that we are underestimating the relationship), while the
coefficients on exposure to abuse and relief pass the test. Finally, in the far right column, we
see that the coefficients from the analysis of benevolence beliefs are the least robust, with
both the coefficients on security and abuse exposure failing to pass the threshold.
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Figure C.2: Sensitivity in analysis of willingness to cooperate










































































































































Note: These figures visualize the robustness of the results on willingness to cooperate following the procedure
outlined in Oster (2014).
